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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores British direct investment in Russia 1892-1914, in order to 
answer the following research question: to what extent did the Russian government 
adhere to the rule of law and regulations in its relationship with British business 
interests undertaking foreign direct investment in Russia?  
In order to answer these research questions, this thesis begins by analysing Russian 
commercial law and economic policy towards foreign companies before 1914. It 
finds that Russian commercial law legislated for a high level of arbitrary control over 
foreign companies by multiple sections of the Russian government. On the other 
hand, economic policy changed between 1900 and 1904 towards more lawful 
regulation of the affairs of foreign companies. 
It then analyses patterns of British investment in Russia and investor perceptions of 
the Russian market. It finds that British investment between 1892 and 1914 can be 
divided into two distinct phases either side of the industrial downturn of 1900-1904, 
with more modern and dynamic investment patterns in the latter period. Russia was 
seen to be profitable purely because of the natural resources found there as opposed 
to Russian government policy.  
Finally, this thesis examines incidences of conflict between British business interests 
and the Russian government. It finds that the shift in government policy towards 
closer regulation after 1900-1904 was reflected in how it dealt with the provision of 
redress for British companies, although considerations of state interests over the rule 
of law resulted in British companies being unable to form stable assumptions about 
the Russian government. 
Taken as a whole, these findings indicate that although the Russian government 
attempted to reform its relationship with foreign capitalists over the period 1892-
1914, its efforts produced little effect on British business interests, who displayed 
little trust in the Russian government to follow regulations and the rule of law.  
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Introduction 
 
The influx of foreign capital into Russia during the 1890s is usually associated with 
Sergei Witte’s policies to encourage foreign investment as the Minister of Finance 
from 1892 to 1903, such as tariff reform and the attainment of the gold standard. As 
a result, it is estimated that foreign investment in Russia increased from 214.7 
million roubles in 1890 to 911 million roubles by 1900, and reached 2,000 million 
roubles before the outbreak of the First World War.1 In contrast, this thesis will argue 
that the economic incentives offered by the Russian government formed only a part 
of the experience of foreign companies in the Russian business environment, and that 
alongside these policies there was an equally important change in the relationship 
between foreign businesses interests and the Russian government. This occurred 
through gradual change throughout the period 1892-1914 in the way in which the 
Russian government adhered to legal norms and regulations in its treatment of 
foreign business interests, despite significant continuities in the general structure of 
Russian commercial law. 
 
Closer analysis of the pattern of British foreign investment in Russia from 1892 to 
1914 shows that foreign direct investment was not solely determined by the 
economic policies of Witte; British investment shows a more pronounced disparity 
with Russia’s economic policies. The major influx in British investment occurred 
from 1900, and it was only at this point that British companies in Russia began to 
adopt more modern financial structures, such as the publicly listed joint-stock 
company, and abandon the traditional family-orientated management and financial 
structure.2 These patterns contrast substantially to the pattern of French investment, 
which only substantially increased after 1894 in response to the industrial boom in 
France and the political stimuli of the Franco-Russian entente.3 
 
                                                          
1 John McKay, ‘Foreign Enterprise in Russian and Soviet Industry: a Long Term Perspective’ BHR 
Vol. 48, No. 3 (1974), 345; Pioneers for Profit. Foreign Entrepreneurship and Russian 
Industrialisation, (London: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 25; statistics from M. Falkus, The 
Industrialisation of Russia, 1700-1914 (London: Macmillan, 1970), 70. 
2 N. Gurushina and I. Potkina, ‘‘Angliiskie kapitaly i chastnoe predprinimatel’stvo v Rossii’, in B. 
Bovykin (ed.), Inostrannoe predprinimatelʹstvo i zagranichnye investitsii v Rossii (Moscow: 
ROSSPEN, 1997), 107-108. 
3 Olga Crisp, Studies in the Russian Economy before 1914 (London: Macmillan, 1976), 159. 
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The pattern of British investment also does not adhere to the economic cycle of 
Russia, given that the period 1900 to 1906 was marked by a significant industrial 
decline, especially in the extractive industries that were a major recipient of British 
capital.4 The thawing of Anglo-Russian relations towards the outbreak of the First 
World War will be explored below, but at the time of the significant influx of British 
investment into Russia Anglo-Russian relations had not improved, and did not do so 
significantly until the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese war in 1905.5 British 
investment in Russia was therefore sensitive to changes beyond those of Tsarist 
macro-economic policy, economic cycles and diplomatic relations, and therefore 
represents an important component for the study of the Russian government’s 
relationship with foreign industrial interests. 
 
Through study of this relationship, this thesis will investigate the extent to which the 
Russian government fostered a stable business environment through adherence to the 
rule of law and defined legal standards. Firstly, it will set out the commercial legal 
framework in Russia, and how it applied to British companies operating in Russia. 
Secondly, it attempts to map out the geographical pattern of British investment in 
Russia through the use of British consular reports and stock market data in order to 
identify geographical trends in British penetration of the Russian market. It will then 
attempt to establish how Russian economic policies and the Russian government 
more generally fostered perceptions among British businesses about the Russian 
business environment, through an analysis of British financial and business literature, 
and their use of British diplomatic and consular services. Finally, it investigates the 
extent to which the Russian government adhered to the rule of law through an 
analysis of how British diplomats and consuls acted on behalf of British business 
interests, the successfulness of British companies in gaining redress from the Russian 
government, and the legal and structural precautions taken by British companies 
investing in the Russian market. 
 
As the following literature review indicates, British businesses in Russia possessed a 
strong knowledge of the Russian market, and possessed increasingly strong links to 
                                                          
4 Peter Gatrell, The Tsarist Economy 1850-1917 (London: Batsford, 1986), 167. 
5 Keith Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar: British Policy and Russia, 1894-1917 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1995), 268. 
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the Russian government. British companies tended to undertake investment as a 
result of pre-existing trade relationships with Russia, and were more likely than their 
international counterparts to maintain managerial control over their investments. At 
the same time, changes in the diplomatic service towards professionalism and 
concern with commercial assistance, as well as the thawing of diplomatic relations 
between Britain and Russia, meant that British companies had access to a group of 
knowledgeable officials with increasingly strong connections within the Russian 
government. The relationship between British business interests and the Russian 
government therefore forms an important part of the wider picture of state tutelage of 
Russian industry, and the emergence of cooperation or conflict between the Russian 
government and the emerging Russian civil society. 
 
Chapter 1 will outline the basis of Russian corporation law and economic policy, 
which formed the basis of Russian government interaction with foreign companies. 
Chapter 2 will look at how Russian economic policy concerning foreign companies 
changed over the period in question, in order to analyse changes in the Russian 
government’s priorities and attitudes towards foreign investment, as well as the legal 
and policy basis of its relationship with them. Chapter 3 examines the structure of 
British investment, charting the development of British investment in Russia over the 
time period, by the number of companies, their corporate structures, and the 
industries in which they were engaged in. Chapter 4 looks at how Russian 
investments were portrayed in the British financial press, in order to assess the effect 
of the Russian government’s interaction with foreign business on the perceptions of 
British companies, as well as some of the preconceptions that these companies may 
have had when undertaking these investments.  Chapter 5 investigates how these 
preconceptions worked in practice when British companies attempted to use the 
British diplomatic and consular service in order to protect or further their interests in 
their dealings with the Russian government. Finally, chapter 6 seeks to examine how 
the Russian government engaged with British businesses in disputes between itself 
and these companies, in order to understand whether the Russian government 
became more consistent in its approach to foreign companies before 1914. 
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i. British direct investment in Russia before 1914 
 
In order to illustrate that the study of British assumptions about the Russian regime 
will yield valid conclusions about the development of legal standards and 
accountability in the Russian government’s dealings with business interests, this 
section addresses three key questions. Firstly, to what extent does the current 
literature suggest that investment decisions were based upon informed assumptions 
of the profitability of Russian enterprises, or based upon wider stereotypes and 
beliefs about the Russian business environment? Secondly, to what extent did British 
business interests retain control through ownership over their Russian investments, 
and thus have sound commercial knowledge of Russia? Finally, where this control 
can be established, did British businesses retain adequate managerial control over 
their investments? 
 
 
The export of British capital overseas 
The assumption that attracted British firms to Russia in the first place was that 
returns from investment in Russia would in general be higher than exporting to 
Russia. The current literature suggests that this assumption was often the result of 
experience through a previous export relationship with the Russian market, and the 
fact that British capital was simultaneously ‘pushed’ out of Britain by low domestic 
returns, and ‘pulled’ overseas by higher returns in less industrialized economies. 
Recent revisions of investment decisions by British multinationals have also 
highlighted the importance of information about the destination of investment in 
investment decisions. This section also compares existing literature on the 
perceptions of Russia among British companies and wider society. 
 
Early research into the flow of British capital abroad before 1914 suggested two 
different models for explaining the outflow of capital from Britain before 1914. The 
first theory, originating from a contemporary study by the statistician John Hobson, 
suggested that due to the pace of British industrialization, British savings increased 
while the outlets for, and returns from, domestic investment decreased. This had the 
10 
 
effect of ‘pushing’ British capital abroad.6 Conversely, a second school of thought 
holds that capital was exported from Britain because technological superiority over 
competitors in developing economies would prevent falls in rates of return, thus 
‘pulling’ British capital abroad.7  Research into the development of British 
multinational enterprises conducted in the 1980s concluded that companies decided 
to undertake foreign investment when it had an advantage over foreign domestic 
companies, such as access to cheap capital, technology, market skills and managing 
ability.8 The ‘push’ theory has been recently revaluated by Rota and Schettio, who 
find that British FDI responded more significantly to falls in British GDP than 
portfolio investment by moving abroad, but within a pre-existing network of 
international trade which entails a significant bias in favour of the profitability of the 
destination of the capital.9 Therefore, for both schools of thought the profitability of 
the foreign investment destination played a significant role in investment decisions. 
 
As Rota and Schettio suggest, prior experience of a particular overseas market was 
an important determinant for British FDI decisions. Earlier analysis of the investment 
decisions of British multinationals suggests that information about overseas markets 
before 1914 was often obtained as a result of a pre-existing export relationship with 
the host market. British manufacturing companies from 1880 commonly followed the 
model whereby firms would dispatch commercial travelers to gain information about 
a particular market, establish branch offices, and finally establish production plants 
in order to ensure supply and maximize efficiency.10 Recently, this approach has also 
been applied to the retail industry.11 
 
                                                          
6 P. Cotrell, British Overseas Investment in the Nineteenth Century (London: Macmillan, 1975), 27. 
7 M. Edelstein, ‘Foreign Investment, Accumulation and Empire 1860-1914’, in P. Mathias and M. 
Postan (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History of Europe Vol. 7, The Industrial Economies: Capital, 
Labour, and Enterprise (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 196, Overseas Investment in 
the Age of High Imperialism, 73. 
8 G. Jones, ‘Origins, Management and Performance’, in G. Jones (ed.), British Multinationals: 
Origins, Management and Performance (Aldershot: Gower Publishing, 1986), 6.  
9 M. Rota and F. Schettio, ‘The Long-run Determinants of British Capital Exports, 1870-1913’, 
Financial History Review vol. 18 (2011), 53, 67. 
10 A. Chandler, ‘The Growth of the Transnational Industrial Firm in the United States and the United 
Kingdom: A comparative Analysis’, EHR, vol. 33, no. 3 (1980), 401; S. Nicholas, ‘Agency Contracts, 
Institutional Modes and the Transition to Foreign Direct Investment by British Manufacturing 
Multinationals Before 1939’, The Journal of Economic History, vol. 43, no. 3 (1983), 677-83. 
11 N. Alexander, ‘British Overseas Retailing, 1900-60: International Firm Characteristics, Market 
Selection and Entry Modes’, Business History, vol. 53, no. 4 (2011), 533. 
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Recent research into investment decisions of British multinationals before 1914 has 
shown that a company’s preexisting information about the target market was also a 
determining factor behind investment decisions. As a result, due to its familiar laws, 
administration and customs, the British empire received a disproportionate amount of 
investment from Britain.12 This approach has also been applied to British merchant 
houses that diversified their interests into production and extractive industries in the 
period. These merchant houses took advantage of their market knowledge and 
contacts with resource owners from previous financing and shipping activities in 
order to establish overseas ventures, especially in Russia where trade was previously 
dominated by a small group of British merchant houses led by the Cattleys, and 
including other families such as the Hubbards and the Cazalets.13 
 
In Russia, McKay has demonstrated the importance of Russian government 
propaganda that cultivated a favorable investment image of Russia in the investment 
decisions of foreign multinationals, which promoted the image of the potential for 
foreign firms to make large profits in Russia.14 However, Carsten’s study of British 
industrial enterprise in the textile and agricultural machinery industries indicates that 
companies extended their manufacturing operations to Russia in order to exploit 
markets already known to them, rather than due to encouragement from the Tsarist 
government.15 Similarly, Gurushina and Potkina have recently argued that British 
enterprises in Russia across all its different organizational forms and sectors were the 
logical results of long standing trade ties with Russia.16 It has also recently been 
argued that many free-standing British companies in Russia often represented one 
facet of a much larger investment group, often arranged around existing shipping or 
                                                          
12 G. Magee, Empire and Globalisation: Networks of People, Goods and Capital in the British World, 
1850-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 182. 
13Julia Mahnke-Devlin, Britische Migration nach Russland im 19. Jahrhundert: Integration – Kultur – 
Alltagsleben (Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz Verlag, 2005) 46-55; Jones, Merchants to Multinationals: 
British Trading Companies in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), 45-9, 54; S. Chapman, The Rise of Merchant Banking (London: George Allen & Unwin, 
2010), 144. 
14 McKay, Pioneers for Profit. Foreign Entrepreneurship and Russian Industrialisation, 1885-1913. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19707), 8. 
15 F. Carsten, ‘Foreign Participation in Russian Economic Life: Notes on British Enterprise, 1865-
1914’, in G. Guroff and F. Carsten (eds.), Entrepreneurship in Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 158. 
16 Gurushina and Potkina, ‘‘Angliiskie kapitaly i chastnoe predprinimatel’stvo v Rossii’, 108. 
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trading companies with an existing relationship with the Russian market.17 This 
pattern is repeated in the oil industry. Although British capital only moved in to 
Russian oilfields in large amounts around 1900, British connections with Russian oil 
interests, in areas such as shipping and procurement predated this date.18 
 
While the formation of these assumptions through experience could be seen as the 
norm for British companies operating in Russia, other research indicates that wider 
societal perception of a host country played an important part in investment decisions 
made by British companies. A recent approach to studying foreign investment 
decisions in terms of information asymmetries asserts that the role of the press in 
relaying important news on political developments within the host country played an 
important role in investment decisions, and that bad press often decreased the amount 
of British capital that would enter a particular country. 19 
 
British perceptions of Russia during the period in question has received scholarly 
attention, as there were several significant changes. In particular, Neilson has 
documented how late nineteenth century adventure and spy novels feature the 
recurring theme of an arbitrary Russian regime in its treatment of foreign spies, and 
was portrayed as the antithesis of everything English.20 Recurring literary tropes 
existed such as the close association of Siberia with the brutal Tsarist penal system.21 
Although terrorism was not seen as legitimate in Britain, there were marked 
sympathies shown for the actions of Russian anarchists due to the repressive nature 
of the Russian regime.22 Politically, Russia was viewed as the antithesis of British 
values, and closer relations with Russia in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese war 
were virulently opposed by the radical section of the Liberal Party, as well as in 
                                                          
17 Jones, ‘British Overseas Banks as Free-standing Companies, 1830-1996.’ The Free Standing 
Company in the World Economy, 1830-1996 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 
345. 
18 G. Jones, The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry (London: Macmillan, 1991), 53. 
19 Magee, Empire and Globalisation, 188. 
20 Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar, 91-3; L. Magill, ‘Joseph Conrad: Russia and England’, Albion 
Vol. 3, No. 1 (1971): 3-8. 
21 Collins, ‘British Interest and Interests in Siberia, 1900-1922’ Revolutionary Russia Vol. 9, No. 2 
(1996), 207. 
22  Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar, 88; M. Hughes, ‘British Opinion and Russian Terrorism in the 
1880’s,’ European History Quarterly Vol. 41, (2011), 255-77. 
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certain regions, such as Tyneside, which demonstrated a particular anti-Russian 
political trend from the accession of Alexander III. 23 
 
Other approaches have highlighted how British perceptions of Russia seem to have 
improved somewhat over the period in question. While the surge in popularity of 
Russian cultural exports in the period may well have coincided with an increased 
interest in Russia among members of high society, travel literature presents a wider 
reimagining of Russia, such as Stephen Graham’s works such as Undiscovered 
Russia, which emphasized the Russian peasant’s underlying godliness, as opposed to 
the traditional focus upon Tsarist tyranny.24 However from these surveys of both 
negative and positive British stereotypes about Russia, it is difficult to extrapolate the 
perception that British investors held about Russia, beyond Neilson’s assertion that 
Russia’s image improved among this group with the dispatch of the commercial 
attaché to Russia and the founding of the Anglo-Russian chamber of commerce in 
1908.25 
 
Other studies into British direct investment in Russia have highlighted negative 
attitudes held by British business interests in the Russian environment that can be 
compartmentalized into problems caused by the Russian legal system. There is little 
to link these perceptions with the somewhat broader perceptions of Russian 
arbitrariness and savagery found in wider British society. In a study of British 
business interests in Russian Asia, White has argued that British business interests 
missed important business opportunities due to an aversion to Russian investments 
that arose as a result of the tangle of prohibitive laws and the confusing 
administration, as opposed to a perception that the authorities were acting against the 
rule of law in a similar manner to the liberal opponents of the Russian regime in 
Britain. 26 
 
                                                          
23 David Saunders, ‘Tyneside and the Making of the Russian Revolution,’ Northern History Vol. 21 
(1985), 262. 
24 Michael Hughes, Beyond Holy Russia: the Life and Times of Stephen Graham (Cambridge: Open 
Book Publishers, 2014), 33. 
25  Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar, 102. 
26 C. White, ‘British Business in Russian Asia Since the 1860s: an Opportunity Lost?,’ in R. 
Davenport-Hines and G. Jones (eds.), British Business in Asia Since 1860 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), 68. 
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The Extent and Proportion of British Foreign Direct Investment in Russia 
The outflow of British capital that occurred before 1914 took two different forms: 
portfolio investment and foreign direct investment. Portfolio investment took the 
form of British capital being used to buy foreign government and railroad securities, 
but was also present in the formation of overseas production centres, in the form of 
shares in various overseas companies. As opposed to foreign direct investment, the 
British parent company retained no managerial control over their investments 
through portfolio investment. It is important, therefore, to ascertain the proportion of 
British foreign direct investment in Russia as opposed to portfolio investment, in 
order to assess the extent to which assumptions made by businesses about the 
Russian business environment were ascertained through direct experience of 
managing investments in Russia. 
 
The most recent estimates of the composition of foreign capital entering Russia for 
the period 1865 to 1914 indicate that Russia was the recipient of 4.2 per cent of the 
total export of British capital.27 However, there have so far been no estimates that 
break down this figure into portfolio investment and foreign direct investment. This 
exercise has been undertaken only with reference to the total outflow of British 
capital to the rest of the world. Earlier estimates from the 1960s and 1970s that rely 
heavily on data from the London Stock Exchange place portfolio investment as 70 
per cent of the total capital outflows from Britain from roughly 1870 to 1914, with a 
particularly significant increase between 1893 and 1913.28 
 
Interpretations of the proportion of portfolio investment should be treated with 
caution because of their reliance on London Stock Exchange figures. Platt drew 
attention to these problems before figures on the proportion of foreign direct 
investment were revised, stating that often direct investment circumvented the 
London Stock Exchange due to the use of personal or company wealth to set up 
overseas ventures and the profits from these ventures being plowed back into further 
                                                          
27 Magee, Empire and Globalisation, 173. 
28 I. Stone, The Global Export of Capital from Great Britain, 1865-1914, A Statistical Survey 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 29. 
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investment.29 Earlier classifications of direct investment generally assumed that 
companies could only retain managerial control of their enterprises by retaining 
fairly large proportions of the shares. Edelstein’s study of British foreign investment 
utilizes a fairly arbitrary benchmark of 30 per cent of shares held by the parent 
company to indicate control and management.30 More recently, Corley and Jones 
have argued that overseas subsidiaries have often been mistakenly labelled as 
portfolio investment, when in actuality they represented direct investment because 
the financing of the projects was spread over the stock exchange and a variety of 
investment trusts and speculators, so that the parent company could retain control 
with a very small stake in the business. As a result, these historians argue that foreign 
direct investment with managerial control represented some 45 per cent of British 
overseas investment by 1913.31 According to them, managerial control of foreign 
investments was much more pervasive than earlier interpretations might suggest. 
 
Free-standing companies also represented foreign direct investment that was 
obscured by a reliance on stock market figures. Real economic strength was 
concealed from the public, and also from historians, by the practice of preserving the 
parent organization as a partnership or private company, while the assets it owned or 
controlled were often registered abroad and run by junior partners or managers there, 
sometimes under different names.32 However, historians who have argued that 
portfolio investment made up some seventy percent of British overseas investment 
also argue that the parent company exercised very little managerial control over the 
free standing company beyond the initial investment phase, often sub-contracting the 
management of their operations.33 
 
In response to this assertion, Hennart and Jones have pointed towards the 
development of the free standing company as part of an investment group, arguing 
that they represented the internalization of the market within the group, and that in 
                                                          
29 D. C. M. Platt, British Investment Overseas on the Eve of the First World War: the Use and Abuse 
of Numbers (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986), 55. 
30 Edelstein, ‘Foreign Investment, Accumulation and Empire,’ 195. 
31 Corley, ‘Britain’s Overseas Investments in 1914: Revisited,’ Business History, Vol. 36, No. 1 
(1994), 72-84, Jones, Merchants to Multinationals, 52. 
32 S. Chapman, ‘British-Based Investment Groups Before 1914,’ EHR, Vol. 38, No. 2 (1985), 231; 
Jones, ‘Origins, Management and Performance,’ 3, 11. 
33 M. Casson, ‘Institutional Diversity in Overseas Enterprise: Explaining the Free-Standing 
Enterprise,’ Business History Vol. 36 (1994), 101. 
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most cases strategic control was still asserted from London.34 Casson, although 
arguing that the majority of free-standing companies were not controlled from 
London, does acknowledge that industries that involved the use of advanced 
manufacturing or extracting techniques tended to opt for managerial control from 
London as the use of these technologies engendered complex managerial decision 
making.35 In Russia, British investment tended to go into manufacturing and 
extractive industries, where managerial control from London would have been most 
advantageous for free-standing firms.36 
 
This argument is supported by studies into the evolution of British enterprise in 
Russia. By the end of the nineteenth century British enterprises in Russia had 
transformed from being run and financed by a small family circle to possessing 
larger, more complex organizational and financial structures as joint-stock 
companies, drawing capital from a range of new sources.37 Although many more 
independent bodies became involved in financing these enterprises, British 
involvement in the management of their Russian companies went well beyond the 
financing stage, and only a small number of enterprises were controlled through 
Russian sources of capital.38 
 
Nonetheless, portfolio investment made up a substantial proportion of British 
overseas investment in the period, and it is important to recognize that British capital 
involvement in overseas ventures did not necessarily result in managerial control of 
the company. Economic conditions in Britain pushed British capital overseas due to 
low domestic returns, and was invested more commonly in portfolio investments. 
However, recent revisions suggest that the proportion of direct investment was much 
higher than previously estimated, and importantly for this study, especially in 
contexts where companies relied on superior technology and pre-existing trade 
                                                          
34 J. Hennart, ‘Free-standing Firms and the Internalisation of Markets for Financial Capital: a 
Response to Casson,’ Business History Vol. 36 (1994), 118-123, Jones, ‘British Banks as Free-
Standing Companies’, 345.  
35 McKay, Pioneers for Profit, 62. 
36 McKay, ‘Foreign Enterprise in Russian and Soviet Industry,’ 345: Pioneers for Profit, 34-5. 
37 McKay, ‘Foreign Enterprise in Russian and Soviet Industry,’ 345; Gurushina and Potkina, 
‘Angliiskie kapitaly i chastnoe predprinimatel’stvo v Rossii,’ 107-108. 
38 N. Guruschina, ‘British Free-Standing Companies in Tsarist Russia’, in M. Wilkins and H. Schroter 
(eds.), The Free Standing Company in the World Economy 1830-1996 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998), 193. 
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relationships that led to the internalization of markets. Due to the reliance on superior 
technology and that free standing companies in Russia generally existed within the 
framework of an established investment group, managerial control from London was 
more likely in Russia. As a result, one could conclude that assumptions made by 
British businessmen about the Russian environment resulted as a direct consequence 
of managerial activity in Russia, and the study of these assumptions and activity can 
provide valid insights  about the ways in which the Tsarist government interacted 
with business interests between 1892 and 1914. 
 
 
The Quality of British Managerial Control in Russia 
Although this review of the literature on British companies has demonstrated that 
British parent companies generally retained control through formal ownership over 
Russian investments, there exists a debate surrounding the successfulness of British 
companies operating overseas. This debate has a bearing on the hypothesis presented 
by this study. If overseas ventures were administered poorly, then their assumptions 
about the Russian business environment might have been incorrect due to a lack of 
knowledge, and poorly administered ventures may have attracted a disproportionate 
amount of difficulty with the host government. 
 
In terms of global multi-nationalism, British business has been accused of failure in 
comparison to American investment because it possessed underdeveloped 
managerial structures. This failure is identified in terms of a reduced rate of 
production and the tendency for British investment to be concentrated within the 
empire as a symptom of its lack of competitiveness.39 Due to the size of the UK 
domestic market, British businesses did not develop management hierarchies that 
could effectively control overseas assets, unlike their American counterparts who had 
a much larger domestic market in which to develop their management structures, and 
family interests in the running of British businesses which were often incompatible 
with the development of advanced management structures.40  These issues, and the 
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lack of control that they engendered, have led historians to assert that British 
businesses failed to deploy resources correctly in response to international 
opportunities, and avoided joint-stock arrangements.41 
 
Such interpretations suggest that where direct managerial control was established 
from London through ownership or majority shareholding, the quality of the 
managerial control that was exercised meant that micromanagement of the business 
from London was impossible. Jones’ study of British multinational enterprises found 
that generally managers abroad were given a fairly free rein in the day to day running 
of the overseas subsidiary or free standing company, leading to disruptive 
management practices.42 This issue has been associated with failures in British 
multinationals’ selling and marketing strategies overseas. Chandler has argued that 
British multinationals failed to develop advanced selling and marketing techniques as 
a consequence of their failure to develop advanced management structures, a 
phenomenon which Kirby has argued was key in British economic failure in the 
period.43 
 
However, these failure may not have been as a result of particularly British instances 
of failure in management of overseas enterprises. McCloskey has challenged the 
assumption that British production fell behind their competitors, arguing that 
production was proportional to the amount of available resources.44 This has 
implications for the successfulness of British enterprise overseas, as it suggests that 
British overseas production was proportional to the amount of available capital. 
Nicholas has also argued that there has been little direct comparison between British 
firms and their French, German and American competitors, and that the lack of 
managerial structures did not necessarily mean that British multinational enterprises 
did not develop new forms of control.45 In particular, in the mechanical engineering 
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sector, Saul argues that British companies dominated the world market up to 1914.46 
Accusations of British failure in marketing and selling strategies have been disputed 
by Nicholas and Saul who found little evidence of poor selling, and suggest that the 
archives of French and German consulates indicate that poor selling was also true of 
Britain’s competitors.47 
 
The picture of British managerial control in Russia is very mixed.  British 
multinationals reacted slowly to the discovery of new business opportunities in 
Siberia at the beginning of the twentieth century. Historians who have investigated 
this area have found that British multinationals rapidly fell behind their American 
and German competitors in the race to exploit these new regions.48 This lack of 
ability to take advantage of new opportunities is also made clear by the remarkable 
rate of failure of British subsidiaries in the oil industry. For example, the failure rate 
of British companies operating in the Maikop region of Russia was around 50 
percent.49 Among the merchant houses operating in Russia that played a major role 
in British investment there was a very high business mortality rate.50 Historians have 
also found a general failure of British companies to adapt to Russian business 
practices such as buying on credit and processing small orders. British companies 
also did not take into account the needs of individual Russian consumers, with very 
few companies developing cheaper goods for the Russian market, and converting 
their weights and measures into Russian measurements.51 
 
However, studies into the commercial organization of British companies in Russia 
have shown that over the period in question, British companies adopted more 
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complex management structures and came to rely on a wider variety of sources of 
capital and credit.52 
Case studies of British companies engaged in agricultural machinery and textiles 
indicate that British companies were relatively successful at adapting to Russian 
business and agricultural conditions and dominated the market for certain 
agricultural products.53 This suggests that British enterprise in Russia was not wholly 
dominated by managerial failure. 
 
Due to the tendency for British companies to undertake direct investment with 
managerial control in Russia, it is likely that British companies at least attempted to 
supervise their investments closely, and the evidence suggests that in Russia their 
management structures improved throughout the period, and there are many 
examples of companies that were very successful. Although many companies did not 
take advantage of new business opportunities in Russia and did not adapt to Russian 
business practices like their international counterparts, this does not necessarily 
indicate poor management, but a certain conservatism in the way in which they 
undertook foreign direct investment. It is therefore a reasonable conclusion that a 
substantial number of British business interests in Russia possessed adequate 
managerial structures in order to be able to form reasonably well informed 
assumptions about the Russian business environment and the Tsarist authorities. 
 
The literature surrounding British multinational enterprises indicates that British 
business interests engaged in Russia would have been able to form reasonably well 
informed assumptions about the nature of the Russian business environment. 
Investment decisions by multinational companies were made on the basis of the 
amount of information on the investment destination, which was commonly 
developed through a prior export or trading relationship with Russia. Upward 
revisions of the levels of foreign direct investment also indicate that British investors 
generally retained managerial control over their companies, which indicates that the 
parent companies would have had an awareness of the particular problems faced by 
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these ventures. Although British companies did not develop the sophisticated 
managerial hierarchies of their American counterparts, accusations of managerial 
failure were not universal for British ventures in Russia. This indicates that British 
business interests were competently managed, and would have supplied reasonably 
accurate information about their activities. 
 
 
 
ii. Anglo-Russian relations, 1892-1914 
 
 
Throughout the period in question there was a development of closer Anglo-Russian 
cooperation on various international issues. Both British and Russian foreign policy 
evolved over the period to become more reconciliatory and to involve closer 
cooperation between the two empires, culminating in the 1907 Anglo-Russian 
agreement, but this did not result in completely stable relations. 
 
In the 1890s Britain was forced to reassess its policy of ‘splendid isolation’, as 
British foreign secretaries were confronted by the rise of powerful European power 
blocs that threatened the isolation of Britain from Europe and her imperial 
vulnerabilities such as the defence of India.54 As a result, Britain engaged in a more 
active form of diplomacy with her later entente partners, France and Russia, while 
maintaining the semi-aloof position of maintaining the European balance of power. 
Thus threats to Britain and her Empire, precipitated by her poor performance in the 
Boer war, were predominantly solved through the diplomatic strategy of the British 
Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey that consisted of limited support for Russia and 
France to contain Germany.55 A group of officials who were anxious to strengthen 
Britain’s ties with France and Russia, while avoiding close continental 
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entanglements, rose to prominence under Grey, however, suggesting an improvement 
of Britain’s stance towards Russia towards 1914.56 
 
In terms of the corresponding Russian foreign policy, much has been made of the 
manner in which the regime’s prestige was linked to a successful foreign policy.57 
Russia therefore followed an expansionist foreign policy in the Far East that 
eventually led to the opening up of China by other foreign powers in response to 
Russia’s aggressive expansion in this area.58 In particular, Geyer maintains that 
Russia was unable to pursue a Far Eastern strategy based wholly on informal 
influence due to her relative economic backwardness, and her expansion necessarily 
had political and military implications, such as the occupation of Port Arthur in 1897 
and the occupation of Manchuria in the wake of the Boxer Rebellion.59 
 
However, Russian foreign policy in the areas where it would have caused friction 
with Britain had begun to become more passive by the 1890s in comparison to the 
preceding decades. Russian policy objectives in Asia by this time, partly due to the 
threat of foreign competition, became more concerned with integrating pre-existing 
areas more closely with central Russia.60 The military and entrepreneurial 
adventurism in Manchuria that eventually provoked the Russo-Japanese war was a 
significant but exceptional departure from this general pattern, and the Russian 
defeat and revolution of 1905 resulted in a more passive and reconciliatory policy 
being followed by the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aleksandr Izvol’skii.61 The 
threat to India, which dominated British foreign policy making, was viewed by the 
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Russian government as a useful diplomatic tool with which to influence British 
foreign policy but was never seriously considered.62 
 
The most significant result of this new situation for both British and Russian foreign 
policy was the signing of the 1907 Anglo-Russian agreement. Most importantly, it 
set the definition of spheres of influence in Persia that insulated the strategic area of 
Seistan from Russian influence. The agreement also established that Afghanistan 
would be situated purely within Britain’s sphere of interest. Both of these matters 
were seen as vital for Indian defence planners.63 This agreement has been set in the 
context of Britain’s recognition of her limited capabilities to defend India, and to be 
able to successfully mount an amphibious attack on Russia.64 However, Nish also 
places the agreement in the context of increasing cooperation between Britain and 
Russia in Asia up to 1907, such as Anglo-Russian cooperation during the 1894 Sino-
Japanese war, and the peaceful coexistence of British and Russian railway building 
and investment in the area.65 This is supported by Anglo-Russian cooperation had 
occurred in 1907 over the proposed loan to the Persian government in an attempt to 
exclude German influence in Persia.66 
 
The agreement also had the effect of allaying fears among potential British investors 
in Russia of a potentially disruptive war between the two countries, and thus could be 
seen to have acted as a stimulus for British investor confidence in Russia.67 Reports 
from the financial press from the period of the 1907 agreement certainly indicate that 
the Russian government began to view British capital favourably, for example The 
Times stated that, ‘Russia had innumerable resources, but money was required to 
work them; and if friendly foreign capital were embarked in them the Russian 
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government would certainly accord all possible facilities for ensuring success.’68 
This agreement was also preceded by the Anglo-Russian agreement for the mutual 
recognition of joint-stock companies in 1904, which allowed judgements in Russian 
and British courts cases between companies to be valid in both Russia and Britain.69 
 
Although the 1907 agreement was clearly the culmination of increased Anglo-
Russian cooperation and British engagement with her entente partners, it is important 
not to overestimate its significance. Anglo-Russian cooperation on a range of 
international problems, such as influence over the Persian government, remained 
limited even after tensions between Britain and Russia over India and the Far East 
had broadly dissipated.70 The continuation of Russian railway building that extended 
towards Persia also excited the traditional British fear of a threat towards India.71 
Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia has also been credited with leading to the formation of 
a veiled protectorate in Tibet in 1912.72 This was further exacerbated by significant 
concerns surrounding the public’s reaction to cooperation with Russia given the 
activities of the Tsarist regime, which to an extent precluded increased cooperation, 
as well as an unwillingness among British diplomats to antagonize the liberal 
sections of the Duma from 1906 through cooperation with the Tsarist government.73 
 
The increase in international Anglo-Russian cooperation had important implications 
for British business interests in Russia. As conflict between Russia and Britain 
became less likely with the formation of the triple alliance and entente towards 1914, 
Russia may have become a more attractive destination for British capital and 
companies, as the threat of war and subsequent confiscation of property and 
associated losses became less likely. This thesis will examine whether this change in 
international relations played a role in attracting British companies to Russia, or 
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whether other factors, such as the Russian government’s treatment of foreign 
business interests, played a more significant role. 
 
 
 
iii. Industrial paternalism, the Russian Government and the Modernisation of 
Russian Society 
 
The Russia that British investors and diplomats observed in the period 1892-1914 
was a country undergoing rapid political change. There is still significant uncertainty 
in historical interpretations of the stability of Late Imperial Russian society; the main 
point of contention being whether Russia was evolving towards a peaceful 
constitutional society along European lines or whether the contradictions between 
constitutionalism and autocracy made revolution in 1917 inevitable regardless of the 
destabilizing effect of the First World War. A central theme to these interpretations is 
the relationship between the autocracy and the emergent civil society in Russia. This 
section will then make the case that the economic policies of the Russian government 
and its economic tutelage of private enterprise played a significant role in Russia’s 
industrialisation in the period. Just as the Russian government attempted to harness 
civil society while maintaining political control over the input of society into 
governance, so it attempted to harness the power of private enterprise to stimulate its 
industrial growth while attempting to retain paternal control over its activities. 
 
The Russian Government and the Emergence of a Civil Society 
More than fifty years ago, Leopold Haimson argued in a seminal article that Russian 
society in the decades before the revolution had become increasingly polarized on 
two levels:  the urban workers had become estranged from the intelligentsia, and 
more importantly for the current work, both of these groups had become estranged 
from the bureaucratic state. A later revision to this work emphasised the inability of 
the principal actors and groups, including those in the state, to react to this crisis.74 In 
these and later arguments, the role of the Russian state in suffocating the emergence 
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of a Russian civil society and excluding it from politics played an important role in 
this polarization.75 Reform directed towards the creation of a law governed state by 
Stolypin failed because of the lack of a politically empowered middle class and the 
entrenched interests of the autocracy.76 
 
This behaviour had serious repercussions; arbitrary government treatment of worker 
industrial action and unions effectively validated the argument of the Bolsheviks 
among the workers that democratic worker demands would always be opposed by 
the power of the autocracy; thus government intransigence played a significant part 
in working class radicalism.77 For some, part of this problem lay in the fact that the 
Russian autocracy failed to adopt a consistent policy of political reform.78 In attempts 
to preserve its autocratic privileges by excluding civil society from government, the 
government also failed to address serious socioeconomic problems that arose from 
Russia’s modernisation, such as a growing agrarian crisis.79 
 
More recent interpretations challenge this pre-existing assumption of the 
unbridgeable gulf between state and society in Late Imperial Russia, highlighting an 
emerging cooperation between state and society. They emphasise the importance of 
cooperation between emerging civic bodies and civil society and the Russian 
government across a number of fields, that, according to these interpretations, 
presaged the emergence of a law governed constitutionalist state.80 For example, the 
Russian government became more tolerant of charitable institutions with ambitious 
social agendas after the constitutional reforms of 1905 and 1906, and public and 
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judicial debate surrounding marital and family law had a significant effect upon the 
drafting of marital law, and the decisions of the Civil Cassational department of the 
Senate.81 
 
Due to the significance of the relationship between state and society, historiography 
has focused upon the emergence of obshchestvo, or ‘society’, broadly defined as 
educated society opposed to the bureaucratic state and who possessed a certain 
public mindedness.  This approach has been taken to study of the zemstvos, the 
creation of which devolved significant local responsibilities to elected institutions, 
albeit those that were dominated by the nobility.82 The zemstvos in many ways came 
to form an early nucleus of private civil initiative, especially when they were 
authorised to form national congresses such as in response to the famine of 1891 and 
the Russo-Japanese war in 1904.83 They have also been studied as a locus for liberal 
opinion before the twentieth century giving rise to organisations such as Bethesda 
and the Union of Zemstvo Constitutionalists whose members would later go on to 
form the Kadet and Octobrist parties.84 However, historians have maintained that the 
zemstvo was flawed by the way in which the government maintained supervision 
over the zemstvos from their inception, through restrictions on their activities and 
discussions, and the lack of a zemstvo institution above that of the provincial level, 
leading to the charge that the zemstvos were a ‘building without a roof’, and that 
their influence was effectively curtailed by later restrictions.85 
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Joseph Bradley and other historians have traced the development of voluntary and 
professional associations in Russia, which formed an increasingly important 
component of private public initiative in Russia. Yet, in a similar fashion to the 
zemstvos, these associations faced severe governmental interference. They were 
forced to provide agendas to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, faced police 
supervision of the topics of discussion of their meetings, and operated on the basis of 
government approved charters which severely limited their activities to those 
prescribed by their charter.86 
 
Despite these government limitations, professional and voluntary associations 
dynamically competed with the government for legitimacy over their particular field, 
from the provision of technical education to workers to the training of pharmacists.87 
In these endeavours the voluntary associations possessed many similarities with 
zemstvo professionals such as teachers and agronomists, who became increasingly 
active and assertive in defence of their prerogatives in their respective fields against 
bureaucratic interference.88 However, this was not a relationship based purely upon 
conflict; in particular, charitable organisations that were created in response to 
specific socioeconomic change in the period, such as for the provision of 
unemployment and homelessness relief for migrant workers in cities, enjoyed a 
broadly positive relationship with the autocracy.89 Research into these issues has 
recently moved into different areas, for example the increasing importance of public 
property in Russia, with a newly conceptualised aim of benefiting the public good, 
which was applied to state rivers and forests.90 
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The relationship between this nascent civil society and the Russian government was 
significantly affected by the revolution of 1905 and the resulting promulgation of the 
October Manifesto and Fundamental laws. The creation of the Duma and the 
obligation to pass legislation through it resulted in the removal of the legitimacy of 
the Tsar’s unlimited autocratic power; Stolypin and later government ministers were 
forced to construct right wing coalitions in the Duma and the State Council to push 
through legislation.91 Arbitrary government treatment of extra governmental 
organisations was also restricted by the promulgation of the fundamental laws in 
1906 which guaranteed the freedom of association, as well as the freedom of the 
person from arbitrary arrest and punishment. Mironov argues that these provisions 
fundamentally altered the relationship between the state and the rest of society 
through this conferment of rights and by changing the basis of law in Russia.92 
 
However, there still exists substantial debate as to the effectiveness of these reforms 
in altering the relationship between the state and civil society. Historians have argued 
that in the aftermath of the 1905 revolution the autocracy was able to bypass the 
concessions that it made to society through further restrictions to the electorate in 
June 1907 and the use of field courts-martial to try civilians.93 This partly stemmed 
from Nicholas II’s unwillingness to accept the provisions of the constitutional 
reforms, and in attempting to re-fashion a congenial relationship between the 
government and the autocracy he adversely affected the unity of the government in 
the Duma period.94 The rights of citizens were also ill defined in the constitutionalist 
period; down to 1917, bureaucratic modernisers persisted with a conception of 
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individual citizenship that emphasised the obligations of the individual to the state, 
but left the concept of individual rights in doubt.95 
 
The relationship between the state and the emerging civil society in Russia was 
fundamentally affected by the emergence and development of extra governmental 
associations, which after 1905 occupied a new environment whereby the legal and 
theoretical framework of the relationship between the government and society had 
changed. A key part of this development was the way in which the relationship 
between the state and industrial interests evolved in line with the rest of Russian civil 
society. It is in this developing network of relationships between civil society and the 
Russian government that British direct investment was situated, and was profoundly 
influenced by Tsarist economic policy and the economic tutelage of the Russian 
government. 
 
 
Russian Industrial Growth and Government Tutelage 
The Russian government played an important part in the industrialisation of Russia. 
Before 1880, the Russian economy suffered in comparison to its international rivals. 
A low tariff policy, combined with a labour shortage as a result of the continued 
attachment of peasants to the commune after emancipation meant that Russian 
industry failed to compete with foreign products.96 A new tariff policy beginning in 
the 1880s helped to foster Russian industrial growth, culminating in the 1891 tariff 
policy which set very high rates of foreign raw materials and manufactured goods 
that was designed to stimulate Russian industry and foreign investment in domestic 
manufacture.97 
 
Historians such as Gerschenkron and von Laue have argued that this economic 
policy, as well as the government stimulus through railway building, resulted in a 
high rate of Russian industrial growth up until the First World War. Gerschenkron 
estimates that from 1885 to 1913 the Russian economy grew at an average of 5.7 
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percent annually, even taking into account the slow rates of growth during the 
industrial downturn of 1900-1906.98 This contention is further supported by Gatrell’s 
figures, which suggest the Russian economy grew most rapidly between 1885 and 
1900, encompassing the effect of the new tariff restrictions, Russia’s entry to the 
gold standard, and most importantly Russia’s ambitious railway construction 
projects.99 Due to increased mechanisation from the importation of modern 
machinery, especially in the Moscow province, factory productivity also increased 
after the industrial downturn of the beginning of the twentieth century.100 
 
The extent to which government policy was the sole driver of industrialisation has 
been contested, however, initially by Falkus who cited low international interest rates 
in Western Europe and America that acted as a push factor for foreign capital 
entering Russia, and the preponderance of consumer goods manufacturing from 1907 
to 1914.101 Haim Barkai is more explicit, arguing that the liberalisation of monetary 
policy allowed the ‘latent forces’ of industrialisation to come to the fore in Russia, 
and downplays the role of the state.102 Soviet historians generally followed the 
Leninist model that the Tsarist regime created ideal conditions for the support of a 
small clique of foreigners and millionaires in industry at the expense of domestic 
industry.103 However, later Soviet interpretations of state input into the growth of 
capitalism share many similarities with Falkus and Barkai; they argued that the state 
had very little positive impact in the growth of industry, instead citing the 
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autonomous development of industry.104 More recently, Pravilova has argued that the 
Tsarist government’s economic policies favoured the state and the established 
industrial regions surrounding Moscow and St Petersburg to the detriment of the 
development of industry in  other areas of Russia, which were reduced to economic 
colonies of the centre.105 
 
Barkai’s model is based upon the assumption that Russian money supply inhibited 
economic growth, which has since been challenged by Gregory and Sailors on the 
basis of a greater flexibility of prices, as well as by Drummond, who argues that the 
Russian government maintained a larger money supply than Barkai estimates.106 
Olga Crisp posits a more nuanced version of this industrial growth, identifying two 
separate but overlapping growth ‘streams’, the autonomous growth stream and the 
induced growth stream, with the latter having an indirect effect upon the former.107 
State policies, although not central to the growth of all industries thus had a 
significant effect upon the growth of the industrial economy as a whole. 
 
It is therefore clear that the Russian government took an active role in the stimulation 
of Russian industry, and that a significant part of its strategy was the encouragement 
of foreign investment. However, as with other examples of the growth of private 
initiative in Russia, the government was not willing to relinquish its control over the 
forces of private initiative. Therefore, much work on the growth of Russian industry 
has stressed the paternal stance taken by the Russian government over industry in 
Russia. For example, Gatrell argues that the government, while aiming to encourage 
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the growth of private industry for reasons of international competition, attempted to 
control and subordinate it to the needs of the state.108 
 
The extent to which this paternalism affected commerce and industry in Russia has 
been debated.  According to some historians, the regimentation of the law and the 
subordination of commerce to the state were detrimental to market forces and also 
the productive capacities of the population, and created an atmosphere of antagonism 
between industrialists and the state, especially in the mainly state-controlled 
armaments industries.109 Government policies also created a sense of uncertainty 
among private enterprise, due to the uncertainty of certain economic privileges and 
private property.110 Disputes between ministers, a chronic symptom of the autocracy, 
have also been credited with causing significant disruption in a number of industries 
that the government attempted to stimulate such as railway building and the oil 
industry.111 More recently, Thomas Owens argues that due to its incompatibility with 
autocracy, the joint-stock corporation lost its dynamism in Russia and became 
subordinate to the bureaucracy.112  This has also been applied to foreign enterprises 
in Russia, for example the state often abandoned its official goal of legal equality 
between domestic and foreign enterprise in order to safeguard the interests of the 
former.113 
 
On the other hand, Olga Crisp argues that the Russian government succeeded in 
creating conditions in which industrialisation could proceed rapidly through the 
agency of private individuals through the pursuit of general economic and political 
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goals.114 Grant has also rejected the notion that the Russian autocracy prevented 
corporate prosperity in Russia, instead arguing that in the case of the Putilov 
Company, market realities shaped the companies’ behaviour to a greater extent than 
the peculiarities of the Russian autocracy.115 Nevertheless, due to the Russian 
government’s economic policies of tutelage in the period, the Russian government’s 
treatment of business interests would likely have played a major role in the Russian 
business environment and would have significantly shaped the experience of British 
investment interests. 
 
The economic policies of the Russian government and its treatment of business 
interests therefore constitutes a significant component of the Russian government’s 
treatment of extra governmental bodies that formed the nucleus of the developing 
obshchestvo in Russia. In other words, the experience of business interests with the 
Russian government is necessarily similar to the experiences of other emerging civic 
groups in Russia that could have formed a viable civil society. An important part of 
this development was played by the emerging foreign industrial interests in Russia, 
and in particular, the British interests who largely remained in managerial control of 
their invested capital. 
 
These developments can be viewed as part of a long term development of the 
Russian business environment as experienced by British investment interests. The 
emergence of civil society in Russia and the development of cooperation between it 
and the government, and restrictions on the government’s arbitrary power, occurred 
during a time of increased British investment in Russia, despite the industrial 
downturn of 1900-1906. At the same time, from the beginning of the twentieth 
century Anglo-Russian relations improved, giving the newly professionalised 
diplomatic and consular corps greater access to the various levels of Russian 
government in order to pursue the interests of British commerce. This raises the 
possibility of a link between greater cooperation between government and civil 
society in Russia and the increase in British investment to Russia. In order to 
investigate this phenomenon further, it is therefore necessary to examine the forms of 
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legal control that the government took over Russian foreign industrial interests in the 
period. 
36 
 
Chapter 1, Russian Commercial Law and Foreign Companies, 
1892-1914 
 
 
A major component that defined the relationship between British companies and the 
Russian state was the corpus of Russian commercial law, and its provisions for 
foreign companies. Apart from some alterations by Segei Witte, the Russian Minister 
of Finance 1892-1903, in order to encourage foreign investment, Russian 
commercial law and the position of foreign companies in the period remained largely 
unchanged, thus representing a significant continuity in the history of government-
industrial relations in Russia before 1914.  This continuity is significant because 
commercial law in 1892 enshrined the concept of arbitrary intervention in the affairs 
of companies in the law, as opposed to creating an environment of positive law that 
defined the rights of commercial interests against the state, through assigning 
ministerial and official discretion over the day to day affairs of companies in Russia. 
Despite minor alterations to the conditions of foreign companies and the imposition 
of a modicum of regulation on the extractive industries in the 1900s, the system of 
ministerial discretion survived intact until 1914. Because Russian commercial law 
was rooted in ministerial discretion, the government’s treatment of foreign 
companies was therefore of key significance to the formation of positive or negative 
assumptions about the Russian business environment, and the formation of an 
adequate working knowledge among British businesses about the Russian 
government’s role in the business environment. As commercial law was based in 
discretion, the consistent application of the law also depended entirely upon the 
Russian government, as did mechanisms for the provision of redress. 
 
In order to address this question, this chapter addresses five key areas. Firstly, it 
addresses how ministerial discretion over the activities of companies in Russia was 
initially established through the law, and whether there was a corresponding growth 
of regulation that accompanied this expansion of bureaucratic power. Secondly, this 
approach is applied to the corpus of law governing the activities of foreign 
enterprises, and how this gave even greater levels of discretionary power over 
foreign companies to members of the Tsarist bureaucracy. These processes can then 
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be contrasted to the regulations affecting companies in the extractive industries, 
promulgated during the period in question, which arguably left less room for 
ministerial discretion. This chapter also explores the general legal position of British 
companies in Russia, the rights accorded to them, and the implications of the legal 
disabilities from which they suffered. Finally, it considers the quality of legal 
representation available to them and the implications of this. 
 
 
1.1 Proizvol and the Russian Legal System 
 
Any discussion of Russian law should firstly, however, be prefaced by an 
examination of the development of legality in Russia. The Russian legal system as a 
whole was significantly affected by the tension between the persistence of arbitrary 
autocratic power, or proizvol, alongside the development of lawfulness, or 
zakonnost’, in Russian government. This question revolves around the extent to 
which the Russian monarchy preserved the crown’s autocratic privileges while 
attempting to implement legality in Russia from above. This can be addressed 
through an examination of several key features of a law governed state in Russia: the 
existence of a codified body of law, fundamental laws restricting the power of the 
monarch, the existence of an independent legal profession and courts system, and the 
extent to which autocratic power affected the working of the wider bureaucracy. 
 
Three general historiographical viewpoints emerge with reference to this question. 
Historians who are particularly critical of the Russian regime assert that the Tsars 
attempted to impose only the overt trappings of legality while maintaining their 
autocratic powers, to the detriment of modern social and economic development.1  
From such a perspective, the legal reforms of 1864 can be interpreted purely as a 
reaction to the administrative and revolutionary problems created by the 
emancipation of the serfs in 1861.2 A separate position highlights the importance of 
the backwardness of Russia. Baberowski contends that the attempt to introduce 
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legality through judicial reform was detrimental due to Russia’s inherent 
backwardness and it was inept at dispensing justice and in need of state oversight.3 
Conversely, Mironov, while starting from a similar assumption of backwardness, 
identifies a gradual increase in legality in nineteenth century Russia, and the 
development of a basic law-governed state.4 Finally, Wortman, in his major work on 
the development of the legal profession, agrees that certain Russian Tsars such as 
Catherine the Great and Alexander II genuinely attempted to introduce lawfulness to 
the monarchy, government, and society, however they simultaneously attempted to 
preserve the exercise of personal power due to its importance in their presentation of 
monarchical power and resisted any kind of reform that would restrict this.5 
 
A key facet of a law governed state in the nineteenth century was the institution of a 
clear code of laws. Such a code could be used by multiple sections of society, such as 
judges, legislators, and the officialdom, in order to act in accordance with clearly 
defined laws and regulations.6 By 1892 Russia possessed the Polnoe Sobranie 
Zakonov (Complete collection of laws, PSZ) and the Svod Zakonov (Code of laws, 
SZ). The PSZ was a historical collection of laws of the Russian Empire, organised 
chronologically. As opposed to this, the SZ was an active code of law, organised 
topically, and was intended to be used as a guide to the PSZ.7 The introduction of the 
legal code has been credited with the inculcation among Russian jurists of the 
importance of establishing legal standards upon which social and economic 
modernisation could take place, and the development of judicial criticism and 
discussion of the laws.8 Before the creation of the PSZ and the SZ in the 1830s, 
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Russian law was incompletely codified by the 1649 Ulozhenie, the legal code 
promulgated by Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich. 
 
While stimulating judicial knowledge and discourse, the PSZ contained an inherent 
contradiction as an autonomous legal code by not distinguishing between laws, 
judgements, and administrative decrees. Under this system, the monarch could make 
any administrative ruling law by decree, whether or not it conflicted with existing 
law. This has led to the suggestion by historians who are more critical of the regime 
that there was no formal distinction between laws judgements and administrative 
decrees, and led to considerable confusion in Russian public life.9 Other 
interpretations suggest that the codification of Russian law did in fact allow Russian 
citizens to enforce their rights in civil and criminal cases, although the legal systems 
asserted the state’s authority over the definition of rights.10 The important point here, 
however, is that a ‘law’ and an ‘administrative decree’ were indistinguishable in the 
PSZ, which indicates that laws were purely embodiments of the Imperial will as 
opposed to a separate source of law. This contradiction was even embodied in the 
fundamental law of the 1832 edition of the PSZ, which stated that the empire was to 
be governed on the basis of laws while the first article contained an assertion of the 
autocratic right.11 
 
Bureaucratic regulations and codification attempts of the eighteenth century provide 
an important backdrop to this ambiguity. Although Peter I created many different 
laws such as the General Regulation, they were neither codified nor reconciled with 
previous laws. The General Regulation itself, while providing a system of rules and 
corresponding punishments for bureaucratic work, was conceived as an extension of 
the ruler instead of as an institution that would implement rationality and regularity, 
a situation which is particularly underscored by the use of the army in the 
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administration.12 Successive eighteenth-century senatorial commissions were 
followed by the Legislative Commission of Catherine II, who believed that 
codification would instil confidence among her subjects in the courts.13  But none 
came close to achieving a working codification. A significant problem was that 
Russian monarchs in this period did not trust the delegation of codification of laws to 
officials who might have attempted to usurp the Tsar’s legislative authority.14 Thus, 
when codification was finally successful, its overt function was the continuation of 
the Russian legal tradition in the face of constitutional challenges posed by the events 
of the early nineteenth century; the officials tasked with codification although relying 
on Western precedent carefully denied the influence of alien models.15 Therefore 
instead of a complete guide to Russian law and legal precedent, the PSZ instead 
represented a means through which the Russian autocracy preserved its hegemony 
over the issuance of laws while obtaining some of the social and economic stability 
that a code of laws implied. 
 
This conclusion is supported by the incompleteness of the PSZ. In compiling the 
code, Speranskii was forced to confine the inclusion of laws into the PSZ to those 
that originated from the monarch via imperial decree, when in fact there were many 
other collections of law in the Russian empire such as senate rulings, high court 
rulings, provincial governors and Synodal edicts.16 This problem of incompleteness 
was sustained after the initial publication of the PSZ and SZ. The judicial reform of 
1864 placed the responsibility for the interpretation and definition of the law with the 
Civil Cassation Department in the Ministry of Justice. Research into this 
department’s activities indicates that it took advantage of ambiguities in the current 
statutes and effectively shaped Russian law. According to Wagner, its decisions, 
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published in official government publications and not the PSZ, were tantamount to 
statutory law.17 In 1892, there therefore existed a multiplicity of bodies that were 
able to issue laws that were not included in the PSZ. Due to its autocratic 
underpinnings and incomplete nature, it is therefore very difficult to equate the PSZ 
and the SZ with a legal code found in a law governed state; i.e. one that could act as 
a definitive guide of regulations and procedures that could guarantee the expectations 
held by society of the state. 
 
The opposition of the Tsars in the nineteenth century to a limitation of their powers 
stemming from a legal code is also evidenced by the almost complete absence of any 
personal safeguards for the citizenry until the granting of the October Manifesto and 
Fundamental laws of 1905 and 1906. Throughout the development of various 
codification processes in Russia, there was no attempt to implement a set of inherent 
freedoms for the Russian people. For example, though it proclaimed the virtues of 
lawful rule, Catherine the Great’s Nakaz, a statement of principles intended as a 
guide for the 1767 commission for the formulation of a legal code,  contained 
nothing about the idea of natural law,  inherent freedoms,  or a social contract.18 
Studies have shown that this attitude to such so called civil rights was sustained in 
Russia in part due to the inherent challenge to autocratic power which the security of 
the person and property implied.19 
 
The flawed nature of Russian codification by 1892 was a reflection of the persistence 
of autocratic power and influence over the legal system. A significant part of this 
supremacy stemmed from the law of succession, which effectively placed the will of 
the autocrat above the law. Peter the Great’s original law of succession of 1722 
created a system of succession by designation, which guaranteed the unrestrained 
nature of the monarchy instead of a notion of limitation with a law of hereditary 
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succession.20 This law of succession was later supplanted by Paul I’s legislation in 
1797, although this was subverted in 1825 when Nicholas I succeeded Alexander I 
instead of Grand Duke Constantine. Although hereditary succession continued 
throughout the nineteenth century unopposed, heredity did not in itself constitute a 
right to rule.21 More controversially, this law has been interpreted as leading to the 
formation of a completely one-sided relationship with society, whereby the state 
sought to inculcate the population with a common sense of destiny while preserving 
the omnipotent power of the state.22 
 
The limitations of the importance of the fundamental law of succession in forming 
the Tsar’s legitimacy can be linked to the manner in which Tsars presented 
themselves and their right to rule. Successive Russian Tsars in the nineteenth century 
represented themselves as successors to Peter the Great’s legacy, by rejecting the 
legacy and restrictions of the immediate past and imposing order from above. The 
rejection of legal limitations on the monarchy in these presentations became more 
overt in the reigns of Alexander III and Nicholas II who appealed to traditional 
muscovite patriarchal imagery and rejected foreign conceptions of limited 
monarchy.23 
 
Alongside a functioning codification of laws and the legal limitations to the power of 
the monarchy and the state that grew out of this, an important facet of the law 
governed state of the nineteenth century was the existence of an independent legal 
profession. An independent legal profession had certain connotations for the exercise 
of arbitrary autocratic power, as it represented a body that had a separate claim to the 
administration for the implementation and interpretation of the law. Due to this 
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conflict an independent legal profession did not develop in Russia along with other 
notions of legality, such as the codification of Russian law. 
 
Neither Peter I nor Catherine II attempted to introduce any kind of independent legal 
profession to Russia in tandem with their reforms, although Catherine II was 
nevertheless interested in sending scholars abroad to study jurisprudence. When legal 
education was finally introduced to Russia under Nicholas I, the emphasis of this 
education at the School of Jurisprudence was purely technical; trainee lawyers were 
taught to practice law in a purely mechanical form of simply applying the relevant 
laws without any focus upon interpretation.24 Some historians have seen this 
development as resulting in a stunted development of the legal profession; the poor 
provision of legal training and culture meant that before the judicial reform there was 
no group of legally minded officials in the bureaucracy which could form the nucleus 
of a legal profession.25 This has since been challenged by Wortman and Pintner, who 
identify a group of officials trained by educational establishments under Nicholas I 
dedicated to the law occupying important positions in the Ministry of Justice.26 
However, in these formative years it is clear that a judicial profession was kept in a 
position where it could not compete with the autocracy as an alternative source of 
law. 
 
The conflict between the judiciary and the autocracy became more overt after the 
creation of an independent legal profession after the judicial reforms of 1864. 
Wortman, in his study of the legal profession, portrays this new profession as 
existing in conflict with the traditional patterns of autocratic power, and that 
successive Tsars were concerned with keeping legal interpretation within certain 
bounds. There therefore emerged a split between the administrators who believed in 
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the power of the bureaucracy as the instrument of autocratic will, and the new 
judiciary who regarded themselves as the only guarantor of justice.27 
 
Part of the manifestations of this conflict was the attempt of the government to 
restrict the jurisdiction of the new court system created in 1864. The separation of 
justice from the administration as a result of the judicial reform of 1864 marked a 
significant point of departure for the provision of justice in Russia. It located justice 
in an independent system of courts, governed by their own rules and regulations and 
regulatory bodies. Before 1864 the Russian justice system was a complete behind 
closed doors process attached to the administrative system, with evidence being 
submitted and considered in secret, along with unaccountable judges. This quite 
clearly represented a significant reduction for the scope of arbitrary state power 
through the law.28 
 
However, after the creation of an independent court system, the Russian government 
took active measures to attempt to subordinate the justice system to the 
administration. The government attempted, for example, return the trial of certain 
crimes such as terrorism to the military courts through the 1881 emergency laws, 
which were never repealed in the Imperial period. These courts were used to try a 
large number of citizens in the 1880s and particularly in the aftermath of the 1905 
revolution.29 
 
The scope of the new courts was also circumscribed in the field of the prosecution of 
administrative crimes. Most significantly, officials were virtually protected from any 
criminal proceedings into wrongdoing taken by the courts by the so called 
‘administrative guarantee’, which meant that no official could be tried without the 
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agreement of his superior, thus administrative cases continued to be governed by the 
culture of autocracy.30 Reforms to this system were vigorously opposed from within 
the ministries, and by particularly reactionary individuals such as Pobedenostsev.31 
 
Cutting the jurisdiction of the courts was combined with attempts to undermine 
procedures in them. Research has pointed towards the tendency of prosecutors to 
collaborate with the administration in order to secure convictions and to further their 
own careers, as well as an imbalance of power in trials towards the prosecution, with 
the prosecution, judge and defence lawyer negotiating a consensus instead of 
engaging in an adversarial process.32 The government also circumscribed the 
independence of the new courts by retaining control over entry to the bar and could 
prevent oppositional individuals from entering it.33 
 
Historians have identified the rejection of legal constraints upon the Tsar’s autocratic 
power with a more widespread ineffectiveness of legal limitations among the wider 
Russian officialdom. According to Waldron, the ethos of autocracy flowed through 
the Russian state, and at the local level individual officials were imbued with the idea 
that they could act with impunity, which was exacerbated by the fact that the 
executive power of the autocrat meant there was a lack of coordination between 
ministries.34 This lack of coordination is also highlighted by Pearson’s study of 
attempts to reform local administration. According to his analysis, the persistence of 
personal power invited ministerial infighting and a fragmentary penetration of 
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bureaucratic power into the countryside, resulting in a tangled and confused local 
administration.35 
 
Robbins identifies the increase in government and the lack of clear direction from the 
centre as the primary reason for the exercise of arbitrary power by local officials. In 
his study of the Russian Governor-Generals, he concedes that throughout the 
nineteenth century the governor generals became more subordinated to the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs who attempted to hold them to legal standards. However, a lack of 
direction from the centre lead to inconsistency an uncertainty as to how to use their 
powers, thus governors acted in a personal, quasi vice regal manner.36 Similarly, a 
recent study of the implementation of government initiatives in Nizhnii Novgorod 
found that central initiatives were implemented through a process of interaction 
between the central initiatives and a local response, which relied upon a certain level 
of consensus between the two, a consensus that, by the 1890s, had largely 
disappeared.37 This relationship was further complicated by the existence of locally 
elected zemstvos from 1864, which had control of some local administration but 
were subject to various bureaucratic controls on the type of work they could carry 
out and the subjects that they could discuss.38 
 
Historians have identified how the growth of the bureaucracy hindered the exercise 
of executive power by the Tsar and his ministers, although this work tends to 
highlight the persistence of proizvol in the lower sections of the bureaucracy. A 
separate code of ethics and working was initially identified by Yaney, who argued 
that the post reform bureaucracy adhered to a moral standard of operating with its 
own highly entrenched informal rules, as opposed to a standard set out by law.39 
                                                          
35 T. Pearson, Russian Officialdom in Crisis: Autocracy and Local Self-Government 1861-1900 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 251. 
36 R. Robbins, The Tsar’s Viceroys: Russian Provincial Governors in the Last Years of the Empire 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 89, 243-44. 
37 Catherine Evtuhov, Portrait of a Russian Province: Economy, Society and Civilisation in 
Nineteenth Century Nizhnii Novgorod (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2011), 163. 
38 Terrence Emmons, ‘The Zemstvo in Historical Perspective,’ in Wayne Vucinich and Terrence 
Emmons (eds.), The Zemstvos in Russia: an Experiment in Local Self Government (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982), 432; Lincoln, The Great Reforms, 157-8. 
39 George L. Yaney, The Systemisation of Government: Social Evolution in the Domestic Environment 
of Imperial Russia, 1711-1905 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973), 292-317. 
47 
 
Several historians identify deeply entrenched reactionary attitudes among the tsarist 
bureaucracy. Orlovsky, in his study of the post reform Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
identifies an entrenched political culture within the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
stemming from deeply rooted sources of reaction that came to the forefront after 
Alexander II’s great reforms. With the exponential increase in government business 
throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, this political culture of reaction 
and defence of autocratic power led to entrenched systems of carrying out 
governmental work which paradoxically limited the Tsar’s ability to exercise 
executive power.40 Rowney’s research into the service lists of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs also indicates that this expansion of government meant that ministers 
had very little control over the makeup of the ministry, which he argues was 
undergoing a process of change up to 1914 independently of central policy.41 
 
Wcislo also identifies a bureaucratic ethos centred on the police state, but also an 
ethos of bureaucratic reformism, and maintains that both groups utilised state power 
to gain political support for their policies.42 Similarly, liberal members of the State 
Council were able to influence policy formulation to the extent that they were able to 
water down three of Alexander III’s reactionary policies; changes to the 1864 
judicial reform, the creation of land captains, and modifications to the zemstvos.43 
This approach therefore suggests that instead of entrenching proizvol, the expansion 
of the bureaucracy in some areas safeguarded legality, although it is difficult to apply 
this idea to the wider administration given the increase in reactionary and apolitical 
officials in the second half of the nineteenth century identified by Orlovsky.44 
 
When considering the extent to which the legal code gave bureaucrats significant 
discretionary powers over foreign companies, it is important to consider the effect of 
the persistence of autocratic power on Russian officialdom, as these structures of 
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autocratic power had important ramifications as to the amount of latitude that these 
officials could exercise. Research into the Russian bureaucracy indicates that this 
persistence of autocratic power invested in the monarch led to the permeation of the 
autocratic ideal throughout the Russian officialdom. Although there are some 
differences in approaches, broadly speaking it caused a breakdown of coordination 
between ministries and lines of communication to local administration that resulted 
in officials throughout the administration being able to act with impunity. 
 
The influence of proizvol therefore permeated the expanding Russian bureaucratic 
machine. Although successive Russian monarchs from Peter I had attempted to 
impose regulation and uniformity onto the system, in genuine attempts to improve 
the social and economic development of Russia, their unwillingness to abandon their 
autocratic privileges resulted in an underdeveloped legal environment. Key 
institutions of a law governed state that could potentially regulate government 
activity were significantly underdeveloped as a result, and thus cannot be supposed 
to have regulated the actions of the bureaucracy at high government and the local 
administration. It was in this environment of arbitrary bureaucratic intervention that 
the corpus of Russian commercial law was situated, and took its main influences 
from. 
 
 
1.2 The Law of 1836 and its Implications 
 
The legal basis upon which all joint-stock companies in Russia operated until the 
Revolution of October 1917, was the law of 6 December 1836. Formulated by 
Nicholas I’s Ministers D. Bludov and E. Kankrin, the law was designed to encourage 
entrepreneurial progress in Russia, whilst avoiding the volatility in the corporate 
securities market that had caused severe financial crises in the West in the 1830s. To 
this end, the law and its 57 articles represented an attempt by Nicholas’s regime to 
prevent the exploitation of the stock market by unscrupulous individuals and to 
protect the interests of shareholders through bureaucratic regimentation, whilst at the 
same time encouraging western corporate capitalism. In principle, this law remained 
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in force in an unmodified form until the end of the old regime, with only two 
relatively insignificant amendments.45 
 
According to Owen, the 1836 law cemented bureaucratic control over companies in 
Russia by subordinating many aspects of their operations to bureaucratic 
regimentation. However, in his analysis by the beginning of the period 1892-1914, 
significant divergences had developed between the law of 1836 and the various 
company charters issued by the Russian government, that were considered to be laws 
of the Empire according to a Senate ruling in 1884. Therefore in practice by as early 
as 1874 the law of 1836 had little relevance, as company charters were simply 
drafted on the basis of articles that had recently been approved by the Minister of 
Finance, with little acknowledgement of the provisions for company charters 
contained within the original 1836 law.46 
 
I argue, by contrast, that two aspects of the law of 1836 did have far reaching 
implications: the principle of incorporation by concession and the principle of 
granting special privileges and monopolies to specific companies, both of which 
were included in the original legislation. These two principles operated in tandem to 
give officials in the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and 
local governors and officials, sweeping discretionary power over several key aspects 
of company activities, from the initial founding of a company to adjustments in share 
capital. This discretionary power formed the basis of arbitrary government 
interference in the affairs of all joint-stock companies in Russia in the period 1892-
1914, and illustrates how in the commercial sector, arbitrary state action was a key 
component of lawfulness. 
 
Russian commercial law contained strict regulations for the formation of joint-stock 
companies, which were not revised during the Tsarist period. Under Article 39 of the 
1836 law, those wishing to form a joint stock company in Russia were required to 
submit a request for permission to the ministry to which the company was primarily 
subject, usually the Ministry of Finance until 1904 and thereafter the Ministry of 
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Commerce and Industry.47 Companies were not necessarily entirely subject to just 
one ministry, however. For example, under later legislation, companies wishing to 
establish companies in Turkestan and the Trans-Caucasus regions were required to 
seek permission from the local Governor-General, and the Minister of War, was well 
as the usual permission from the Minister of Finance.48 The decree of 14 June 1902, 
which opened up Primorskii Krai and Usinskii to foreign gold mining companies, 
required that such companies apply to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry 
of the Interior, and the local Governor-General.49 Therefore in granting permission 
for the establishment of a company, many officials were often involved in the 
process, both in St Petersburg and at the local level, increasing the discretionary 
power of various ministers and officials to affect the business environment as they 
saw fit in various geographical areas. 
 
Article 2 of the 1836 law outlined the technical workings of this system. Company 
charters underwent review by the appropriate minister and the committee of 
ministers before being submitted to the Tsar for approval. Further articles contained 
in the 1836 law illustrate how pervasive discretionary power of these bodies could be 
during the review process. Article 53 outlined the basis upon which the relevant 
ministers should consider a proposal for acceptance, and essentially provided 
ministers with three grounds for refusal of a company. Firstly, permission could be 
refused if the general regulations of the 1836 law had not been followed, such as 
those pertaining to the rights of stockholders (articles 35-48), and technical 
specifications relating to proposed charters (article 51). Because by 1892 most of 
these rules had little relevance, this requirement left a great deal of scope for the 
relevant minister to refuse the charter for whatever reason he saw fit. The other two 
requirements were that the charter safeguarded the rights and interests of all those 
who wished to participate in the company, and that the project did not affect the legal 
rights of third parties, both of which also left a great deal of scope for ministerial 
discretion. 
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Combined with the provisions in article 13, which prohibited ‘Companies whose 
purpose is clearly unprofitable, or contrary to the laws, to morality, to good faith in 
trade and to public order, or, finally, which would cause significant detriment to the 
state’s revenues or harm in industry’, there was a significant level of scope for a 
proposed charter to be rejected. Owen argues that this article was primarily used as a 
weapon to protect the state from the interests of business.50 However, combined with 
the provisions in article 52, it also represents a facet of state control over joint-stock 
companies. 
 
The granting of special privileges and monopolies to specific joint stock companies 
also left a good deal of scope for arbitrary ministerial decisions. Although article 4 of 
the 1836 company law explicitly denied that the state endorsed any particular 
company or guaranteed its success, articles 5 to 9 stated that the state could grant a 
new company special privileges, such as a monopoly, tax exemptions, or financial 
support. However, article 53 specified very vague grounds for the granting of such 
privileges, stating that they should be determined according to the importance of the 
enterprise for the state. This regulation obviously left a great deal of leeway for 
arbitrary action by the ministries, or at worse blatant profiteering. This was 
potentially compounded by the fact that the law also stipulated in article 54 that 
where two different companies or persons requested the same exclusive privilege, the 
decision was at the discretion of the State Council. Article 18 also specified that if a 
company enjoying special privileges was liquidated, then these special privileges 
ceased to exist along with the company. Therefore if a company holding such special 
privileges was liquidated in order to reorganize the exploitation of their concession, it 
would then have to reapply for its concession. This practice was common in the oil 
industry, as will be examined below. 
 
In a similar fashion to this control over the reorganization of company privileges and 
monopolies the 1836 company law required that individual companies reapply to the 
relevant ministries if they wished to change their constitution, as specified in their 
company charters. This meant that ministers effectively had control over whether 
companies undertook such basic and necessary operations such as increasing or 
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decreasing their basic share capital, or producing an alternative product, giving 
ministers a large amount of power over the workings of joint-stock companies. 
 
Although the basic structure of company law in Russia did not change before 1914, 
there were certain modifications and supplementary regulations that served to 
increase the power of the state over individual corporations. Although most of these 
amendments were introduced to prevent the exploitation of shareholders by 
unscrupulous company founders and speculators, they had similar implications to the 
original1836 law, in that they reinforced government control over the activities of 
companies in Russia. The most important change was the establishment by the 
Senate in 1884 that company charters, as authorized by the council of ministers, the 
relevant minister and finally, the Tsar, carried the full force of the law.51 This granted 
more power to the individual ministers involved in granting charters of companies 
because it gave them more freedom with which to impose their own conditions that 
could differ substantially from those legislated for in the 1836 law. Thus corporate 
charters, that were in essence the law in these cases, were freely manipulated to suit 
the desires of the state. 
 
Several of the original aspects of the 1836 law that were intended to prevent 
speculation were updated between its promulgation and the revolution of October 
1917. These moifications maintained and reinforced governmental control over the 
operations of the companies in question. One of the more significant modernizations 
of the law was the legalization of shares made out ‘to the bearer’ rather than to a 
named individual. This regulation, which encouraged freer trading of stocks on the 
market, was not published in the code of laws, but from 1887 the PSZ stated that 
exceptions to article 23 were permitted in company charters.52 This therefore implied 
that although the principle of having stock made out ‘to the bearer’ was allowed at 
the time, its implementation in company charters was completely at the discretion of 
the government. Time deals on stock were also legalized in 1893, although this 
change was accompanied by legislation that increased government control over this 
sort of trading by limiting these deals that occurred without a broker, and increased 
government control over the activities of brokers by introducing audits of brokers’ 
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records by the Ministry of Finance.53 Nevertheless, these modifications represent a 
significant lightening of earlier restrictions on the activities of companies, and 
possibly correspond to a more lenient approach taken by the Russian government 
towards industry in the late 1880s that corresponded with a period of economic 
growth in Russia from 1885, from which date reliable statistics on economic growth 
are available.54 
 
While these changes mainly related to company structure, there were some important 
articles in the 1836 law that had far reaching consequences. The most significant of 
these was the lawful subordination of company affairs to the whims of individuals 
within a wide range of positions within the Tsarist government. Although the 1836 
company law in many respects had become obsolete by 1892, the core principles of 
incorporation by concession and the granting of special rights and privileges were 
never repealed or modified. These principles allowed the Russian government an 
enormous amount of discretionary power in the development of new businesses and 
the day-to-day workings of established businesses. Since the vague wording of the 
1836 law in these two areas left a great deal of leeway for arbitrary decisions, it will 
be important to study how the law was applied by the relevant  officials in order to 
establish whether any norms of interaction with businesses were ever developed by 
the Russian government. 
 
 
1.3 The Permissions System and Foreign Enterprise in Russia 
 
As global foreign investment began to increase in the 1870s and 1880s, Russian 
legislators began to implement laws in order to prevent important assets of the 
Russian government from falling out of their control, namely reserves of natural 
resources and land in areas of strategic importance of the empire. This trend, which 
continued down to 1914 with very few relaxations, effectively reinforced the 
discretionary power of officials and ministers over the affairs of foreign companies 
in two separate ways: a more rigorous incorporation by concession system than 
described above that was applied to foreign companies, and geographical restrictions 
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on their operations. These trends reflected the conflicting aims of the Witte system of 
the 1890s; while attempting to promote economic development through the entry of 
foreign capital to Russia the state sought to retain control over the business 
environment, and especially over its key natural assets. 
 
One facet of the Russian government’s attempt to safeguard its interests against 
foreign corporations was an extension of the incorporation by concession system of 
the 1836 law to a more complex permissions system. Foreign corporations were 
required to obtain Imperial permission in order to begin their operations in Russia 
and to purchase real estate. Legislation in 1887 stipulated that all foreign joint stock 
companies operating in Russia without Imperial permission must apply for it or cease 
their operations in Russia by 1 January 1889.55 Imperial permission implied that 
foreign companies operated under a set of ten conditions, such as the requirement to 
obtain permission to perform mergers, submit to Russian law in disputes, and most 
seriously, to cease operations entirely in the event of the Russian government 
withdrawing its permission.56 Although the latter requirement was cancelled by Witte 
in 1898, the Russian government still exercised a large degree of discretion in the 
operation of foreign corporations through these conditions.57 
 
These conditions were very similar to the restrictions placed upon business by the 
original 1836 laws. The principles of ministerial control enshrined in the 1836 
company laws were transferred to the operation of foreign companies in Russia, 
although in many cases they were more severe. Although these conditions do not 
seem to be specified in the Russian law codes, a brief sketch of the special conditions 
under which British companies typically worked is provided by L. Rastorguev, a 
sworn advocate of the high court of Khar’kov, in his summary of the most important 
laws relating to foreign enterprise in Russia, The Legal Position of English 
Companies in Russia, published in London in 1911, and aimed at British commercial 
interests. The first and ninth conditions defined limits to the operations of the 
company. The first condition was usually a statement of the name of the company, its 
geographical location and the specific industry in which it was engaged, for example: 
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‘The English Joint Stock Company under the name of ---- shall open its operations in 
the Empire for the exploitation of deposits of copper ores in the District of the ---- 
government.’58 This statement was directly linked to the ninth condition, which 
stated that the activity of the company, ‘shall be limited exclusively to the object 
stated in paragraph 1 of these conditions’. It also stated that for any change to these 
articles, and by extension, changing the commercial operations of the company, the 
company would have to obtain authorization for the Minister of Finance and the 
Minister of State Domains.59 It therefore followed that had the copper company in 
the above example found an abundance of iron ore on their land but not a 
commercially viable source of copper, it would have to reapply to the stated 
ministries for permission to alter its articles in order to exploit the source of iron. 
 
As well as giving the government discretion over the day to day operations of 
companies, the permissions system also gave the government discretion over any 
modifications to company structure. Article 9 required that permission from the 
Ministry of Finance and State Domains be obtained in order to amalgamate with 
other similar companies, increase or decrease stock capital, issue debentures, or 
otherwise change the articles of association. This control was supplemented by 
Article 3 of the conditions that stated that foreign companies were subject to previous 
certification from local authorities for the purchase of land, effectively bringing in 
the local provincial government into the permissions system.60 These provisions 
meant that the above ministries exercised a significant amount of discretionary power 
over the affairs of foreign companies through the law, as many of these actions 
would have been important for the successful running of any joint-stock company, 
especially modifications to stock capital. 
 
While foreign business owners would have been largely exempt from the whims of 
the Russian state being subjects of a separate country, this immunity was also 
attacked by the Russian government. Article 5 of the typical conditions cited by 
Rastorguev required foreign companies to appoint a special agent in Russia invested 
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with the power to act on behalf of the company in legal matters, and demands made 
upon the company by the state and third parties. The Article also stated that the 
director of the business and the managers of any real estate in Russia must be 
Russian subjects.61 This law further enhanced the power of the Russian state over 
foreign business interests by ensuring that the managers of foreign enterprises were 
Russian subjects, and so more subject to the Russian state than their foreign 
counterparts. Thus the Russian permissions system as it was applied to foreign 
companies introduced more stringent rules and regulations to the operations of 
companies, and an increased level of ministerial discretion. 
 
The Russian government also used geographical restrictions in order to protect its 
interests and to control the actions of foreign enterprises. This tendency can be seen 
to date from 1885, when the Siberian gold mining and metallurgy industry was 
restricted to Russian subjects.62 Further restrictions followed. The law of 14 March 
1887 denied foreign subjects the right to own or lease land in Poland, and in the 
Western Provinces.63 These pieces of legislation did not completely bar foreign 
companies; they required that any companies formed be registered in Russia and held 
in the name of a Russian subject. These individuals would often be Russian agents in 
the employ of the company, or in some cases naturalized local consuls, according to 
contemporary accounts of the Russian business environment.64 
 
The 1890s witnessed a growth in the output of the oil industry, reaching a peak in 
1901, with a similar growth in the production of coal, alongside similar increases in 
consumption. 65 The Mining industries also grew particularly rapidly during this 
decade, Gerschenkron estimating that it grew at an annual rate of 8 per cent in this 
decade.66  Due to this growth in the oil and mining industries, and its own ambitious 
railroad building programme,67 the Russian government was obliged from the late 
1880s and 1890s to begin to open up certain key peripheral areas of the Empire to 
foreign enterprise, in order to stimulate the growth of Russian domestic industry. The 
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opening up of these regions to foreign enterprise was accompanied with certain 
requirements and restrictions that served to increase the discretionary power of the 
government over foreign private commercial enterprise. This system of establishing 
permissions for foreign companies may have been part of a wider trend of the Late 
Imperial Russian government to attempt to centralize control over the peripheries of 
the Empire, as the belief ran that importing Western systems of colonial government 
would create separatist tendencies within the Empire.68 However, the type of 
restrictions placed upon foreign companies in these areas was consistent with the 
general permissions system for foreign enterprises in Russia, which engendered a 
great deal of ministerial discretion in their initial foundation, and did not encourage 
the formation of clearly defined notions of what would constitute an acceptable 
enterprise. 
 
For example, legislation introduced in 1893 stipulated that corporations could only 
purchase land in Turkestan and the Caucasus if their charters restricted the ownership 
of stock to Russian subjects or to local natives.69 Under this legislation, foreign 
companies could not even hold land through a Russian intermediary, as the law 
stipulated that the stockholders of the company had to be Russian subjects. 
Exemptions to this law were made for foreign companies operating in the oil 
industry, who were required to obtain special permission to acquire land through the 
Ministry of State Domains.70 From 1897 foreign companies were permitted to 
purchase land in Turkestan with the permission of the Committee of Ministers and 
the Tsar.71 
 
The permissions system imposed upon foreign businesses in Russia therefore led to a 
high level of ministerial discretion surrounding the operations in Russia of a foreign 
company. These laws did not state upon what basis a company might be refused 
permission to operate, and so it is reasonable to assume that the system would have 
led to a great deal of uncertainty for any company considering undertaking an 
investment in Russia, a theme which will be addressed in subsequent chapters. The 
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vagueness of their wording meant that there was little clear basis upon which a 
company might be refused permission to commence operations in Russia, or carry 
out normal business practices such as an increase in stock capital. 
 
Such a system therefore relied heavily upon the accountability and ethos of the 
Russian bureaucracy, and its commitment to consistently applying the law. The law 
surrounding the permissions system for foreign corporations would therefore have 
not in itself resulted in the establishment of legal norms and consistency; it was 
inherently dependent upon those tasked with administering it. As these laws were not 
amended before the outbreak of the First World War, the establishment of legal 
norms thus depended upon how the government used this power at its disposal. This 
system was not prevalent in all aspects of industry however, as an exploration of the 
corpus of regulation surrounding the oil and mining industries that grew up during 
the period in question that removed many avenues for the exercise of ministerial or 
official discretionary power. 
 
 
1.4 The Oil and Mining Industries as a Microcosm of State Control 
 
It is worth studying the legislation surrounding the oil and mining industries in 
Russia for three reasons. Firstly, the oil industry, and to an extent the mining 
industry, were viewed by the Russian government as being an essential component to 
the industrial modernization of Russia. It therefore follows that there was a strict 
regimentation of the exploitation of the oil industry by private enterprise. This trend 
began after bureaucratic reorganization in 1883 that resulted in the transfer of the 
administration of the Caucasian mines and the petroleum industry to the Ministry of 
State Domains.72 Secondly, the expansion of the oil industry occurred at a great pace 
in the period 1892-1914, and thus there was a corresponding issue of legislation 
surrounding the oil and mining industries, an analysis of which will be indicative of 
the Tsarist government’s attitude towards private enterprise in the period. Thirdly, a 
large proportion of British investment in Russia was located in the oil and mining 
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industries in the Caucasus and Siberia, so this discussion has significance for many 
companies dealt with in this study. 
 
Mining law allowed a high degree of governmental discretion in the affairs of 
companies, both through regulations surrounding their operations, and extensions to 
the incorporation by concession system that were applied to it during the industrial 
downturn of 1900-1906. This can be contrasted with the oil and mining legislation 
promulgated in the following years, which legislated for less ministerial discretion 
through the establishment of clearer regulations surrounding company formation, 
permissions, and stock. This comparison can further our understanding of changes in 
the Russian government’s economic policy regarding a rapidly expanding and new 
industry, and how the legislation in the post reform era resulted in the establishment 
of more defined rules and regulations pertaining to businesses in this area. 
 
At the most basic level, oil and mining industries were separated by law between 
those located on crown lands and those located upon private lands. Companies and 
individuals held mining operations on crown lands in ‘possessional right’. These 
were lands granted by the crown, often with attached forests, to be exploited for an 
unspecified period of time, but not to become their property altogether, and could not 
be transferred without permission of the Senate.  The government attached 
conditions to this kind of ownership. Most significantly, the working of the mine or 
oil concession was to be uninterrupted and without any reduction in quantity or 
quality of the materials produced. The concession could not be partitioned in any 
way, and the attached forests were to be used exclusively for the requirements of the 
works. Holders of such mines were also not allowed to expand, reduce, or terminate 
their mining activities on these lands without the knowledge and permission of the 
mining department.73 
 
Land which was owned outright by the company or individual was subjected to 
fewer restrictions. However, the owner or company was still required to exploit the 
land in a technically correct manner, and submit a plan of his works to the local 
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supervisor of mines for inspection by the district mining engineer. If the landowner 
and the local supervisor failed to agree, then the matter was decided by the 
department of mines. In the case of the landowner deciding to lease the land to a 
third party for exploitation, the law required the landowner to inform the mining 
administration with a plan of the allotment and a copy of the agreement. If the lease 
extended for more than twelve years, the law permitted the landowners to petition the 
council of ministers for permission to conclude agreements for longer periods.74 
Mining works and their accessories were also not saleable without the knowledge 
and the permission of the department of mines.75 
 
The law also established that the responsibility for public safety, landscaping, and 
security in privately controlled mining works rested with local representatives of the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, the local mining administration, and local police.76 In 
areas containing minerals necessary for the state and foreign trade, the law also gave 
oversight for the Minister of State lands to ensure that metals and minerals were not 
left unexploited, and private landowners were obliged to inform the department of 
mines about changes to their mines’ production.77 
 
The basic provisions of the mining law for possessional and private rights therefore 
necessitated a level of governmental interference in the affairs of oil and mining 
companies to different degrees, in a way that gave primacy to the discretion of the 
individual ministers and officials involved. This was mirrored by the way in which 
the permissions system was reinforced by the Russian government for the entry of 
foreign oil and mining companies into the Russian market in the run up to and during 
the industrial crisis of 1900-1906. 
 
The industrial downturn in Russia from 1900 to 1906 hit the mining and oil 
industries particularly hard due to overproduction as well as revolutionary activity.78  
This seems to have corresponded with the promulgation of several restrictions on the 
rights of foreign companies to set up oil and mining ventures in various parts of 
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Russia in the late 1890s and early 1900s, and is indicative of a trend in Russian 
government to legislate against some of the more speculative activities of foreign oil 
and mining companies. The rules for foreign entrepreneurship in the Caucasian oil 
industry established in May 1898, offer a good example of the development of the 
extent of government control over the authorization of individual foreign companies 
in the area. The law allowed the purchase by foreign subjects or companies of real 
estate outside of ports and towns in the region for the establishment of factories and 
other industries, including oil production, by special certificate of the General 
Director of the Civil Office in the Caucasus. This rule applied even when a foreign 
company had previously obtained permission to operate in Russia. In case of doubt 
about the suitability of the real estate for the industrial purpose outlined by a 
company, the General Director was instructed to turn to the Minister of Finance or 
the Minister of Agriculture for a decision.79 
 
A similar process was followed in the Siberian mining and metallurgy industries, 
following a ban on foreign companies in 1885. Various provinces in Siberia were 
gradually opened up to foreign enterprise during the industrial downturn, but with the 
caveat of the requirement for applying for special permission from several different 
agencies. For example, in 1902 restrictions against foreign companies owning land in 
the Primorskii and Usinskii districts were lifted, on the condition that they applied to 
the Committee of Ministers. In some areas, this requirement was extended to 
obtaining permission from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Internal 
Affairs, the Minister of Finance, and the local Governor-General. Thus the system of 
permissions in these areas relied on both the local and high government officials, and 
the law to a large degree rested upon their personal discretion. The application of this 
law to foreign companies who had already received permission to operate in Russia 
also shows the enhanced control that the permissions system gave to all levels of 
officials over the affairs of foreign companies. It therefore seems that the permissions 
system as it was applied to foreign companies was manipulated by the Russian 
government to increase government supervision and discretionary power over the 
industries that they perceived to be in particular crisis. 
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However, the revisions and additions to the mining law relating to mineral and oil 
extraction essentially reduced this discretionary power of both the local authorities 
and those in St Petersburg. The fact that these laws were mainly promulgated in the 
post reform period from 1907 implies that in this particular sphere of the business 
world there was a drive to increase the regulation of the industry. However, these 
revisions seem to have had more to do with the crisis in the oil and mining industries 
from 1900 to 1906, than any particular drive for lawfulness by the Russian 
government. Nevertheless, the way in which these revisions were crafted, in that they 
avoided ministerial discretion, is still significant. These revisions related to 
regulations surrounding the structure and affairs of oil and mining companies, as well 
as revisions to the permissions system for these companies in strategically sensitive 
areas. 
 
The industrial crisis also prompted the government to introduce measures against 
speculation in the oil industry. In January 1907 the prices at which interest bearing 
securities received as collateral for oil activities and products were fixed by the 
government.80 Later in 1907 local commissions were created, tasked with assessing 
oil companies issuing securities. Companies were required to submit a certificate of 
appraisal issued by the local excise office. The commissions were to be made up of 
the local excise official, the district mining engineer, and two representatives of the 
oil industry. For the inspection of refineries in urban areas, the commission consisted 
of two excise officials, the factory inspectorate, and representatives of the city 
council.81 
 
This increase in legislation also set out rules for the relations between oil and mining 
companies and local communities, especially in the Cossack territories. In 1909, 
parties engaged in the oil industry on Cossack lands were required to submit their 
contracts and statements to a regional board. A year later, the remuneration paid to 
the local natives in these territories by oil and mining companies was established at a 
specific rate, and in 1911 the government introduced rules for what constituted 
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‘admissible evidence’ of oil on Cossack territories, something that had not been 
established elsewhere.82 
 
From 1907, the Russian government also legislated for separate systems for the 
granting of permissions in various different areas according to the local conditions 
there, with defined parameters for granting of concessions. For example, on the 
Aspheron peninsula the Minister of Trade and Industry was authorized to grant 
permission to companies for oil exploration, provided that the company established a 
borehole of at least 20 fathoms and established production of 10,000 poods per 
month.83 This development was also linked to the state’s policy of reducing 
speculation in the oil industry, as it prevented the kind of speculation that was rife in 
the other oil bearing lands of the empire where companies held land without 
developing it, thus artificially inflating the price of land in these areas. 
 
Similarly in the strategic areas of the island of Sakhalin and the Siberian coastline 
laws were promulgated in 1908 that set out clear requirements for the establishment 
of oil companies. Companies were allowed to sample two areas for evidence of oil, 
and for permission to establish works, were required to provide evidence of at least 
one well within 100 fathoms that contained oil of industrial significance. However, 
the law here also contained the vague requirement that the Governor-General of 
Primorskii Krai and the Minister of Trade and Finance did not find the enterprise 
‘inadmissible’, a requirement somewhat similar to the permissions system for the 
formation of new corporations in Russia in that it established a level of discretionary 
power over the foundation of new oil and mining enterprises in these areas.84 
 
Legislation surrounding the oil and mining industries indicates an interesting point of 
departure from the state of the law regarding these industries at the beginning of the 
period. The post 1907 legislation by and large established clearly defined rules and 
regulations surrounding the industry, through taking steps to fix preconditions for the 
operation of companies, clearly setting out production levels, and attempting to 
eradicate speculation by fixing prices on securities. In doing so, it decreased the 
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discretionary power of the ministers and local officials by defining the parameters of 
what constituted acceptable business operations in law. It is therefore possibly 
indicative of a new trend of establishing legal norms, especially as this was in a field 
of industry with rapidly changing characteristics due to the discovery of various new 
oilfields, mineral deposits and a rapid influx of foreign and domestic capital. At the 
same time, it is also important to consider that the oil and mining industries were just 
emerging from a depression in which they had suffered worse than other industries. 
As overproduction had played a key part in the problems that the oil industry faced 
from 1900 to 1906 it is feasible that the Russian government attempted to introduce 
stricter controls. This tendency is not reflected in other areas of corporate law. 
 
 
1.5 The Legal Position of British Companies 
 
In order to assess the implications of such ministerial discretion over the affairs of 
British companies in Russia, it is important to assess the legal status of British 
companies there. In many respects, British companies shared the same legal 
privileges as their Russian counterparts. However, it is worth exploring a particular 
legal disability that British companies suffered from; their position in relation to 
Russian bankruptcy law. These legal difficulties are important to consider in terms of 
the wider context in which British companies entered the Russian market for the rest 
of this study, but in the present analysis it is conceivable that these difficulties would 
have reinforced the power of the state over foreign enterprise through the use of the 
Senate as the highest court of appeal against legal decisions of the courts. 
 
British nationals were able to conduct business in Russia under the 1801 convention 
of peace, navigation and commerce.85 However, even this early agreement stipulated 
that the laws, decrees and special regulations regarding commerce and industry in the 
two countries applicable to foreigners were not affected by it. These privileges 
survived intact into the period 1892 to 1914. Foreigners of every nationality had the 
right to live in Russia, and their persons and real estate were also under the 
protection of Russian law.86 Foreigners were also allowed to enter into agreements, 
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deeds, and obligations of any kind between themselves and Russian subjects, as long 
as these agreements complied with Russian law. They also had the right to bequeath 
their property to foreigners as well as to Russian subjects.87 
 
Although British companies operating in Russia had the same legal status as Russian 
companies under Russian law, it was not until the Anglo-Russian commercial treaty 
of 1904 that judgments relating to commerce delivered in a British court could be 
valid in Russia, and vice versa. 88 This agreement complemented the 1881 senate 
ruling that, ‘A judgment delivered in a court of law in one country may be valid in 
another country only in cases where the execution of judgments is allowed by the 
laws of the latter, or by treaties dealing with this subject.’89 However, the 
implications of this law exclusively affected companies engaged in the importing and 
exporting business with Russia, involved in disputes over breach of contract for the 
delivery of goods, payment, etc., because articles 2 and 8 of the typical conditions for 
operations for the operation of a foreign company within Russia stipulated that the 
trial of disputes between the company and government institutions and private 
persons should be effected on the basis of the law in force in Russia and Russian 
courts, and overrode the terms of the above agreement.90 
 
This had serious implications for multinational British companies that established 
manufacturing subsidiaries and undertook branch selling in Russia, because the 
Russian law to which they were subjected incorporated certain deficiencies that 
would have proved extremely disadvantageous to a British multinational acting as a 
creditor to its subsidiaries, agencies or clients in Russia. The most serious of these 
deficiencies was complications that could arise due to features of the Russian 
bankruptcy law. As will be discussed below, British companies often took 
precautions to avoid being overexposed to Russian creditors in the event of a default, 
and were reluctant to extend credit to Russian customers. 
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The bankruptcy law that was active in the period 1892-1914 was promulgated in 
1800.91 Although it was subsequently divided between the various volumes of the 
digest of laws in 1832, it survived largely intact, with only minor alterations until the 
end of the Imperial period. According to the law, a board of primary creditors was to 
be established in order to determine the type of bankruptcy (articles 8-12). For this 
purpose, the law distinguished between three different types of debt:  ‘accidental’, 
‘reckless’, and ‘malicious’. Bankrupt individuals were automatically assumed by the 
law to fall into the ‘reckless’ category, unless it could be proven that the bankruptcy 
occurred ‘accidentally’ due to natural disaster, enemy invasion, or a fall in prices or 
market activity that also affected other merchants (article 2). If it was found by the 
creditors that the bankruptcy was ‘reckless’, they could proceed to rank the claims on 
the bankrupt’s estate for satisfaction in preferential order by majority rule, and how 
the bankrupts estate should be administered to satisfy those claims (articles 25-34). 
 
The implication of the bankruptcy law for foreign companies was that where they 
acted as creditors for subsidiary companies, agencies, and branches in Russia, as was 
largely the norm for foreign direct investment in Russia, they could not participate in 
the first rank of creditors who decided how the debtor’s estate should be divided, 
because their claims were subordinated to those arising from Russian subjects.  
According to Article 4 of the conditions of foreign companies operating in Russia, 
‘The personal and real estate belonging to the Company within the limits of the 
empire, and all the payments accruing on behalf of the company should be 
convertible to the preferential satisfaction of the claims which may arise from its 
operations in Russia.’92 Therefore, their claims on the bankrupt party were placed in 
a less preferential position by the Russian liquidators than claims arising from 
Russian sources. 
 
A Senate ruling in 1907 reinforced this application of the law as regarding the status 
of a foreign company as a creditor of a subsidiary. The Senate decided that in the 
case of the Belgian-operated Kharkoff Mechanical Works, the claims of the Belgian 
stock holders and Central Exchange and Public Funds trust should only be paid by 
the estate of the Kharkoff Mechanical Works after the satisfaction of claims arising 
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from creditors in Russia. The Belgian company had argued that the debts of their 
subsidiary to them arose out of their subsidiary’s operations in Russia, as they had 
effectively operated as an investment fund for the purchase of machinery and 
materials for use in Russia. However, the Senate in their judgment explicitly 
separated the operations of the company in Russia from its financial transactions 
with overseas individuals and companies. Further, extending this guarantee to the 
foreign creditors could open the system to abuse by allowing them to claim against 
all the company’s assets, some of which may be located abroad, at the expense of 
Russian creditors.93  This ruling therefore placed British multinationals in a 
precarious position, because they would not be able to participate in the first rank of 
creditors appointed by the local authorities to divide up the bankrupt estate. By not 
participating, they put themselves in a position open to abuse by unscrupulous 
Russian creditors. 
 
Further complications to this system were also caused by the restrictive policies of 
the Russian government with regards to foreign individuals or companies having 
control over lands located in restricted areas such as Poland, the Western Provinces, 
and the Caucasus. In Poland and the Western Provinces, foreigners were banned 
outright from taking possession or acquiring properties to which they were 
creditors.94 In the Caucasus, they could not take control of a bankrupt’s estate unless 
it could be proven to be used for the establishment of factories or metallurgical 
industry.95 
 
Foreign companies could also be disadvantaged by this law if they acted as a creditor 
to a Russian subject or company. Because the board of creditors to a bankrupt estate 
was formed locally and not advertised particularly well, British companies were 
often not aware of their existence. This led to abuses whereby British companies 
were defrauded out of large sums by bankrupt parties in Russia. Even by 1911, this 
problem was highlighted by British officials in Russia, who highlighted the trend 
whereby bankrupt persons often colluded with the board of creditors in order to 
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obtain an ‘accidental bankruptcy’ ruling or preferential treatment in the case of the 
administration of their debts by the board.96 Even Barrett, an advocate of Anglo-
Russian trade and investment, warned British companies to be careful of extending 
credit in Russia because the system of the appointment of the board of creditors lent 
itself to many possibilities to defraud foreign firms.97 
 
Therefore, Russian law regarding bankruptcies put British companies at a severe 
disadvantage. This disadvantage worked at two levels. Firstly, due to the preference 
given by the law to Russian creditors to a bankrupt estate, the investments of British 
companies would have been very insecure, as in the result of a bankruptcy of a 
subsidiary, the British company would have been unlikely to satisfy any claims that 
it had upon the property of the subsidiary through ownership of stock. Equally as 
problematic were the problems that could be caused by the bankruptcy law for the 
recovery of debts from Russian debtors. These problems would not have encouraged 
the development of trust and stable expectations of the Russian business environment 
if such laws could be manipulated by Russian debtors or creditors to the 
disadvantage of British companies, and thus were a serious obstacle for the 
development of a stable business environment in Russia. As this aspect of the law 
was not amended, British companies would have approached the Russian market 
from this basic position of distrust throughout the entire period, and would have 
affected their views and understanding of the Russian commercial courts system. 
 
 
1.6 Lawyers and the Commercial Law 
 
Since many British companies operating in Russia took legal action against either the 
state or other companies operating in Russia, it is important to provide a sketch of the 
legal representation available to British companies. Lawyers with whom British 
companies would have contracted to act on their behalf, would have varied between 
different geographical regions in terms of the type of lawyer that would have been 
likely to have been available, and the degree to which the Russian lawyers would 
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have potentially shared the ideal of the defence of the rights of the individual against 
the state. 
 
In late Imperial Russia, lawyers were divided into two groups. The judicial reform of 
1864 created an independent regional bar council that consisted of sworn advocates 
and their assistants.98 By 1892, there were stringent educational requirements for 
membership of the Russian bar, which included a degree-level law qualification, and 
a certain length of time working as an apprentice. Bar associations were only created 
in Moscow, St Petersburg and Kharkov, however, due to subsequent restrictions on 
their establishment in 1874. Thus the sworn advocates in these areas broadly evolved 
towards an ideal of a regulated Western profession to a greater extent than their 
counterparts elsewhere, who were regulated by the circuit courts.99 In these areas 
where autonomous bar associations existed, sworn advocates to an extent developed 
a recognizable professional identity, as opposed to an estate identity, through the 
development of regulated behaviour and codes of ethics. 100 
 
The growth of this professional identity coincided with support for western liberal 
values, such as the defence of the individual from attacks by the state, opposing 
administrative rule in favour of civic autonomy protected by the law.101 Wortman 
argues that faced with the general lawlessness prevailing in Russia, the legal 
profession regarded the dispensation of justice as their particular responsibility, 
claiming an authority that had been the monarch’s prerogative.102 Defence speeches 
made by these individuals in the trials of revolutionaries often attacked the basis of 
government authority, and lead the government to attempt to transfer these cases to 
military courts. Although by 1892 the reaction following the assassination of 
Alexander II dampened such liberal spirits, from the 1890s there was a new wave of 
activism involving the formation of political clubs and groups.103 However, it would 
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be unrealistic to assume that all sworn advocates were idealistic defenders of the 
individual against the state; research into complaints brought before the Moscow bar 
association indicates that there was a considerable amount of lawyerly misbehaviour 
in Late Imperial Russia, such as charging extortionate fees and not taking action in 
cases.104 
 
Generally, though, it appears that this class of lawyer would have been better 
educated and would have been more likely to have a desire to protect the individual 
against the state than their private, unsworn counterparts. The latter branch of the law 
profession was created in 1874. There were no formal or educational requirements 
for these individuals, and they could only practice at courts at which they had been 
registered. They were prevented by the government from forming a collective 
professional body, and they remained a highly fragmented group in comparison to 
the sworn advocates.105 
 
Whether British companies used either sworn advocates or private advocates for their 
dealings with the Russian legal system would have to an extent depended upon their 
geographical location. Sworn advocates tended to be located in large cities. By 1914, 
over half of all the sworn advocates in Russia were located in St Petersburg, 
Moscow, Warsaw and Kiev, while only 6.2 percent of the profession were located in 
small provincial towns. Also, due to the restrictions placed upon the establishment of 
bar associations, sworn advocates who belonged to a truly independent governing 
body were only available in St Petersburg, Moscow and Kharkov.106 In comparison, 
private advocates tended to dominate at the provincial town level. When dealing with 
companies operating in the more remote areas of the empire, such as Siberia, there 
was a severe shortage of legal advocates, meaning that often the accused was often 
not able to obtain legal counsel, a situation which is likely to have applied to foreign 
companies engaged in commercial disputes.107 In areas where sufficient legal counsel 
were available commercial cases were viewed as less prestigious by the Russian 
legal profession. The competition for cases tended to be fiercest for litigation cases, 
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and less successful advocates were forced to fall back on the commercial side of 
legal practice.108 Therefore, the legal advocacy available to companies would have 
been distinctly lower in quality than the legal advocacy generally on offer in a 
particular area. 
 
Somewhat indirectly, therefore, government policy with regards to the regulation of 
the legal profession meant that British companies were less likely to obtain legal 
representation capable of defending their interests in the courts, and sympathetic to 
the defence of the rights of companies against the whims of the state. Although this 
was partly the result of the general outlook and culture of the legal profession in 
Russia, the restrictions placed upon the formation of a professional identity by the 
state meant that the oppositional attitudes common among the sworn advocates in the 
period, which occurred in other areas such as divorce law,109 were much less 
prevalent. Combined with the legal impediments that British companies suffered 
from in legal areas such as bankruptcy, British interests were therefore further 
subordinated to the state. It is likely that due to these impediments and the lack of 
high quality legal representation, more cases involving British companies would 
have reached the Senate court of appeal. 
 
 
1.7 Conclusion 
 
The Russian government in St Petersburg and at the local level exercised a 
considerable level of discretionary power over the affairs of foreign companies, both 
directly through commercial legislation, and indirectly because of the disadvantaged 
position of foreign companies in the legal system and inadequate legal 
representation. The original 1836 corporation law resulted in the requirement to 
apply for permission from the Russian government for foundation, and various other 
necessary operations such as amalgamations. For foreign companies, this 
permissions system mandated even greater control of their affairs. Against this 
backdrop of discretionary power, the development of clearer legislation surrounding 
the operations of oil companies was a positive step away from this discretionary 
                                                          
108 Huskey, Russian Lawyers and the Soviet State, 15. 
109 See Wagner, Marriage, Property and Law in Late Imperial Russia. 
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power towards regulation based on law, although some basic aspects of discretionary 
power remained in the basic legislation surrounding the foundation of oil companies. 
This discretionary power of the Russian authorities over British companies was also 
reinforced because the latter suffered significant disabilities under Russian law, 
especially in the field of bankruptcy law. Their access to less well qualified lawyers 
was not necessarily a product of government policy, more rather a result of the legal 
profession regarding commercial cases as less prestigious. However, the restrictions 
placed upon the formation of a professional identity among private advocates 
mitigated against the legal representation typically utilized by British companies 
sharing the vociferous defence of the rights of industrial interests against the state. 
 
What emerges, therefore, is a system of commercial law where foreign companies 
were, for the entire period of 1892-1914, subjected to the personal arbitrary power of 
both minor officials and government ministers. The commercial and industrial 
environment in Russia shared many aspects of the historical analyses of the Russian 
government that emphasise the primacy of personal, arbitrary power over lawfulness. 
In the case of commercial law, arbitrary intervention was enshrined in the law, a 
situation which did not change throughout the period, apart from some revisions in 
the oil and mining industries. Lawfulness, defined as a series of regulations that 
limited the arbitrary action of officials, was therefore theoretically not a significant 
force in the Russian commercial environment, especially where it concerned foreign 
enterprises. 
 
This dependence upon the discretionary power of officials did not necessarily mean 
that the law automatically stunted the development of private enterprise. Essentially, 
Russian commercial law resulted in the potential flexibility of action on the part of 
the officials who held these discretionary powers. Whether this flexibility of action 
lead to the suffocation of private enterprise in Russia was therefore entirely up to the 
nature of the Tsarist bureaucracy in St Petersburg or in the localities. Apart from the 
more stringent regulations surrounding the oil industry in 1907, which were arguably 
a response to the crisis in the oil industry, the law actually introduced few explicit 
barriers for the development of private enterprise, aside from the geographical 
restrictions placed of foreign companies operating in strategically sensitive areas. 
What the law did not achieve, however, was the development of definite legal norms 
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for the granting of permissions for various aspects of company operations. It is very 
difficult to see how the law in itself would have encouraged the development of 
concrete assumptions among the business community, and especially among the 
representatives of British investment, for whom the permissions system was 
especially stringent. This would have depended upon the Russian government’s 
commitment to the principles of accountability and adherence to consistent 
regulation. It is thus important to study how the law was applied by the Russian 
government in practice, and whether there was a movement towards uniformity and 
consistency in its application in its interactions with British business interests before 
1914.
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Chapter 2. The Witte system and Russian Economic Policy towards 
Foreign Capital, 1892-1914 
 
 
Russian commercial law gave responsible state bodies a large amount of 
discretionary power over the incorporation and affairs of foreign companies during 
the period in question. Due to the position of those companies, discretionary power 
could never be successfully challenged due to weak industrial organisations and the 
lack of an effective and independent judiciary. This arbitrary and autocratic power of 
the state was to an extent reflected in Russian economic policy under Witte. Witte 
was unable to make substantial changes to the corpus of Russian commercial law 
regarding foreign companies. However, he attempted to effect significant changes in 
the manner in which the Russian government interacted with foreign business 
interests, attempting to impose a more unified, consistent approach and closer 
adherence to regulations. These changes were undertaken because he recognized the 
importance of clearly delineated guidelines for state interaction with business for 
foreign companies. However, he did not attempt to limit the overall arbitrary power 
of the state itself. In fact, he preserved the power of the state to break its own 
guidelines in the pursuit of what he viewed to be economic necessity. What emerged 
was an inherently contradictory system, where Witte’s arbitrary intervention in 
economic policy in order to attract foreign investment undermined his attempts to 
introduce a consistent economic policy and adherence to the rule of law in 
government relations with foreign companies. This contradiction was only nullified 
to an extent after his departure from the Ministry of Finance and the effects of the 
economic depression of 1900-1904 resulted in a cessation of government 
concessions and special dispensation given to various foreign companies.  
 
There has been considerable debate as to the effect of Russian economic policy in the 
period. Earlier interpretations regard industrial growth towards the end of the 
nineteenth century in the context of intrinsic Russian backwardness, and therefore 
industrialisation was sustained by the state’s economic policies, particularly those of 
75 
 
the Witte system.1 Historians who have identified self-perpetuating growth patterns 
in the Russian economy after the abolition of serfdom that were sustained until the 
economic downturn of 1900-1904 have challenged the traditional view.2 After the 
recovery of the Russian economy in 1907, it is also fairly widely accepted that 
growth was mainly induced through a self-perpetuating domestic demand for 
consumer goods, with government rearmament programmes playing a smaller role.3 
More recently, historians such as Olga Crisp and John McKay have emphasised the 
importance of the autonomous growth of Russian industry and the interaction 
between government policy and these market forces. Studies of individual Russian 
firms and industries have been casting increasing level of doubt over the traditional 
model of state-induced industrialisation, calling for McKay to call for historians to 
‘re-examine the state’s allegedly decisive contribution to Russian industrialisation at 
the macro-level and in quantitative terms’.4 Other historians have argued that the 
policies behind state induced growth in the last decades of tsarist Russia were part of 
a tradition of arbitrary intervention that stifled the development of legality in the 
business environment, and as a result attempted to implement clear regulations so 
poorly that they appeared arbitrary and contradictory.5 These positions afford the 
historian the opportunity to assess the extent to which Russian economic policy 1892 
to 1914 was underpinned by autocratic principles, and thus influenced by other 
considerations unrelated to economic development, especially in relation to foreign 
participation in Russian industry. 
 
As part of their investigation into the success of state induced growth, historians have 
investigated the extent to which Russian economic policy in the period attracted 
foreign investment. Soviet historians generally followed the established line that the 
Russian government arbitrarily supported small cliques of foreign capitalist 
                                                          
1 A. Gerschenkron, ‘The Rate of Growth in Russia, Since 1885’, 146; see also A. Gerschenkron, 
Europe in the Russian Mirror 102-103 where he argues that the state effectively ‘replaced’ certain 
economic preconditions that had stimulated growth in England and Germany; T. von Laue, ‘The High 
Cost and the Gamble of the Witte System’, 425-48. 
2 V. Ia. Laverychev, ‘Rol' gosudarstva v sotsial'no-ekonomicheskom razvitii Rossii’; B. V. 
Anan'ich,’The Economic Policy of the Tsarist Government and Enterprise in Russia; Barkai, ‘The 
Macro-Economics of Tsarist Russia’, 354. 
3 Falkus The Industrialisation of Russia, 75. 
4 Mckay, ‘Restructuring the Russian Petroleum Industry’, 104. 
5 Owens, The Corporation under Russian Law, 117; Gatrell, ‘Economic Culture, Economic Policy and 
Economic Growth’, 39. 
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entrepreneurs, leading to the formation of syndicates such as Prodomat and Prodogul, 
to the detriment of the development of the Russian economy.6 Recently these 
positions have been somewhat revised by historians in the Russian Federation, who 
have found that the corpus of commercial law and government restrictions generally 
did not act as a barrier to foreign investment, and that especially with Witte’s support 
foreign companies were able to commence their activities in Russia with little 
hindrance.7 The most significant problem for the Russian government was how to 
create an adequate regulatory framework for foreign capital, especially in regions 
and industries that had been developed almost exclusively by foreign capital before 
1900.8 According to some recent studies, the Russian government created an 
institutional space for foreign enterprises and brought business regulation into line 
with Western Europe, but at the same time they stress foreign enterprise was often 
regulated informally by the government.9 
 
This chapter explores the relationship between foreign capital under the Witte system 
and the autocracy. It shows how Witte’s economic policies were rooted in the past 
economic policies of his predecessors, and how the attraction of foreign capital to 
Russia was a central part of these reform packages. This chapter then goes on to 
analyse how Witte attempted to create a consistent regulatory environment in order 
to attract foreign capital to Russia. It then looks at how the autocratic system affected 
this development, and how opposition to Witte’s plans led to inconsistency and 
arbitrariness. This is then applied to the period after Witte moved on from the 
Ministry of Finance to later Russian policy towards foreign capital and industrial 
growth. 
                                                          
6 Sidorov et al., eds., ‘Dokumenty po istorii monopolisticheskogo kapitalizma v Rossii’; M. P. Viatkin 
et al., eds., Iz istorii imperializma v Rossii, vol. 1 of Trudy Leningradskogo otdeleniia instituta istorii 
(Leningrad, 1959); A. L. Sidorov, Ob osobennostiakh imperializma v Rossii. 
7 Potkina Pravovoe regulirovanie predprinimatel’skoi deyatel’nosti v Rossii, 209-210; L. 
Sapogovskaia, Berezovskaia zolotopromishleniia kompnaniia, (1874-1917 gg.) (Ekaterinburg: 2004), 
178; the development of Tsaritsyn defence and heavy industries is characterised as being self-
perpetuating after initial government stimulation by M.M. Zarorul’ko, V. V. Bulatov, and V. N. 
Koctornichenko, ‘Vickers’ v Rossii: materialy dlia razrabotki problematiki inostrannogo kapitala i 
gosudarstvenno-chastnogo partnerstva v voennoi,neftiannoi i elektrotehnicheskoi otrasliakh 
promishlennosti Rossii i  SSSR (Volgograd: 2012), 109. 
8 O. Baev, Inostrannii kapital v promishlennosti kuznetskogo basseina (Kemerovo: Kuzbassvuzizdat, 
2004), 173. 
9 M. N. Barishnikov, K. K. Vishniakov-Vishnevetskii Inostrannie predprinimateli v Peterburge vo 
vtoroi polovine XIX-nachale XX veka (St Peterburg: CPBIGO, 2006), 427. 
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2.1 Foreign Capital and the Witte System 
 
Of central importance to the Witte system was the attraction of foreign capital to 
Russia. Many other aspects of the Witte system, such as stabilising the rouble and 
infrastructure projects were designed to facilitate this aim. Historians of the Witte 
system such as von Laue have convincingly argued that the Witte system was not a 
unified plan, and that its separate policy objectives remained largely distinct.10 
However, the attraction of foreign capital to Russia was a common goal across the 
various components of the Witte system from 1892-1900. Tariff reform, the gold 
standard, and even railway construction all contributed to the attraction of foreign 
investment to Russia, which Witte viewed as essential to Russia’s economic 
development as a great power due to the dearth of capital in Russia and the 
competitive element that would stimulate Russian industry. 
 
Witte believed that foreign capital was an important component of his system, and 
that attracting foreign capital was of paramount importance to the Russian 
government, largely due to the lack of capital available in Russia in order to exploit 
her copious natural resources. In a secret memorandum to Nicholas II in 1899, Witte 
characterised Russia as occupying the position of a semi-colonial country, which 
supplied Western Europe with cheap raw materials and agricultural products while 
not possessing the abilities to make use of her abundant natural materials in order to 
develop manufacturing industries. In a separate minute, he placed the blame for this 
on the lack of abundant capital in Russia as a result of excessive taxation in order to 
fund Russia’s foreign policy objectives.11 This sentiment towards foreign capital was 
not just exclusive to Witte. Dimitrii Mendeleev, who had played an instrumental role 
in the development of the Russian oil industry in the 1870s and supported freer 
competition in the production and marketing of kerosene,12 argued that foreign 
capital was essential for developing Russia’s industry, and that not to do so would 
                                                          
10 Von Laue, Sergei Witte and the Industrialisation of Russia, 77. 
11 Witte and M. N. Murav’eva, minute notes on Russian commercial industrial policy, March 17 1899, 
in Witte sobranie sochinenii i dokumental’nykh materialov vol. 4 book 1 (Moscow: Nauka, 2002), 
201. 
12 McKay, ‘Restructuring the Russian Petroleum Industry’, 90. 
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cause significant harm to the country. Russia was not America; whereas in America 
there was an abundance of capital in Russia there was not. Russian industry 
desperately required the further mechanisation of the means of production, and for 
this foreign capital was essential.13 
 
When Witte became the minister of Finance in 1892, attracting foreign capital to 
Russia was the stimulus to some of his first economic policies. One of his first acts 
was to raise tariff rates on foreign manufactured goods. This tariff had two 
interrelated goals; on the one hand in protected Russian industry from competition 
from cheaper foreign made manufactured goods, and at the same time it encouraged 
foreign firms that had been engaged in selling to Russia to set up manufacturing 
operations in Russia behind the tariff wall.14 He also began to cultivate a network of 
agents overseas in order to cultivate a positive image of Russia’s progress. These 
individuals published reports and guides for foreign companies interested in Russian 
investments.15 
 
Between 1890 and 1901 the railway network increased from 30,600 to 56,500 km. 
Witte also increased Russian state ownership of the railways by buying up railway 
stock.16 Government orders for railroad materials undeniably had a positive effect 
upon heavy industry, and Witte also undertook to stimulate local industry 
surrounding his large railroad projects, especially in the case of the trans-Siberian 
railroad, much of which was achieved through foreign investment. According to 
Gatrell this expansion meant that by 1900 Russian capitalists were in a position to 
exploit the improved access to material supplies and markets.17 This was especially 
true for the development of some of the more remote regions in Russia, where 
industry had previously struggled due to the lack of infrastructure, much of which 
                                                          
13 RGIA f. 20, op. 4 d. 4231, l.74, 82-83, Dimitrii Mendeleev to Nicholas II 11 November 1898. 
14 Crisp, Studies in the Russian Economy, 32. 
15 S. Harcave, Count Sergei Witte and the Twilight of Imperial Russia (London: M. E. Sharpe, 2004), 
71; Witte targeted the British capital market in particular for oil investment, M. Chshieva, Istoriia 
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16 Gatrell, The Tsarist Economy, 151. 
17 Von Laue, Sergei Witte and the Industrialisation of Russia, 84; Gatrell, The Tsarist Economy, 154. 
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they had previously been expected to provide themselves.18 However, as an example 
of the disunity in Russian economic policy in the period, the railways were often 
built in order to satisfy strategic, and not commercial, concerns.19 
 
At the same time in 1897 Russia was able to join the gold standard. This was 
achieved through a multi-pronged strategy of eliminating speculation of the rouble 
on the Berlin Bourse in 1894, introducing gold into circulation by permitting 
business transactions to be concluded at the rate of gold on the day, maintaining and 
building a large gold reserve through increased bullion production, stimulation of 
grain exports through railway tariffs and Russian credit operations abroad.20 This 
development stabilized the rouble, freeing up capital for domestic investment that 
had been previously been employed in currency speculation, and made Russian 
government railroad bonds and company shares more attractive to foreign 
investors.21 Taken together, these significant parts of the Witte system helped to 
foster a level of economic opportunity in Russia that would have attracted foreign 
investment. 
 
While British capital took longer to respond to these new conditions created by the 
Witte system, as will be discussed in a further chapter, French capital responded very 
quickly, partly due to the effect of the Franco-Russian alliance. The Franco-Russian 
alliance in 1894 was an important phase in Witte’s plan for the industrialisation of 
Russia, as it secured for the Russians the continued support of the French money 
market for state loans and investment in Russian joint-stock ventures.22 
 
The effect of Witte’s reforms on the influx of foreign capital in the 1890s that was 
led by the French was enormous. In 1890 there was 214.7 million roubles of foreign 
capital invested in Russian companies; by 1895 this figure was 280.1 million and in 
                                                          
18 McKay, ‘Restructuring the Russian Petroleum Industry’, 98. 
19 Falkus, The Industrialisation of Russia, 74. 
20 Crisp, Studies in the Russian Economy, 106-108. 
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1900 it had increased to 911 million roubles. In industries that were particularly 
dominated by foreign (mainly French) capital, such as the southern mining and 
metallurgical industries, foreign capital made up 90 percent of capital in joint-stock 
companies, up from approximately a third in 1890.23 
 
Foreign capital was therefore an essential component of the Witte system, and 
complemented other central aspects of the Witte system, such as railway 
construction, the gold standard, and tariffs. As this chapter will explore, this created 
two pressures; the fact that Witte recognised the need to implement a lawful and 
regulated system for foreign companies in order to attract foreign capital, and the fact 
that government stimulation of the economy, including attracting foreign investment 
was undertaken in an autocratic manner. 
 
 
2.2 Autocratic Prelude to the Witte System 
 
Fundamental to the Witte system was the bureaucratic and ideological environment 
in which he attempted to implement these reforms. Due to this environment, Witte’s 
later attempts to impose lawfulness and legal standards on business regulation 
fundamentally conflicted with the manner in which he attempted to stimulate 
industrial growth. Some within the Tsarist government advocated a laissez-faire 
approach of restricting the state’s activities to maintaining order and allowing 
industry to evolve organically. Others supported close regulation and control over 
industry, especially in favour of protecting agricultural interests. As a result 
government intervention where it did occur was arbitrary and inconsistent due to 
conflicting policy objectives under the autocratic system. 
 
The lack of development of the Witte system before the 1890s has been attributed to 
the bureaucratic culture of Russia, whereby government officials resented 
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manifestations of industrialism such as the stock market and the extension of modern 
property rights to land. Ultimately, these restrictions existed in order to preserve 
autocratic privilege combined with state supervision, and to protect society from the 
consequences of capitalist industrialisation.24  Russian economic policy was 
therefore marred by disagreements in the 1860s and 1870s. Marks has shown that 
divisions in the government over the construction of the trans-Siberian railroad 
stemmed from divisions in the world view of the Russian bureaucracy; one group 
under Loris-Melikov rejected the role of the state in the economic life of the country 
and favoured a route that served market interests, and conservatives such as Pos’et 
favouring government intervention in improving the economic conditions of the 
country. Bunge was caught between the two sides of this debate. While attempting to 
modernise the state on western lines by promoting ideals such as freedom of the 
person and freedom of private enterprise, he attempted to take into account what he 
regarded as particularly Russian characteristics, such as the necessity of preserving 
the autocratic power of the state.25  The practical implications of these dispute was 
that Russian industry struggled to develop before the 1880s. A low tariff policy 
meant that Russian industry struggled significantly against foreign competition 
before Vyshnegradskii introduced higher tariffs. Industries based in remote regions 
such as the oil and mining industries struggled because of a lack of government 
funded infrastructure projects.26 
 
Witte’s monetary and financial reforms had considerable basis in the reforming 
efforts of his predecessors at the Ministry of Finance. Attempts were made by 
successive ministers from Reutern to accumulate a gold reserve and to create a more 
efficient money supply in Russia, which they believed would fuel industrialisation. 
However, these attempts met with limited success due to inter-ministerial opposition, 
a symptom of the autocratic system in which these ministers operated. Reutern was 
able to introduce the payment of customs duty in gold and proposed to allow 
business transactions to be conducted in gold at the rate of the day, however the latter 
was blocked in the state council due to desires to exercise controls over businesses at 
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the time. Later, Bunge attempted to occupy a middle ground between industrial and 
agricultural interests by advocating a dual strategy of promoting agricultural activity 
through liberal taxation and the extension of credit, while also introducing protective 
customs in order to stimulate industry. He was limited by the need to balance the 
budget and was forced to introduce a number of indirect taxes. Vyshnegradskii was 
more successful, aiming to accumulate a gold reserve through increasing exports and 
attracting gold into the country, culminating in the tariff of 1891, which resulted in a 
considerable surplus in the balance of trade, averaging 311.2 million paper roubles 
annually 1887-1891, against 62 million annually 1882-86. He was also able to 
restructure Russian state debt on the Paris markets in 1888, leading to an annual 
saving of 12.5 million roubles on the maintenance of Russia’s state debts.27 
 
State intervention in industry before Witte was also often haphazard and arbitrary. 
This tendency can be traced to Peter the Great; his progress in governance was 
matched by a spurt in the growth of the industries that he viewed as important, such 
as metals, hemp, timber and gunpowder. This development also involved the 
arbitrary displacement of peasant populations in order to provide a workforce.28 In 
the decades preceding Witte, the Russian government took many steps to facilitate 
the growth of the Russian metal industry; it facilitated the flotation of municipal 
loans that guaranteed markets for industry, and often insisted that orders be placed 
with Russian industry. This was often done in a highly arbitrary manner, for example 
the Warsaw municipality was forced to place orders with a Russian firm under threat 
of non-provision of transport costs and import duty relief. The finance ministry also 
encouraged municipalities and private banks to undertake loans to industry.29 
 
In 1883 state policy in the petroleum industry became more interventionist. Domestic 
taxes imposed by Bunge and Vyshnegradskii on the domestic consumption of 
Kerosene led to a reorientation of the Caucasian petroleum industry towards export, 
and combined with further taxes imposed by Witte in 1892 led to the industry 
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altering production towards producing liquid fuel for railway and industrial 
consumption.30 Witte’s encouragement of British petroleum interests in the Caucasus 
also mirrors Vyshnegradskii’s support of the Rothschilds in the area in the 1880s, 
and McKay argues that foreign infusions of capital were used by successive Russian 
Ministers of Finance to quicken the pace of the development of the Russian oil 
industry.31 However, in McKay’s analysis state intervention in Baku was not very 
successful due to ministerial divisions, as well as conflict between local 
businessmen, which worked in favour of interest group politics.32 
 
The Witte system was precluded by a system of arbitrary intervention in support for 
various industries and monetary policies by previous Russian Ministers of Finance. 
These policies resulted in a complex interaction between market forces and 
government policy that resulted in industrial growth, as opposed to state induced 
growth. The basis of inconsistency in government policy was already established, 
and significant disputes between different bureaucratic culture and outlooks 
threatened to undermine Witte’s economic reforms. 
 
 
2.3 The Witte System and the Importance of Regulatory Frameworks 
 
Witte recognised that foreign companies viewed Russian investments as carrying 
substantial risk, and that this risk was mainly due to the lack of clear regulation, and 
a consistent economic policy. As such, he undertook measures to improve the 
incorporation by concession system and the system of company charters in order to 
reduce the amount of arbitrary power given to government agencies, and to create a 
unified governmental policy towards foreign investment. At the same time, he 
believed in the use of arbitrary state action in order to stimulate growth in key areas 
of the economy, such as heavy industries, oil production, and those industries 
connected to the trans-Siberian railroad. The Witte system was therefore inherently 
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contradictory; on the one hand Witte attempted to create a unified government policy 
towards foreign enterprises and to limit the exercise of autocratic power by 
government agencies whilst simultaneously manipulating the Russian economy in an 
arbitrary and inconsistent manner in order to promote growth. This paradoxically 
created an environment where foreign enterprises became dependent on arbitrary 
government policies for stimulating growth, and defeated the former aim of Witte’s 
policies. 
 
From the beginning of his tenure as Minister of Finance Witte pursued a policy of 
adapting Russia’s laws to the needs or expectations of foreign investors. In 1894 
Witte recognized the need for a more suitable framework of commercial law in 
Russia, mentioning it in his budget report for 1894 as ‘the unfavourable conditions 
which cramp the economic development of this country’.33 Early measures to 
improve Russia’s company laws included the standardisation of weights and 
measures in 1893 and the revision of patent laws and trademarks in 1896. Witte had 
also taken steps to make Russia’s industrial taxes more consistent by introducing a 
progressive tax in 1894 and clearly defining net profit and tax obligations in 1898.34 
 
These initial steps culminated in an attempt to reform the incorporation by 
concession system, and the system of company charters. These efforts began in 1899 
when both Witte and Dimitrii Mendeleev, in a position in the Ministry of Finance, 
attempted to reform both aspects of company law. Witte attempted to persuade 
Nicholas II to abandon the incorporation by concession system for a more liberal 
incorporation by registration system that existed in Western Europe. Witte believed 
that the most obstructive stipulations commonly found in this system was the ban on 
foreign companies holding property in the Western provinces of Russia, the need to 
apply to the committee of ministers for incorporation, and that a foreign company 
could be denied permission to operate in Russia at any time for no reason.35 
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Witte believed that such arbitrary decisions by local and central authorities to a large 
extent hindered foreign participation in Russian economic life. This was due to 
difficulties caused by the ‘difficulty and ordeal that foreign founders must undergo in 
Russia, all kinds of applications… which must be applied for at the provincial and 
central offices, depending not only on the laws but on administrative offices...’.36 He 
also pointed out that the concession system led to the development of the importance 
of the granting of exclusive benefits by the government in individual cases, which 
was both unsustainable for the government and prevented the formation of a clear 
regulatory framework.37 Mendeleev had earlier also highlighted these problems. In 
1898 he had reported to Nicholas II that Russia attracted very little direct investment, 
a trend he attributed to a widespread belief among foreign entrepreneurs that the 
Russian government was hostile to foreign investment and acted arbitrarily to protect 
its interests.38 
 
Witte’s efforts in this area eventually led to the establishment of the Tsitovitch 
commission, which was tasked with examining the importation of incorporation by 
registration system to Russia. The commission made a series of recommendations for 
the liberalising of Russian company law, although none were eventually 
implemented.39 During this time, however, Witte recommended not introducing any 
new restrictions on foreign capital until at least 1904, and not amending company 
charters during this time either.40 This is significant because Witte effectively 
requested that the Russian government limit its own reach in relation to the formation 
of foreign companies for a five-year period in order to achieve consistency and to 
encourage foreign capital inflow. Given that industrial regulations and policy up to 
1899 and to the end of the Tsarist period effectively took the form of the outdated 
commercial legislation of 1836 and subsequent restrictions introduced by the Russian 
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government on an ad-hoc basis, this represented a significant attempt to curb the 
autocratic power of the government. 
 
Alongside the deliberations of the Tsitovitch commission, Witte adopted a system in 
1901 whereby changes and additions to joint-stock companies capital size and 
composition, business activities, and the timing of general meeting could be made 
without prior application to the relevant authorities. While this was initially meant to 
be a temporary measure while the Tsitovitch commission deliberated changes to the 
1836 law on the incorporation of joint-stock companies this system persisted until 
1914.41 By this time, Witte had also ended the use of the controversial tenth clause 
included in the charters of most foreign companies, which stated that the government 
could withdraw its permission for the foreign companies’ operations in Russia at any 
time for no reason.42 This policy aimed to reduce financial risks for foreign 
companies, and it also removed further elements of arbitrary governmental power 
over them. 
 
Alongside reforms to the incorporation system and amendments to company charters, 
Witte also attempted to create a more unified government policy towards foreign 
companies. According to Witte’s letters to Nicholas II, a consistent government 
policy towards industry, and in particular foreign capital, was paramount. 
Government industrial policies needed to be carried out with strict consistency 
regularity, and conform to a defined plan, otherwise government policy could cause 
significant shocks to the economic whole and cause ‘painful and pernicious 
consequences’. Even beneficent policies towards industrial interests could take 
decades to bear fruit if they were applied in an inconsistent manner.43 Witte urged 
Nicholas II in 1900 to adopt a clear plan for the industrial development in the country 
so that the actions of all responsible departments of government could be strictly 
consistent with each other.44 Witte highlighted in particular the number of ministerial 
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agencies that were involved in the process of incorporating a foreign company and in 
decisions over its activities, as was afforded to the by Russia’s commercial law.45 
 
As well as attempting to influence Nicholas II in this area, Witte initiated discussions 
in 1899 in the council of ministers to attempt to make restrictions and regulations on 
the operation of foreign companies in Russia more consistent. He pointed out that 
regulations banning foreigners from some business activities and acquisitions in 
sensitive areas were often enforced for one company, but disregarded in the case of 
another. This state of affairs, Witte argued, hampered the development of joint-stock 
enterprises, a necessary mode of foreign entry into the Russian business 
environment.46 
 
British charters illustrate the inconsistencies in the criteria that the various ministries 
applied to the opening of foreign enterprises in Russia. For example, in the case of 
the British oil company Caucasian Oil, the local government offices in 
correspondence with the Ministry of Finance stated that they had no objections to the 
formation of the company as long as the conditions of their charter met those of other 
foreign companies in the area, such as the British ‘Russian Oil Company’.47 This 
seems to suggest a variation of the typical company charters in use in the Caucasian 
oil region for foreign companies. The mining department of the Ministry of State 
Domains had different criteria, stating that the company should not be given rights to 
begin operations in the Ugadkakh region, but that otherwise the ministry did not 
meet any objections to the company’s other operations.48 
 
Despite his attempts to reform Russian laws surrounding the incorporation of 
companies, the systems of company charters and creating a unified economic policy, 
Witte never envisaged the abandonment of the autocratic system in Russia. 
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According to one of the more prominent Soviet historians of Imperial Russian 
economic policy, there was ‘no official acknowledgement of the significance of 
Russian commercial or industrial development or of the authority of the Ministry of 
Finance to carry out a unified commercial and industrial policy’.49 Witte’s ideal of a 
regulated system rested on this being imposed by the Tsar on his government in an 
autocratic manner. According to Witte, only the sovereign ruler of the Russian 
Empire could coordinate the various arms of the Russian government in order to 
create a ‘unified and harmonious system, which your subjects have come to expect in 
other branches of government’, which would encourage the ‘entrepreneurial spirit 
and diligence’ of his officials.50 
 
James Whishaw, a British merchant who had taken Russian citizenship in 1884 and 
was engaged in the export of flax from Russia, and then later in the Baku oil 
industry, believed that Witte attempted to retain the arbitrary power of the state over 
foreign companies.51 Whishaw was in a reasonable position to judge Russian 
economic policy towards English companies, as he managed the Whishaw family 
business that had been established in the Russian flax trade from St Petersburg since 
before the Crimean War, and served as the British Vice-Consul in St Petersburg from 
1886 to 1899. Around this date he decided to abandon shipping for oil interests in 
Baku, and became the responsible agent for many British oil companies operating in 
Russia.52 
 
Many other British companies at the time expressed similar concerns that the 
Russian government was attempting to implement tight controls over the activities of 
foreign companies in the late 1890s. The British shipping firm, Samuel and Co, who 
were engaged in the storage and shipping of Caucasian oil from Batumi, complained 
to the foreign office in March 1898 that the Russian government was bringing great 
pressure to bear on the company to register their ships as Russian and to register their 
company as a Russian company, with Russian directors. According to the company, 
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the Russian government in this capacity was acting arbitrarily in order to protect their 
interests, especially as they believed that Batumi had been designated a free port by 
the treaty of Berlin in 1878.53 
 
The actions of the Russian authorities at Batumi caused other companies serious 
concerns, especially in relation to the security of their property. In 1899, the military 
authorities in Batumi cancelled all foreign companies’ leases of land for construction 
of tank storage, ostensibly due to security concerns. The Tank Storage and Carriage 
Company, a British company affected, appealed to the Foreign Office, stating that it 
had damaged investor confidence in the area due to the way in which the Russian 
authorities protected their interests. 
This information came quite unexpectedly, and has very much upset all people 
interested in the naphtha products export trade, and you will easily find how difficult it 
is to do regular business under such circumstances, when the authorities at a moment’s 
notice can upset all commercial arrangements made.54 
 
Witte himself engaged in granting special rights and privileges to companies that he 
viewed as essential for the development of Russian industry, usually without any 
regard for the opinions of industrial interests. For example, Witte tended to use 
government assistance such as subsidies and favourable procurement orders to 
support certain industries that he thought were important, such as the iron industry, at 
the expense of others such as textiles, and manipulated freight rates on government 
railways to promote exports. While he sought the advice of various industrial 
congresses and interest groups, he tended to only act upon them if he considered 
them to be within the national interest.55 In his memoirs, Witte is quite dismissive 
about the input of business interests, especially when they opposed the extra tariff on 
goods imported from Germany, describing them as self-interested and not qualified 
to comment on industrial policy.56 Witte had also been doing this on a small basis 
before 1901 in specific industries. For example, Chshieva has recently shown how 
Witte adopted Russian policy on industrial credit in the Caucasian oil industry to suit 
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the need of foreign capitalists.57 These arbitrary policies resulted in conflicting 
results. For example, he encouraged the growth of cartels in order to stabilize the 
domestic market, but at the same time maintained laws against price fixing.58 Such 
inconsistent policies arising as a result of a desire to stimulate growth could in fact be 
interpreted as exacerbating the inconsistencies and arbitrary aspects of the system. 
 
Previous studies have shown that Witte gave several British companies preferential 
treatment in the oil industry, and that personal connections with high government 
played an important part in company formation and successfully obtaining 
permission for various business activities. Witte was tempted to facilitate British 
companies in particular because of the potential funds of the London stock exchange. 
Companies such as the Shibaev Company and the Russian Oil Company were 
extremely successful in Caucasian oil fields because of their ties to Witte. According 
to Chshieva, these companies were able to pressure Witte to intercede on their behalf 
with ministries such as the Ministry of State Domains where they did not meet 
Russian legal requirements to begin their operations. Thus these British companies 
were able to obtain free action in Russian oil fields throughout the period in question, 
with the exception of the crisis years of 1900-4.59 
 
The practice of British companies obtaining special favours from Witte was also 
prevalent in other industries that British companies were involved in. For example, 
W. Vesty and Co., who were engaged in the export of Siberian butter from Riga 
received permission from Witte to import materials such as galvanized iron to build 
cold storage facilities in Riga free of import duty.60 Such an exception was in line 
with Witte’s policy of assisting industries that were connected to the construction of 
the trans-Siberian railway. This particular example shows how Witte in pursuing is 
particular economic objectives, in this case in Siberia, was willing to reserve the 
power to override other aspects of his economic policy such as his tariff on foreign 
manufactured goods in this particular example. 
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Witte in part was able to succeed in creating a more regulated environment for 
foreign companies to invest in Russia, and it could be argued that this led to 
increased confidence abroad in Russian investments, a hypothesis that will be tested 
later on in this work. However, Witte’s policy of attracting foreign investment 
through the construction of a regulated system was in itself based on autocratic 
exercise of power. He used his influence over the state council to impose his 
streamlining of the incorporation system, a state of affairs that was never made law, 
and made alterations to existing practice of granting company charters as opposed to 
implementing clear regulations over company formation and operations. He also 
engaged extensively in using arbitrary practices to stimulate industries that he viewed 
as important in order to encourage industrial growth in a haphazard manner that did 
not lead to the development of a consistent and clear economic policy towards 
foreign companies. 
 
 
2.4 Opposition to the Witte System 
 
The inconsistencies in the development of the Witte system between the need to 
develop a unified policy and clear regulation and the arbitrary stimulation of certain 
industries to an extent reflect the opposition that Witte faced from various sections of 
the Russian government in implementing his policies. As has already been identified, 
the Russian government under the autocratic system consisted of multiple 
overlapping jurisdictions, so economic reforms necessarily conflicted with other 
interests, most notably those of the landed nobility. Therefore, the autocratic 
environment in which Witte tried to implement his reforms worked to preserve 
autocratic power over the affairs of foreign businesses. 
 
There is a general historical argument that as a result of their declining position, the 
Russian landed gentry opposed state policies that favoured industrialisation over, or 
to the detriment of, agriculture. Agricultural productivity stagnated in Russia after 
92 
 
the emancipation, agricultural output growing at an average rate of 2% a year, just 
above the rate of population increase. Conversely, manufacturing output grew at a 
rate of 5% annually, although by 1913 manufacturing only employed 5% of the 
workforce and accounted for 20% of the national income.61 Output per worker 
increased at a rate of 0.9% annually in agriculture from 1860 to 1913, compared to 
2.7% annually for manufacturing.  Research by Barkai has suggested that 
industrialisation in Russia was essentially financed by harsher taxation by the state, 
which essentially tapped in to internal resources in Russia in order to finance large 
state projects and the attainment of the gold standard.62 This view has been 
challenged by Drummond, who points out that the Russian government actually kept 
a looser control over money supply in 1896 to 1897 and afterwards than it had done 
in the 1880s and 1890s.63  
 
In his memoirs, Witte stated that foreign capital would have entered Russia more 
abundantly had it not been for the interference of the Russian regime, and the various 
‘experiments’ that were imposed by self-interested parties in the court camarilla.64 
Witte also made reference to the fact that there was substantial opposition to the 
influx of foreign capital into Russia, stating that these voices should not be able to 
influence policy in a manner that may affect the consistency of Russian economic 
policy towards foreign multinationals. To this end, he stated there were certain 
policies that the Russian government should stand firm on in the face of reactionary 
opposition. These included policies such as the high customs tariff of 1892, widely 
opposed by landed interests that regarded it as having a negative effect on 
agricultural exports.65 Mendeleev shared these concerns in 1898, and stated that the 
plans of reactionaries to thwart Witte’s plans of attracting foreign capital to Russia 
threatened the future economic initiative of the country.66 
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Witte was unable to make any progress towards improving the legislation 
surrounding the formation and operation of joint-stock companies in Russia. 
Historians have seen the failure of the Tsitovitch commission as due to certain 
sections of the Russian government including Witte being wary of expanding the 
reach and scope of foreign companies in Russia.67 In his memoirs, Witte claimed that 
his efforts to facilitate the formation of join-stock companies were systematically 
thwarted by the Ministry of the Interior, and Plehve and Durnovo in particular.68 
 
To an extent this appears to have been partly due to xenophobic elements of the 
Russian government objecting to foreign economic activity of Russian soil. Before 
Witte’s attempts to modernise the system of the incorporation of foreign companies, 
the process of obtaining permission to begin operations in Russia was very 
inconsistent for foreign companies. Often British companies were refused for very 
abstract and unclear reasons. For example, as late as 1899 the Ministry of War 
refused to grant permission for the establishment of the Anglo-Russian Chatma 
Company because it considered the development of oil fields in the Terek region was 
not in the interest of Russian industry, a reason that appears to not be in the purview 
of the Ministry of War.69 
 
Russian economic policy could vacillate between the needs of agriculture and 
industry, and it is therefore indicative that Witte faced significant opposition from 
landed interests within the Russian government itself in his attempts to promote 
industry. There was also, before Witte’s reforms, considerable resistance among 
some parts of the Russian government towards foreign economic activity in Russia. 
These sources of opposition created conflict under the autocratic system of 
overlapping jurisdictions and led to the creation of further inconsistencies in how 
economic policy was applied to foreign companies. Therefore, while Witte attempted 
to introduce consistent policy and regulation as part of his economic reforms, these 
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were constantly undermined by the autocratic system in which he operated, and in 
many cases, could only be overcome by the use of autocratic power. 
 
 
2.5 The persistence of the Witte System 
 
After Witte’s departure as Minister of Finance and the upheavals of 1905, the 
industrial policies of the government were characterised by retrenchment. The state 
took a less active role in stimulating industry, and due to concerns brought about by 
the economic downturn of 1900-1904, placed more emphasis on the development of 
Russian industry than securing foreign investment. This resulted in a different 
business environment from that under the Witte system; as government interference 
in industry to promote foreign investment became less prevalent, some of the more 
arbitrary aspects of the Witte system were reduced, and government policy towards 
foreign enterprise to an extent became more consistent. 
 
Gerschenkron argued that as industrial growth after 1907 was driven mainly by 
cartels and large banks instead of the state, the state’s role was reduced to that of a 
hindrance in this period.70 Although the state took a much less active role in the 
economy, this view is probably too simplistic. Gatrell argues that after 1905 the 
government refused to countenance any significant assistance to the private sector, 
however this created a significant amount of uncertainty. The government, as a result 
of the industrial downturn, used its control of state assets more aggressively to 
counter any increase in the power of domestic or foreign capitalists, and kept them at 
length through design of mass regulations. In fact, post Witte, the Ministry of 
Finance tended to regard the development of private enterprise as a convenient 
source of revenue, not a policy to pursue as an end in itself, and as a result businesses 
and industry developed in an atmosphere of official antagonism and public distaste.71 
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The government policy of stimulating only certain industries, such as those relating 
to defence, led to criticisms from industrial societies that the government was 
following a system of state-socialism.72 At the same time, the government defended 
the interests of Russian industry from imported European goods and from anti-
capitalist forces in the state Duma.73 There therefore emerged tensions in government 
policy; on the one hand the government aid to industry was significantly reduced, but 
on the other hand the government retained a semi-active role in certain areas of the 
economy. However, the arbitrary granting of concessions and privileges under Witte 
occurred less frequently by this reduction in activity, although it did not necessarily 
result in a more stable business environment. 
 
This trend is especially evident in relation to foreign business. The economic 
downturn of 1900-1904 resulted in distrust towards foreign enterprise among 
members of the Russian government, and the effects of this economic downturn 
strengthened the hand of those within the Russian government who viewed foreign 
enterprise as a threat to Russia’s economic stability. Generally this resulted in a 
reduction in special favours and exceptions given out to foreign companies in 
industries regarded as important to the Russian government.74 It also presaged a trend 
that was continued up to 1914 where the Russian government began to focus more 
on stimulating Russian industry at the expense of foreign companies in Russia. 
 
Government procurement orders began to be limited to only Russian companies; for 
example by 1913 the question of issuing orders for armaments was settled by a 
commission which gave priority to Russian joint-stock companies.75 It also triggered 
a movement towards greater control of joint-stock companies and in 1914 a law was 
almost passed which gave the bureaucracy sweeping new powers over the day to day 
activities of foreign joint stock companies. However, due to the fact that this law 
caused uproar among French investors, the largest holders of government and 
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railway bonds, and Russia’s closest ally in the run up to the outbreak of the First 
World War, this law was eventually abandoned.76 
 
The government targeted syndicates and other types of industrial organisations that 
had hitherto been tolerated. Witte had tolerated the formation of syndicates in order 
to support the interests of foreign firms, especially during the industrial downturn 
post 1900. However, alongside the recovery of the Russian economy in 1907 the 
Russian government began taking action against such organizations, preventing the 
formation of a cartel in the metallurgical industry, beginning court proceedings 
against Prodogul in 1914, and threatening to set up state enterprises to meet state 
needs and lower duties on metallurgical products.77 
 
The clampdown on special privileges accorded to foreign companies is aptly 
demonstrated by the experience of Vesty & Co. Three years after obtaining their 
original concession from Witte, Vesty contacted the foreign office asking for 
diplomatic assistance in Russia. Due to an increase in demand for Siberian butter, the 
company had been obliged to expand its cold storage facilities in Riga in time for the 
butter season in 1902. For reasons of expediency due to the sudden rise in demand 
for Siberian butter in 1902 he had been obliged to further expand his cold storage 
facilities and then retrospectively apply for a reduction in the customs duty applied to 
the materials used. However, as this application was made after Witte’s departure 
from the Ministry of Finance, and during a period where foreign companies were 
granted less largesse due to the economic slowdown of 1900-1904. As a result, the 
application was refused, despite Witte’s earlier assurances to the contrary.78 The 
clash between attempting to create a more consistent economic policy and attempting 
to stimulate key industries related to the trans-Siberian railway in this instance 
appear to have mitigated against the development of a more regulated environment. 
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A major problem that began to confront British companies in this period was the 
extra rigour with which the Russian government applied tax laws on income tax. 
When a new law was passed in 1906 by the Duma introducing a progressive tax on 
the profits of companies, a number of British companies were affected by its 
implementation. The problem was so significant that Charles Smith ,consul at Odessa 
from 1900 to 1913, wrote to the Foreign Office stating that British companies should 
take extra care when publishing their accounts and paying taxes, as there had been 
many instances of British companies being fined due to errors and re assessments of 
their income and profits.79 This new law and its rigorous implementation affected 
two companies covered in this study, the Troitzk and Orsk Goldfields Ltd, and the 
Anglo Russian Cotton Factories Ltd.80 Such problems for British companies suggests 
that the new rigour with which the Russian government applied the law relating to 
income taxes was surprising, and perhaps indicative of a new trend in government 
industrial relations. 
 
Despite these changes in policy due to a new attitude towards foreign enterprise in 
the Ministries of Finance and Trade and Industry, some aspects of the Witte system 
persisted, such as the state’s role of inducing growth through government orders, 
selective assistance and manipulation of certain industries and the system of 
preserving certain special privileges for various companies. Re-armament from 1907 
to 1914 to an extent preserved some of the aspects of the Witte system, namely the 
stimulation of heavy industry through government orders. Gatrell makes the case that 
rearmament brought recovery to Russia’s industry, encouraged capital investment 
and stimulated modern forms of industrial organisation. Government aid packages to 
some private firms suggest that some government departments championed the needs 
of private industry, although the government also focussed upon the regulation and 
close supervision of the management of companies.81 The Octobrist majority of the 
third Duma consistently voted to authorise increasing military budgets due to their 
commitment to Russian imperialism, as well as promoting private property rights in 
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Russia.82 Railway construction continued at a reasonable pace, offering some 
elements of state induced growth, although the rate of additions to the railway 
network was much lower than in the 1890s, averaging 1100 km per year in 1906-
1910 compared to 2820 km per year throughout 1896-1900.83 
 
French investment in banking illuminates this trend after Witte. Following the crisis 
of 1900-1906 it became clear that the Russian government would not let the banks 
fail, and was prepared to go to great lengths to save them from bankruptcy. 
According to Crisp, this policy offered security minded French investors a good 
guarantee of their investments in Russian banks after the crisis. However, French 
banking interests could not operate in Russia regardless of government policy; the 
Russian government’s status as a debtor put it in a reasonably powerful position in 
the relationship, as did its power to remove certain privileges and its tradition of 
interference in the affairs of banks.84 
 
As well as some similarities in policy with the Witte system, the new attitude of the 
Russian government as a result of the economic depression was not reflected in 
legislation. As Thomas Owen has demonstrated, the 1836 corporation law was 
largely still the basis of corporate law in the period, with company charters acquiring 
legal status once they were approved by the Tsar.85 Economic crisis in Russia only 
produced two revisions to corporate law itself that cannot be seen as restrictions 
specifically placed on foreign enterprise. In December 1901 a law was introduced 
that strengthened the position of smaller shareholders at the expense of larger 
shareholders and company directors in order to combat speculation. The law 
introduced thresholds for the attendance of stockholders at company meetings if 
major changes were to be introduced to joint-stock companies, and enabled 
extraordinary company meetings to be called by owners of just one fifth of the stock. 
The law also prevented directors of banks from holding directorships in 
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corporations.86 The second major piece of legislation introduced restrictions on 
Jewish landholding outside of the pale of settlement, and restrictions on Jews being 
able to work as managers for companies issuing bearer shares.87 
 
Taken together, this collection of legislation suggests very little changed during and 
after the industrial downturn and Witte’s departure from the Ministry of Finance. 
However, as the legislation surrounding commercial law changed very rarely since 
1836, and it left such a wide scope for arbitrary implementation of the law by 
government bureaucrats that a change in government policy towards foreign 
businesses would not necessarily be reflected in legislative changes to existing 
corporate laws. The fact that it was reflected in an emerging body of law relating to 
rapidly expanding industries where foreign capital was heavily involved is 
significant, and indicative of a new tendency within the Russian government to more 
heavily regulate and control foreign enterprise. 
 
After Witte, some aspects of his system remained intact. Although the amount of 
special privileges and concessions for specific companies were reduced, due to the 
government taking a reduced role in economic development, government assistance 
on an industry wide basis remained, especially in sectors that the Russian 
government considered to be important such as banking. This could be seen as 
something of an improvement on the Witte system; the Russian government’s 
restriction on special privileges and concessions for individual firms was a logical 
outcome of Witte’s campaign for consistent economic policy and adherence to 
regulations that Witte himself was not able to emulate. However, the stimulation of 
certain industries still caused uncertainty in the business environment, and the 
government took no steps to resolve the inherent problems contained in the body of 
Russian commercial law, apart from where it related to new and emerging industries. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
 
From the evidence presented above, it is undeniable that Witte’s efforts to secure the 
so-called fourth pillar of the Witte system, foreign capital, produced a tangible effect 
in smoothing the process by which foreign companies entered the Russian market. It 
also reduced the level of government interference over their business affairs by 
reducing the number of ministries and governmental agencies that possessed 
jurisdiction over their investments. 
 
These developments did not lead to the formation of a lawfully regulated system, nor 
were they intended to in the first place. In a similar fashion to the development of 
Russian commercial law, Witte’s economic policy was based on a system of arbitrary 
power concentrated in the hands of the Russian government and its ministries. The 
Russian government, although it at times attempted to adopt a more uniform and 
consistent policy towards foreign investment, never abandoned its autocratic 
prerogatives to make arbitrary decisions in relation to foreign companies. In fact, in 
pursuing other aspects of the Witte system and later economic development, such as 
the stimulation of extractive and heavy industries, and industries connected to the 
trans-Siberian railroad, the Russian government often breached its own rules and 
laws, such as those related to tariffs and the establishment of foreign companies, and 
acted in a highly inconsistent manner. 
 
However, a significant change occurred between 1907 and 1914. Although arbitrary 
power over companies was still concentrated in the hands of the government, it 
began to take a much less active role in stimulating economic development and 
making use of such powers in the way that Witte had. While many aspects of 
government intervention in the economy between 1907 and 1914 remained 
problematic, it could be argued that the Russian government became more consistent 
in this policy towards foreign companies than it had under Witte. Even if the Russian 
government was consistently less friendly to foreign enterprise, by not using 
arbitrary methods to stimulate particular industries for example, it could have created 
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a friendlier overall business environment in Russia for foreign companies because of 
greater consistency in government action. 
 
Despite attempts to modernise, the Russian business environment still manifested 
many autocratic features by 1914. An unreformed corpus of commercial law that 
gave the government seeping discretionary powers over the affairs of foreign 
companies was complemented by reformed yet still contradictory and arbitrary 
economic policy towards foreign entrepreneurs. This thesis will attempt to 
investigate whether these macro features of the Russian business environment 
affected the development of a stable business environment and government-industrial 
relations in the experience of British companies in Russia. 
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Chapter 3: The Development of British Foreign Direct Investment in 
Russia, 1892-1914 
 
 
As the preceding two chapters have shown, the corpus of Russian commercial law 
relating to foreign companies remained virtually unchanged throughout the period, 
and permitted a high level of government interference into the affairs of companies. 
At the same time, Russian economic policy towards foreign investment underwent 
important changes under Witte and his successors. Witte introduced economic 
policies designed to encourage foreign investment in Russia, and in particular to 
encourage the growth of foreign enterprises in Russia that could compete with 
domestic industry. These policies were based on arbitrary foundations, however, 
which would have significant effects even after their curtailment with Witte’s 
departure from the Ministry of Finance. 
 
This section seeks to determine the pattern of the formation of British companies in 
Russia, and to see if these trends can be related to changes in Russian government 
policy and commercial law. The general outline of foreign investment in the period is 
well known. Witte’s policies had a marked effect on the entry of foreign capital into 
Russia. Investment in all forms increased throughout the period, and was particularly 
marked in the purchase of government bonds and railway stock abroad, especially in 
France. French indirect investment in Russia through these means, and through the 
large industrial syndicates such as Prodogul, is often cited as the main significant 
modes of foreign investment in Russia. However, there was a significant growth in 
foreign investment in companies located in Russia. In 1890, a third of all shares 
issued by companies in Russia were held abroad, to a value of 214.7 million roubles. 
This figure increased to 2,000 million roubles by the outbreak of the First World 
War, increasing annually every year apart from during the period of industrial 
downturn and revolutionary disturbances from 1900 to 1906. Foreign investment in 
general tended to be directed into the industries and locations that the Russian 
government prioritised for development, such as heavy and extractive industries, 
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where foreign capital accounted for up to 90% of all capital in some locations.1 
According to Olga Crisp, Witte’s policies had a marked effect on foreign investment 
in the 1890s; investment by foreign companies increased by 389% over the decade. 
The increase was such that foreign investment in the year 1898 was more than the 
total foreign investment in the period 1851-1892.2 These figures do not show the 
inflow of real resources into Russia, and Barkai contends that Russia industrialised 
largely on its own resources, although foreign investment played a significant role.3 
 
What is not so clear is the pattern of British foreign direct investment (FDI). The 
statistics and studies cited above do not separate direct and indirect investment. 
Neither do they discuss the numbers of companies involved in the Russian market, 
their geographical location, the industries in which these companies were involved, 
or their corporate structure and organisation. This section attempts to explore these 
aspects. 
 
Data on the historical development of British companies in Russia have been derived 
from a variety of sources, each with their own limitations that are important to 
consider. The majority of the data came from the records of authorisation for foreign 
companies to begin operations in Russia, or the formation of joint-stock companies 
in Russia that involved foreign capital. These are held by the Ministry of Finance up 
until 1906, and thereafter by the Ministry of Trade and Industry. These are a useful 
resource because they also record when a particular company filed for liquidation, or 
changes to its composition, activities, or share capital, all of which required 
permission from the relevant ministry by law and was thus subsequently recorded in 
their file. However, these records rely on companies declaring their nationality; they 
do not account for many British-financed companies that formed Russian ‘free 
standing’ companies, registered as Russian companies in the name of an agent such 
as James Whishaw. 
                                                          
1 P. Ol’, Innostrannie Kapitali v Rossi (Moscow, 1922), Cited in Falkus, The Industrialization of 
Russia, 70. 
2 Crisp, Studies in the Russian Economy, 32; 107. 
3 Barkai, ‘The Macro-Economics of Tsarist Russia’, 362. 
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To fill in these gaps, other sources have been used. In 1903, consular officials were 
required to submit lists to London of British companies located in their consular 
districts. This list is in parts quite rich, as the consular officials were required to 
submit additional information about the businesses in their area, such as the date of 
establishment, amount of share capital, its current profits, and the number of workers 
that it employed. While this list is a useful resource and contains a vast amount of 
information missing from company incorporation records, it is entirely reliant on the 
knowledge, skill, and time resources of the consuls in each district charged with 
compiling the information. For example, the British consul in Warsaw, William 
Murray, did not include any data about when the British companies in his district 
were established; neither did he specify their profits.4 Unfortunately, this exercise 
was not repeated before the revolution of October 1917, so this rich source of data 
can only shed light on the first half of our period. 
 
A third source used in this analysis is company reports, advertisements, and notices 
placed in the British press at the time. These are of a supplementary nature, and 
predominantly concern companies set up in the Caucasian and Siberian oil and 
mining industries that vigorously advertised for public subscription of their share 
capital. These records are a good supplement to the Russian government’s records 
concerning the authorisation of foreign companies in Russia as they often include 
‘free standing’ companies, registered in Russia as a Russian company, but in reality 
financed and controlled from Britain. However, not all such companies advertised in 
the financial press, and such reports and advertisements only state the nominal share 
capital, rather than a clear indication of the amount of share capital that was actually 
subscribed. They usually produced a highly sanitised report of the conditions in 
Russia and the activities of the company, often masking the fact that a few of these 
companies were in effect holding companies, speculating on the value of Siberian or 
Caucasian oil concessions. 
 
                                                          
4 TNA, FO 65/1671, f. 269, Murray to Lansdowne, 2 July 1903. 
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Despite these limitations, some key trends in the pattern of British investment in 
Russia emerge from this data. The first concerns the amount of share capital in 
Russia and the number of British companies in Russia and how this changed over the 
period. This trend follows the general pattern of foreign investment in Russia, albeit 
with some key chronological differences. British companies were slower to respond 
to the new conditions created by Witte and the ministry of Finance in the 1890s than 
their French and Belgian counterparts, the main surge of British investment 
occurring towards the end of this period. French and Belgian capital entered Russia 
much earlier and in larger quantities due to the Franco-Russian alliance of January 
1894 and Russia’s dependency on French loans.5 British company formation was 
heaviest in the wake of the revolutionary disturbances of 1905, which did not appear 
to have had the same deterrent effect as the industrial downturn of 1900-1904 did on 
British investment. 
 
Secondly, the industrial sectors favoured by British companies changed from 1892 to 
1914. British companies in the 1890s were primarily concerned with industries 
related to the shipping trade. This changed dramatically at the end of the decade, 
when more British companies formed in the extractive industries prioritised by 
Witte. This growing level of activity was reflected in the wider geographical location 
of these businesses. Whereas in the latter half of the nineteenth century British 
investment was centred around the ports of St Petersburg and Odessa, with minimal 
involvement in the interior of Russia, after 1900 British investment was 
disproportionately attracted to mining and oil districts in Siberia and the Caucasus. 
The investment strategies of British companies also changed significantly from 1892 
to 1914. This section examines how their financing strategies changed, as well as 
how they altered their organisation and diversified their interests throughout the 
period. In this way, we can build up a picture of British engagement with the Russian 
market and shed light on the investment decisions made by British companies. 
 
The chapter will argue that initially Witte’s overtures towards foreign investors had 
little impact on British firms, who moved into the Russian investments 
                                                          
5 Langer, The Franco-Russian Alliance, 399. 
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conservatively. However, the rewards that became apparent from the late 1890s for 
investment in industries favoured by Witte, such as the Caucasian and Siberian 
mining and extractive industries, stimulated substantial British investment in these 
sectors. Although many more British firms were established and capital invested, 
British firms still approached the Russian market conservatively, taking fewer risks 
in diversification and adopting the new financial and organisational models of some 
of their international counterparts. If this conclusion is apparent from the data below, 
it has significant implications for the success of Witte’s plans for inducing foreign 
investment to Russia. It would indicate that British investment was predominantly 
determined by a high ratio of local resources to capital, as opposed to any attempts 
by Witte to improve the business environment in Russia in line with the expectations 
of foreign companies. This determinant and later conservatism on the part of British 
companies would indicate that they never formed stable assumptions about the 
Russian business environment and therefore moved into further Russian investments 
cautiously. 
 
 
3.1 British FDI in Russia before 1892 
 
The surge of British capital into Russia was presaged by a not insubstantial British 
engagement in the Russian market before 1892. This was already beginning to take 
on more modern forms before 1892, although most companies maintained traditional 
business organisations based on a network of family and a small circle of contacts. 
Aside from a few exceptions in the interior of Russia, this activity tended to be based 
around centres of British maritime trade such as St Petersburg, Odessa and Batumi, 
due to a tendency for these investments to have been the outcome of pre-existing 
trade links between Russia and Britain.6 This tendency was as much a product of 
British business as a whole in the late nineteenth century as a reaction to Russian 
conditions. British businesses were slower than their international counterparts to 
take on more modern management hierarchies, and were notoriously resistant to 
                                                          
6 Gurushchina and Potkina, ‘Angliskie kapitali i chastnoe predprinimatel’stvo v Rossii’, 107-8. 
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forming joint-stock arrangements, as opposed to their international counterparts.7 
Despite these limitations, many British companies and individuals became extremely 
rich due to their Russian investments before 1892, especially in the capacity of acting 
as bankers in Russia’s under monetised economy.8 There are many famous examples 
of such firms, such as the Hubbards, Cazalets, and John Hughes & Co., whose 
mining concession in the south of Russia gave rise to the name of the nearby town of 
‘Hughesovka’.9 
 
British involvement in the textile industry in St Petersburg was particularly intense 
before 1890. This is to an extent reflected in the figures on company formations in 
table 1 (appendix). In fact, this involvement before 1890 played a significant role in 
shaping the socio-economic life of the city. Research has shown that they had a very 
culturally distinct colony in the Admiral’teiskaia and Vasil’evskaia areas of St 
Petersburg, and a large summer colony in Peterhof, with their own memory and 
traditions that stretched back to the time of the first British traders in Archangel, 
although still viewing themselves as inexorably tied to Britain.10 The British colony 
in St Petersburg consisted of 1,784 individuals in 1881, which rose to 2,367 in 
1900.11 These British traders were initially involved in the export of hemp and 
herrings from Russia, and later providing banking services to Russia’s under 
monetised economy. British and other foreign capitalists began to move into the 
production of textiles, chemicals, tallow, soap and tobacco in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, as well as becoming involved in commodity markets as St 
                                                          
7 Jones, ‘Origins, Management and Performance’, 14; Kennedy, ‘Foreign Investment, Trade, and 
Growth’, 440; Wilson, British Business History, 87. 
8 Simon Dixon, ‘Allegiance and Betrayal: British Residents in Russia during the Crimean War’, SEER 
94, 3 (2016), 431. 
9 Susan Edwards, Hughesovka: a Welsh Enterprise in Imperial Russia: an account of John Hughes of 
Merther Tydfil, his New Russia Company, and the town, works and collieries which he established in 
Ukraine (S. I.: Glamorgan Record Office, 1992); Thomas Colin, Dreaming a City: from Wales to 
Ukraine (Tal-y-bont: Y Lolfa, 2009); also mentioned by contemporaries: Henry Norman, All the 
Russias: travels and studies in contemporary European Russia, Finland, Siberia, the Caucuses, and 
Central Asia  (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1902), 379.  
10 Konstantin Vishniakov-Vishnevetskii, Inostrantsy v promishlennoi zhizni Sankt-Peterburga vo 
vtoroi polovine XIX veka (St Petersburg: SPBIGO, 2008), 165; Marie-Louise Karttunen, ‘Social 
Memory: Patchwork Fabric from the Roaring Loom of Time’ in M. Ruckenstein and M. Karttunen, 
(eds.) On Foreign Ground: Moving between Countries and Categories 148-61 (Helsinki: Finnish 
Literature Society, 2007), 149; James Bater, St Petersburg: Industrialisation and Change (London: 
Edward Arnold, 1976), 263. 
11 Mahnke-Devlin, Britische Migration nach Russland , 47. 
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Petersburg became the fulcrum of trade between the Russian empire and the rest of 
the world.12 British traders were not restricted to the capital, there was a small and 
numerically stable population of British citizens in Moscow, who set up enterprises 
such as Muir and Mirrielees in the retail trade and Roidin Smith & Co, who 
manufactured boilers.13 
 
These conclusions are supported by an analysis of table 1.14 While there was a 
variety of industries represented, there is a clear tendency for British companies 
before 1892 to be established in St Petersburg and Odessa. Archangel and Kirov are 
also represented on this table; the former being the port where British merchants first 
made contact with the Russian court in the seventeenth century, and the latter being 
located relatively close to Odessa. British companies were mainly concerned with 
textiles industries and related consumer goods industries, such as paper and leather 
belting, especially in St Petersburg. Heavy industry was somewhat underrepresented 
in comparison to these industries; aside from fairly large industrial concerns in 
Odessa, Kirov and Taganrog, British firms engaged in industry tended to be much 
smaller than their counterparts in consumer goods industries. 
 
This demonstrates the determining impact of British shipping before Witte’s reforms; 
British shipping in and around St Petersburg was predominantly concerned with the 
flax trade. In fact, we know from the memoirs of James Whishaw that the main 
British concerns in St Petersburg revolved around the timber, flax and textile trade 
up until the 1890s, when British companies in St Petersburg started to lose ground to 
local and German firms, and the timber and flax trades collapsed due to the advent of 
ironclad warships.15 The Whishaws were an example of the traditional family firm 
that operated in Russia up until the end of the twentieth century, engaged in the flax 
trade in St Petersburg. Although Whishaw’s firm was still in operation in 1903, it 
does not show up in the consular statistics because by this point James Whishaw had 
                                                          
12 Bater, St Petersburg, 216, 258. 
13 Mahnke-Delvin, Britische Migration nach Russland, 55; H. Pitcher, Muir and Mirrielees, the 
Scottish Partnership that became a household name in Russia (Cromer: Swallow House Books, 
1994); The Smiths of Moscow: a Story of Britons Abroad (Cromer: Swallow House Books, 1984). 
14 Table 1, Appendix. 
15 Thompstone, ‘British Merchant Houses in Russia’, 107-30. 
109 
 
become a naturalized Russian subject in order to act as an agent for British oil 
companies in the Caucasus, in order to satisfy Russian legal requirements.16 This is 
reflective of a general trend in Russia where domestic merchants gradually began to 
replace foreigners at the end of the nineteenth century, especially on the St 
Petersburg bourse.17 
 
The vast majority of these companies were formed in the 1880s, and these companies 
were distributed roughly evenly across the periods 1880-85 and 1885-1890. This 
indicates a steady rate of investment rather than any quickening before Witte’s tenure 
as Minister of Finance and resulting reforms. In fact, as this particular list was 
compiled using consular data on the number of firms that were active in 1903, the 
preponderance of firms formed before 1885 suggests that there had in fact been a 
slight slowdown in British investment during the period 1885-1892. It is likely that 
there would have been many more firms that were not included on this list that were 
formed before 1885 and had since gone out of business. This suggests that Russia 
was not seen as a key area of investment or profitability for British companies before 
Witte’s reforms, so any increase during the 1890s should be seen in light of this 
limited prior engagement. 
 
 
3.2 British FDI in Russia 1892-1914 
 
British FDI in Russia during the period in question can be broadly broken down into 
two phases, distinguishable in terms of the number of companies formed, the 
industries in which they were situated and their geographical location. The first 
phase, from the beginning of the period until the industrial downturn of 1900-1904, 
was dominated by a wide variety of industries and geographical locations, although 
the latter were usually determined by pre-existing British trade links. The second 
                                                          
16 Whishaw, Memoirs, 97-109. 
17 P. V. Lizunov, ‘Inostrannye kuptsy na Sankt-Peterburgskoi birzhe, XVIII-nachalo XX veka’ in B. 
V. Anan’ich et al., Chastnoe predprinimatel’stvo v dorevolutsionnoi Rossii: etnokonfessional’naia 
struktura i regional’noe razvitie, XIX-nachalo XX v (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2010), 506. 
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phase, after the industrial downturn until the end of the period saw an increased level 
of British company formation in Russia, but in a narrower selection of industries that 
was dominated by the Caucasian and Siberian extractive industries. 
 
Overview 
Early Soviet statistics compiled by Ol’ estimate that in 1917 British capital made up 
23 per cent of all foreign investment, and was mainly situated in the oil, textiles and 
copper sectors, although this statistic does not break down this figure into direct or 
indirect investment. Other estimates put the figure as high as £110 million in 1913. 18 
However, these figures do not show a chronological breakdown indicating the main 
periods of British capital flows into Russia. An analysis of the number and rate of 
British company formations over the period 1890 to 1914 indicates the following 
conclusions: the formation of British companies increased steadily over the levels of 
the 1880s throughout the 1890s, then stalled after 1900, probably because of the 
significant industrial downturn in Russia for these years. From 1906 the number of 
British company formations surged, rising to a peak in the years 1907-1910, before 
subsequently slowing down to levels not dissimilar to 1906. 
 
Trends in the establishment of British companies in Russia in the decade 1892-1902 
show that British investment reacted slowly to many aspects of the Witte system. 
Tariff controls, brought in in 1892, had very little effect on British investment, and in 
the 5 year period 1892-1896 British company formation was very similar to trends in 
the 1880s; in these years only 10 new companies were established, or gained 
permission to begin activities in Russia, compared to the 17 companies that were 
established in Russia during the period 1880-1891, a very slight increase in company 
formation. The effect of the gold standard is somewhat more perceptible; company 
formations increased dramatically in 1897, although they fell the following year. 
 
                                                          
18 Ol’, Innostrannye Kapitali v Rossi, 71; Platt, Britain’s Investment Overseas, 91. 
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The surge in British investment in Russia during this decade, however, is quite 
clearly identifiable from 1899 to 1900; in these two years 26 new British companies 
began operation in Russia, more than in the period 1892-1897, and more than during 
the 1880s. 
 
Graph 1: British company formations in Russia, 1892-1914
 
 
It is clear from graph 1, however, that the economic downturn of 1900-1904 reduced 
investor confidence in Russia, as the number of new company formations from 1901-
1902 plummeted to just two per year. This was followed by only two company 
formations in 1903, and just one new formation in 1904. 
 
These findings indicate that in the first ten years of the period in question, during the 
genesis of Witte’s reforms to encourage the inflow of foreign investment into Russia, 
British investment was primarily determined by profits as opposed to government 
policy. The increase in British investment 1898-1900 corresponds to the boom in the 
Baku oil industry, which would later become a major draw for British investment. 
This growth was subsequently cut short by the industrial downturn of 1900-1904. 
There does appear to have been a marginal impact made by Witte’s reforms, 
especially the introduction of the gold standard, and the period of increased growth 
in British investment in Russia does also correspond to Witte’s attempts to improve 
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the regulatory and policy framework relating to foreign companies, although it 
appears that the ultimate deciding factor was Russian economic conditions given the 
dramatic fall in investment after 1900. 
 
As graph 1 demonstrates, across the whole period new company formations were 
most intense in the three years from 1910 to 1912. In the wake of the revolution, 
British company formations increased from 1905 to 1909 at a relatively stable rate, 
although the number of formations dropped in 1908. It is significant that the 
revolutionary disturbances did not appear to have had as much of a deterrent effect as 
the earlier industrial downturn. Company formations increased from 1904 to 1907, 
although at a lower rate than 1897 to 1900. This suggests that the revolutionary 
disturbances and uncertain political climate of the first two dumas had very little 
effect on British businesses’ investment decisions. 
 
The peak of 1907 in this development could represent the effect of the Anglo-
Russian entente. However, as graph 1 demonstrates, British direct investment in 
Russia had been gradually increasing from its low levels during the industrial 
depression of 1900 to 1904, and it was only in 1910 that there was a significant 
increase in direct investment, three years after the conclusion of the agreement. 
 
This peak in 1910 coincides with the Grozny and Maikop oil boom in the late first 
decade of the twentieth century. Many contemporary accounts and consular records 
make reference to the vast amount of money and resources that were being poured 
into these oil regions from Britain (as well as the astronomical losses that were being 
incurred due to many wells not living up to the initial expectations of investors). 
William Hunt, the acting consul for Taganrog, for example, noted in 1903 that 
British capital was heavily involved in the Baku oil industry, to the detriment of 
British investments in the South Russian metal industry, and that British capital was 
becoming heavily involved in Grozny.19 A year later, Thompson in his The Oil 
                                                          
19 TNA, FO 65/1672, f. 375, William Hunt to Landsdowne, 6 July 1903. 
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Fields of Russia estimated that up to £6,500,000 had been sunk into these fields by 
British investors.20 
 
The Baku oil fields had initially produced limited amounts of kerosene for the 
Russian domestic lighting fuel market, but Witte’s introduction of a tax of 60 kopeks 
per pood of domestic lighting fuel in 1892 led to a reorientation of the industry to the 
production of liquid fuel to be exported abroad.21 British investment followed the 
overall patterns of the Caucasian oil industry; it surged in Baku from 1896-1900, and 
then in other oilfields such as Grozny and Maikop from 1908-1914.22 Oil extraction 
was one of the industries that was severely hit in the industrial downturn of 1900-
1904, which explains the gap in production and the corresponding investment by 
British companies.23 
 
Industry 
As already discussed, early British involvement in the Russian market largely 
revolved around a variety of industries that were connected to British trade. This was 
dominated by textiles, but also included a certain number of companies related to 
heavy industry, such as nail and file manufacturers, and a company engaged in 
agricultural machinery. As can be seen in table 2 (appendix), there was a significant 
decline in new British companies engaged in textiles in Russia during the 1890s, 
with only a handful of new British textile companies being formed in St Petersburg 
and Reval, compared to a variety of other companies. These companies were mainly 
in industries derived from heavy industry. Although there were no major steel or iron 
works set up by a British firm in this period, the first being Thomas Firth & Son in 
Riga in 1903, the industries that these firms were in can be referred to as derivatives 
of heavy industry, such as the manufacture of machinery, aluminium products, 
bricks, and glassware. Also represented are shipbuilding firms and engineering firms. 
                                                          
20 Arthur Thompson, The Oil Fields of Russia and the Russian Petroleum Industry (London: Crossby 
Lockwood and Son, 1904), 7. 
21 McKay, ‘Restructuring the Russian Petroleum Industry’, 99. 
22 McKay, Pioneers for Profit, 37; Chshieva, Istoriia neftianago sopernichestva, 130; Jones, The State 
and Emergence of the British Oil Industry, 59. 
23 Gatrell, The Tsarist Economy, 172. 
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This movement away from the traditional industries that British companies were 
engaged in via trade represents a level of response to Witte’s attempts to induce 
foreign investment in Russia, although the rate at which new companies were 
established roughly matched the levels of the 1880s for most of the decade. 
 
British capital was heavily invested in the extractive industries, and historians have 
identified foreign companies as playing a leading role in its development, especially 
in Siberia.24 Towards the end of the decade, we can also observe the growth in 
importance of the oil industries for British companies. The first British oil company 
in Russia, the European Oil Company, was established in 1896, and followed by the 
Russian Petroleum and Liquid Fuel Company and the Baku Russian Petroleum 
Company in 1897. These were followed by a further 13 oil companies up until 1901. 
At the same time as this growth in oil companies was a corresponding growth in 
mining companies, indicating that British companies began to view extractive 
industries in Russia much more favourably towards the end of this period. 
 
The industrial downturn of 1900-1904 greatly affected all industries, but it is notable 
that British investment in oil and mining virtually ceased. The Russian oil industry 
was hit particularly hard by the industrial downturn, as well as an overproduction 
crisis in Baku that sent the price of Russian oil plummeting to levels that made its 
extraction unprofitable.25 Only one British oil company was established between 
1901 and 1908, indicating significant investor fears over the profitability of Russian 
oil investments. However, the rate of new formations of mining companies increased 
after 1905, especially in Siberia. Between 1904 and the Grozny and Maikop oil 
booms, it is clear that mining companies became the preferred route for British 
capital, eclipsing all other industries. In fact, after 1905 there was very little 
investment in light industry by British companies, with only 8 companies formed. 
Heavy industry, excluding the extractive industries, fared little better in this period, 
although it had never been a particular draw for British capital in Russia. Only two 
                                                          
24 Baev, Inostranyi kapital v promishlennosti Kuznetskogo Basseina, 172. 
25 Gatrell, The Tsarist Economy, 172; Henry Norman, All the Russias has a good description of all the 
costs that could amount to £3,000 before any oil was drilled, 223. 
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such companies were established after 1905, the English New Russian Company of 
Coal, Iron and Rail Production, Ltd, and the Votigen Steam Pumps Ltd, both 
established in 1909. 
 
From 1909 to the end of the period, British direct investment became dominated by 
oil concerns. This is attributable to the Maikop and Grozny oil booms. In the year 
1910, which saw the highest rate of new British company formations in Russia, 29 of 
the 33 new British companies formed in Russia were oil companies. In fact, the high 
rates of company formation across the years 1908-1914 can be largely accounted for 
by the oil boom in these two areas. A notable secondary development was the 
formation of holding companies, which were involved in financing and land banking 
in relation the Maikop and Grozny oil industries. The rate of formation of mining 
companies fell from the levels of 1904-1908, although British capital still moved into 
this sector at a greater rate than light industry; from 1908 until 1914 19 British 
mining companies were formed in Russia. While this pales in comparison to the 
number of oil companies that were formed in this period, it was still a significant pull 
for British direct investment until 1914. 
 
Overall, three key trends in direct British investment in Russia emerge from this data. 
The first is a reorientation during the 1880s from industries connected to British trade 
towards light industry, including manufacture of machinery, as well as consumer 
goods such as sewing machines and bicycles, as well as a growth in the extractive 
industries in Siberian mining and the Baku oil industry. This trend was arrested by 
the industrial downturn of 1900-1904, and subsequently British capital almost 
exclusively was invested in mining companies. Around 1909, with the discovery of 
promising new oilfields in Grozny and Maikop, British direct investment heavily 
favoured the oil industry, at far higher levels than previously across all other 
industries. 
 
A further trend that is not observable from figures on company formation is an 
increase in interest among firms based in Britain in beginning agency and branch 
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selling operations in Russia. This generally followed the trends of 1890s investment 
in Russia, and thereafter the increase in company formation after 1905. As a sign of 
increasing British retail involvement with the Russian market, multiple British firms 
addressed questions to the Foreign Office about Russian regulations pertaining to the 
import of samples into Russia, and the system of internal passports in Russia as it 
applied to commercial travellers. Russian customs regulations in these instances were 
still little known and the Russian system of internal passports was relatively 
unknown to British companies. However, there was a significant increase in requests 
to the Foreign Office across the decade 1892-1902 for information on the rules 
regarding commercial travellers and the duty free importation of samples. 
 
A common request from British companies in Russia was enquiries about the 
honesty and standing of various Russian firms that British companies were 
considering entering into business with, especially in instances where British 
companies were considering engaging in branch selling operations with a Russian 
distributor. These requests were especially common in the 1890s when British firms 
had less knowledge of the Russian market, and before British companies began to 
engage in manufacturing behind the tariff wall in significant numbers. Requests for 
such information originated from many different industries, from soap 
manufacturers, companies involved in municipal projects such as waterworks. Such 
requests for information were often directed to either the British diplomatic staff in 
St Petersburg, or more commonly the local consuls in cities such as Moscow and 
Odessa.26 This indicates that alongside the increase in British investment in light 
industry there was a corresponding increase in British interest in exporting and 
setting up branch selling operations in Russia. 
 
After the revolutionary turmoil of 1906, it became clear that gaps in British 
information about the Russian business environment became related to purely 
commercial matters as opposed to regulation and government involvement in the 
business environment. These were mainly characterised by requests for commercial 
                                                          
26 TNA, FO 447/18, f. 206, R. E. Bickerdike & Co. to Medhurst, 29 January 1897, f. 3; FO 65/1611, 
Mitchell to Martin Goschen, 5 September 1899. 
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information. For example, many British firms sought Russian partner firms with 
which to engage in the export business, addressed to local consuls, such as Charles 
Davisson & co in 1906, who asked the consul in Moscow for the details of a kiln 
factory in Moscow that they intended to supply with bricks.27 This example 
illustrates how British business interests were very quick to look to enter the Russian 
market in the wake of revolutionary disturbances the previous year. The records of 
the British consular office in Moscow are particularly rich in requests for such 
information, from as early as January 1906, before the fundamental laws were 
published.28 
 
British interest in Moscow in 1906 was sustained throughout the rest of the period. In 
January 1907 the Iron and Steel Trades Journal requested the British consul to keep 
them up to date respecting private, government and municipal contacts for 
machinery, railway, and other engineering works, representing an interests from a 
large segment of British heavy industry, evidenced by the involvement of two British 
firms in the construction of the Moscow tramway.29 Later requests for commercial 
information originated from British firms attempting to establish branch selling, the 
first stage of direct investment, in Russia. These include companies in industries such 
as electrical wiring, electric tools, and industrial plant machinery.30 
 
This interest in branch selling can be related to the growth in British light industry in 
Russia during the 1890s, especially among those companies involved in 
manufacturing consumer goods. This represents a typical change in marketing 
practices in response to Witte’s tariff controls on manufactured goods entering 
Russia. Instead of exporting to the Russian market, clearly many companies such as 
Singer and Starley began manufacturing operations behind the Russian tariff wall. 
                                                          
27 TNA, FO 447/30, f. 91, Charles Davisson & co. to Gove, 9 July 1906. 
28 TNA, FO 447/30, f. 23, Ernest Scott and Mountain Ltd to Gove, 10 January 1906; f. 69 Michael 
Hairn & co. to Gove, 27 January 1906 (floor cloths and linoleums); f. 91 Charles Davisson & co. to 
Gove, 9 July 1906 (bricks); f. 168, Union Standard Machine Co. to Gove, 2 April 1906. 
29 TNA, FO 447/32, f. 11, Iron and Steel Trades Journal to Gove, 3 January 1907; FO 447/34, f. 57, 
London COC to Gove, 7 February 1908; f. 210, General Seating Company Ltd to Gove, 1 May 1908; 
FO 447/35, f. 419, The Forest City Electric Company to Gove, 9 September 1908. 
30 TNA, FO 447/35, f. 337, Armorduct Manufacturing Company to Gove, 16 July 1908; f. 340, 
Kramos Ltd to Gove, 21 August 1908; FO 447/36, f. 117, White Brothers to Gove, 22 February 1909; 
f. 163, Crosley Brothers to Gove, 17 March 1909. 
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However, these requests, and the formation of such companies, almost completely 
ceased after 1900, only picking up again after the worst of the revolutionary 
disturbances in 1906. Although a renewed interest in marketing to Russia among 
British companies is observable from the consular data, it did not correspond with 
any new British manufacturing enterprises in Russia. 
 
Geographical location 
British investment in Russia, barring some exceptions, followed the general trend of 
moving from areas of traditional British trade activity towards the oil and mineral 
bearing peripheries. As has already been established, British investment in the 1880s 
was largely based around the ports of St Petersburg and Odessa, with some industry 
further inland in places such as Kirov, and other smaller ports such as Archangel. In 
the first decade of the period in question, St Petersburg attracted most British 
investment, with 17 of the 51 British companies formed in Russia based there. There 
is evidence that British investment penetrated further into the Russian interior in this 
decade, however, as British companies were set up in Moscow, Smolensk, the Urals, 
and the Russian Far East, as well as in the Caucasian oil industry. The geographical 
spread of companies was much wider than in the preceding decade, if only 
marginally higher in terms of the rate of company formation, as already discussed. 
As well as St Petersburg, the Caucasus was also heavily represented, attracting 17 
new British companies, mainly formed towards the end of the 1890s. Investment in 
other areas was on a far smaller scale, but widely spread; four companies were 
established in Moscow, two in Smolensk, two in Archangel. British companies were 
also established in Reval, Riga, Warsaw, and Karachev. The end of this period also 
saw some British direct investment in Siberia, although not on the scale that was to 
come later. 
 
The geographical pattern of British investment in the decade 1904-1914, following 
insignificant investment in 1902 and 1903, was markedly different. British 
investment became highly concentrated in the Caucasus. The geographical spread of 
British mining companies in Siberia gives the impression that British direct 
investment widened its geographical scope in Russia in this decade. However, the 
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relatively wide geographical spread of British companies in Russia west of the Urals 
in the period 1892-1902 is not replicated in this period. Numbers outside of the 
Caucasian oil industry dropped rapidly, and were concentrated in St Petersburg and 
the Urals themselves. Nevertheless, the spread of British companies around Siberia 
itself was very wide, and included two companies as far east as the island of 
Sakhalin. These companies were almost exclusively engaged in mining. 
 
 
Persistence 
Data on how long British companies were in business in Russia is fragmentary. The 
records of the Russian Ministries of Finance and Trade and Industry are much less 
rich on the records of company liquidations, which needed to be registered with the 
relevant ministry by law. Where we are able to analyse the data, it is clear that 
British companies generally enjoyed significant longevity in Russia, aside from a 
few notable exceptions in the consumer goods industries, such as Singer. 
 
The obvious exception to this trend are the companies in the oil industry. Some 
companies, especially in Baku, were remarkably long-lived, but the majority of firms 
went out of business within three years of beginning their operations. In the Maikop 
and Grozny oil booms, the life of companies could be even shorter, some in 
operation less than a year. This could be due to a combination of factors. Firstly, 
British firms substantially overestimated the profitability of the Maikop and Grozny 
oilfields, which lead to a number of bankruptcies.31 Secondly, although the Russian 
government took steps to eradicate this practice, many British companies formed 
holding companies in Russia in order to speculate on the price of oil-bearing land. As 
the price of oil concessions rose in Grozny and Maikop these companies sold their 
concessions at a profit and were quickly liquidated, while having not been engaged 
in any meaningful development of their concession.32 Thus the short life of these 
companies should be viewed mainly as a product of the conditions of the Caucasian 
                                                          
31 Jones, The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry, 60. 
32 Norrgren and Kennard make reference to this common practice in 1904 and 1911 respectively. 
Norrgren, Russian Commercial Handbook, 97;6 Kennard, The Russian Year Book for 1911, 104.  
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oil industry. British companies often invested in these sectors quite haphazardly; 
legal complications were often so difficult that there was a common tendency noted 
by McKay for foreign companies to recruit local agents to negotiate with the 
authorities on their behalf.33 In the case of British oil companies operating in Russia, 
a common mistake was to purchase land from a local landowner, and then run into 
complications surrounding the ownership of property by foreign companies in 
Russia, which was prohibited until 1898, and negotiating access rights with local 
land communes.34 
 
Some Siberian mining ventures were equally short lived, although not necessarily 
due to inexperience and failure. For example, the 1910 accounts of the Vagliano 
Anthracite mines, formed in 1908, showed a balance of £9000 on hand and profits of 
£689, yet the following year the decision was taken by the directors to liquidate the 
business.35 Unfortunately the reason for the liquidation is unavailable for historians, 
although given the strong performance of the company the year before, it would 
suggest that this was not down to managerial failure. 
 
Investment structures and the rise of Russian incorporation 
Gurushina and Potkina’s research into British companies in the Russian market 
indicates that British investment can be divided into two periods in terms of their 
investment structures. The first phase, encompassing roughly the entire nineteenth 
century, was characterised by individual or family enterprises with few external 
source of funding. In the second half of the nineteenth century, a significant number 
of these traditional family enterprises were converted into share companies, 
involving additional sources of finance from outside the limits of the traditional 
family-relations circle. Often this was carried out through extending the circle of 
favoured shareholders and organising a subscription society, but in many cases the 
changes involved a complete restructuring of the company. At the beginning of the 
twentieth century this restructuring took the form of complex organisations of joint-
                                                          
33 McKay, ‘Foreign Enterprise in Russian and Soviet Industry,’ 349. 
34 Jones, The State and Emergence of the British Oil Industry, 57. 
35 S. Walter. The Mining Year Book for 1911, (London: 1911), 1000; London Gazette, 7 January 1913, 
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stock companies registered in Russia controlled by a parent company registered in 
Britain. These companies exhibited increasingly complex organisational and 
financial ties within their groups, as well as increasingly complex ties with external 
organisations.36 
 
This is particularly well demonstrated by the formation of the Anglo-Russian Cotton 
Factories Ltd (ARCF) in 1897. This joint-stock company registered in Britain took 
control of the various assets of the Hubbard family business in Russia, which in 1897 
was made up of two spinning and weaving mills and a calico printing company, as 
well as a forestry concession in Finland. Significantly, these companies were all 
separately registered Russian companies. The purpose of the ARCF was to provide 
funding for the three Russian textile companies. This was necessary for two reasons. 
Firstly, profits from the two spinning mills had been in decline throughout the 1890s, 
a symptom of a general malaise in these industries in St Petersburg at this time.37 The 
Hubbards were therefore forced to look to external sources of credit in Britain in 
order to finance their enterprises. Secondly, the calico printing company was 
operated at a loss from 1893. In order to protect the printing company from debts to 
Russian creditors, which according to Russian law took the first rank in 
administering a bankrupt company, the ARCF was intended to facilitate loans to the 
printing company derived from shares issued in London and the profits of the 
company’s mills.38 
 
Gurushina and Potkina have rightly pointed out that this represented a new phase of 
British company organisation in the Russian market, but the significance of this new 
form of business organisation lies much deeper.39 Firstly, the Hubbards adopted this 
new form of organisation in order to tap into the vast financial resources of the City 
of London, which was being pulled overseas due to oversaturation of the British 
market.40 Secondly, the ARCF was set up to protect the separate companies from 
                                                          
36 Gurushina and Potkina, ‘Angliiskie kapitaly i chastnoe predprinimatel’stvo v Rossii’, 107-8; 
Gurushina, ‘British Free-Standing Companies in Tsarist Russia’, 160. 
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becoming embroiled in potentially damaging Russian bankruptcy proceedings. These 
new business models were therefore symptomatic of the wider tendency of British 
capital moving to Russia because of the perceived profitability of Russian 
investments at around the turn of the twentieth century. At the same time, companies 
also arranged the structures of their companies in order to protect themselves from 
unfavourable local conditions in Russia, such as deficient Russian bankruptcy laws, 
covered in chapter 1. This therefore suggests that British investment was attracted 
primarily by the potential to make profits as opposed to changes in Russian 
governmental policy towards foreign companies. 
 
The Anglo-Maikop Corporation (AMC) is a significant example of this increasing 
complexity. Formed in London, it acted in a similar manner to the Anglo-Russian 
Cotton Factories Ltd, in that it effectively acted as an umbrella company for distinct 
British companies acting in Russia. However, unlike the ACRF, it was composed of 
distinct companies that were not linked by family ties, and these companies were 
administered separately by their respective investors and boards of directors. The 
role of the AMC was instead to appoint a local representative and trustee, who would 
protect the interests of the corporation and allied companies in the Caucasus, a 
general manager to superintend the engineering and working of the plots of the 
whole group, an accountant who would take charge of the books and accounts of the 
companies involved, and a manager of a materials department who would supply and 
look after the company’s stores. The costs of this were to be met by the companies 
involved.41 This represents a far more complex investment vehicle than the ACRF, 
with more composite companies that were simultaneously more autonomous, and a 
wider source of finance. Analysis of the companies involved shows that they 
engaged in a wider range of sub-industries within the oil industry; as well as oil 
extraction the AMC also consisted of companies involved in building and operating 
pipelines, refineries, and river transport.42 
 
                                                          
41 LMA, MS 24111, ff. 16-17, 26 April 1910. 
42 LMA, MS 25056, f. 6, 18 May 1913; MS 24098, f. 2, 28 August 1912. 
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Similarly to the AMC, the Anglo-Siberian company formed a complex organisation 
of subsidiaries and new formations in Siberia. The company was initially formed in 
1906 in order to acquire and take over existing mining works in the Urals. It then 
subsequently divided these into the Kyshtim Corporation and the Perm Corporation, 
registered in Russia, but financed through Anglo-Siberian. These companies engaged 
not only in mining, but also in smelting, as well as the construction of private 
railways.43 It is significant that there are common examples of advanced business 
organisation in Siberia and the Caucasus by British companies, which calls into 
question the claim that British companies missed opportunities in remote parts of the 
Russian empire. 
 
The new organisational forms of British companies also led to an increase in 
complexity in the various industries in which each company engaged in. Although 
Russian law required companies to apply for permission to engage in activities that 
were not specified in their charters, many companies in the second phase of 
investment looked to diversify their assets and the industries in which they were 
engaged. For example, the records of the Russian Mining Corporation, Ltd indicate 
that it was originally formed in order to exploit mining concession in Siberia. It 
subsequently began to make investments in the Maikop oil fields, and at the same 
time was engaged in exploration for coal in the Donets basin area, the profits for 
which to some extent were offsetting the losses that the company made on the 
Maikop oil fields, like many other British companies there. However, in June 1914 
the company entered into an agreement with another British company to carry out the 
municipal contract for the construction of sewage and draining works in suburban St 
Petersburg. According to the directors of the company, the area was rapidly 
increasing in population and such contracts represented a promising stream of 
revenue for the company.44 The project was discontinued due to the outbreak of the 
First World War, but if it had been carried into effect the company, which was 
originally purely a Siberian mining concern, would have also been engaged in the 
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Maikop oil industry, Ukrainian coal mining and construction projects in St 
Petersburg. 
 
Although British multinationals favored the recruitment of local Russian managers 
because they were cheaper and had more local knowledge, they did not allow their 
management to become composed purely of Russians, and usually ensured that 
accountants and the directors were English.45 Although to an extent this could 
correspond to a lack of trust in Russian personnel, this retention of key British 
personnel betrays a lack of trust in the Russian government; the use of British 
subjects in senior management positions implied a degree of protection from the 
Russian government. 
 
This lack of trust is particularly evident in the Vickers partnership with the Nikolaev 
shipbuilding company, a Russian state shipbuilding subsidiary. Vickers were 
originally contracted to provide technical and management expertise for the building 
of several warships, however the directorship at Vickers and the local British 
management were keen throughout the business relationship to avoid Vickers being 
pulled into areas of production that they were not contracted to carry out by the 
Russian state subsidiary, which led to various conflicts about the timescale and 
delivery of various projects.46 Clearly, Vickers in this instance felt that their own 
expectations about the enforceability of their contract with the Russian government 
was different to the Russian state interests at the Nikolaev shipyard. 
 
In the case of Vickers, foreign production was undertaken only very reluctantly, 
usually following pressure from a government with which an exporting relationship 
had been established.47 However, this difference can be attributed mainly to the 
unique position of companies operating in the arms industry before 1914 in relation 
to host governments; generally speaking, foreign production was avoided because 
governments represented a very difficult customer. Host governments would often 
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insist on arms companies maintaining a very high capacity without guaranteeing 
orders that would cover overhead costs.48 Where foreign production was necessary, 
arms companies generally held very small stakes in the foreign subsidiary, while the 
day-to-day running of the subsidiary remained under close supervision from the 
Russian Ministry of War via an appointed director.49 
 
In some instances, British companies seem to have held negative stereotypes about 
Russian employees that could be linked to wider societal stereotypes about the 
uncivilized nature of Russia.50 British companies were uncomfortable having 
Russian managers in major positions of power because they believed Russians to 
have little respect for public corporations, regarding them as a source for ill-gotten 
personal income.51 The management of the Vickers assistance at the Nikolaev 
shipyard also regarded Russian workers as lazy, and a major obstacle to the 
successful completion of finished warships.52 However, there is little to connect these 
assumptions about the Russian character with British opinions about the arbitrary 
nature of the Tsarist regime. The literature does not suggest that British companies 
believed that this dishonesty and lack of respect for legality among the workers was a 
result of a general lack of lawfulness within the Tsarist regime 
 
As detailed above, one of the major requirements for British companies operating in 
Russia was to have a responsible agent located in Russia who was a Russian citizen. 
If the company was to be a Russian company, it was required to have a certain 
number of Russian directors and managers. This was not a problem for long 
established British companies in Russia, many of whose family members became 
naturalized Russian citizens. But for newly established British companies, this 
requirement could be quite onerous, and could potentially lead to disaster. While 
these agents usually simply played a token role as a formality because of Russian 
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regulations, as they held power of attorney they could cause quite a lot of damage to 
the company if they were dishonest. British companies undertaking investment in 
Russia 1892-1914 seemed to have followed two separate paths when it came to 
appointing their responsible agent. Well connected companies seem to have used 
former British individuals in St Petersburg such as James Whishaw who had become 
naturalized Russian citizens. It seems that the services of such individuals could be 
obtained through personal connections, and that these individuals simply filled out 
the necessary paperwork while taking a significant fee. James Whishaw, for 
example, crops up as the responsible agent in the company formation papers of a 
large number of British companies formed in Russia, from the Caucasus to Siberia.53 
Henry Cooke, in his visits to British chambers of commerce in his capacity as a 
commercial agent in 1902 reported that a large number of companies doing business 
in the Moscow region conducted their selling operations through using member of 
the British colony in Moscow so successfully that they resented his efforts in what 
they viewed as government interference in their business.54 
 
Less well connected companies were likely to run into trouble as a result of this 
requirement. They often employed local Russian citizens located in the area of their 
investments, and not in St Petersburg. While many of these individuals were of 
course trustworthy, according to the British diplomatic archives at the time there was 
a common problem of British companies being defrauded by local agents, 
particularly in the Caucasus and other peripheral areas of the empire. In one case 
involving a British logging company in 1914, Cooke, then as commercial attaché, 
remarked that the case was typical of British companies being defrauded in Russia 
through either the owners of Russian assets or Russian agents.55 Stevens, the consul 
at Batumi, remarked on a similar situation in the case of the Black Sea Petroleum 
Company, who had employed a local agent known as Count Valhermey, who the 
company later discovered was dishonest. Stevens remarked that this was a common 
mistake made by British investors and exporters in the area.56 Most of these agents, 
whether honest or dishonest, are impossible to trace in the historical record as their 
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employment was usually purely a formality and had little impact on company 
operations. Whishaw in his memoirs described his responsibilities as filing 
documents at the Ministry of Finance annually for each company.57 
 
British investment can therefore be divided into two distinct phases, separated by the 
industrial downturn of 1900-1904. The first phase from 1892 to 1902 saw a gradual 
increase in British direct investment into light industry and extractive industries, 
dispersed across a relatively wide geographical area in comparison to the 1880s. In 
the second phase of 1904-1914 British direct investment increased substantially, but 
was limited to the mining and oil industries, and was concentrated in the Caucasus 
and Siberia. At the same time, British enterprises took on a new level of complexity 
in the organisation of their operations, and became more commonly engaged in 
various industries. 
 
 
3.3 Analysis 
 
Several independent factors could explain the pattern of British investment in Russia. 
Firstly, it is important to consider the determining influence of British trade, 
especially during the 1890s. Historians of British overseas investment before the 
First World War have argued that British overseas investment tended to seek out 
markets where British firms had a good knowledge of the local business 
environment, through geographical proximity, political links (such as the empire), or 
existing trade relationships.58 British firms exported a significant amount of 
consumer products to Russia before 1892, although they lagged behind their German 
and American counterparts.59 British shipping companies were also heavily involved 
in the export of textiles from Russia, such as hemp and flax. This corresponded with 
the initial increase in British direct investment in Russia during the 1880s; most new 
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companies were established in the textiles industries of St Petersburg. British trading 
patterns can also account for the rise in light industry in St Petersburg and Odessa in 
the 1890s producing manufactured and consumer goods. Historically, British 
investment overseas tended to prefer regions where British companies had prior 
experience and were familiar with local conditions, which could go towards 
explaining why British investment favoured St Petersburg and Odessa in this decade. 
 
Many British shipping firms, such as Samuel & Co., a precursor company to the 
Dutch-Royal Shell group, were also heavily involved in the export of oil from 
Batumi, which can explain the tendency for British companies to become involved in 
Caucasian oil concessions towards the end of the first phase of British investment in 
Russia. This also helps to explain the boom in Maikop and Grozny towards the end 
of the second phase, especially as some companies in Baku were so successful and 
were reported as such in the financial press at the time. For Gurushina and Potkina, 
these pre-existing trade relations effectively determined the pattern of British 
investment at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. 
English enterprise ‘migrated’ to Russia along these pre-existing trade routes due to 
tariffs and increasing levels of production in Russia.60 
 
However, British trade does not explain British movement of capital into Siberian 
mining and oil concerns, and also to an extent the Caucasian oil industry, the two 
largest destinations for British capital. British trade had very little prior experience in 
this sector, the only tenuous link between British industry and Siberian extractive 
industries being a limited supply of machinery to this region.61 The failures of British 
engineering and manufacturing firms to successfully export their goods to these 
regions was frequently the topic of many consular and diplomatic reports to London. 
Buchanan recognised these failings, and in 1914 called for an extension in British 
consular services in Russia in order to assist British trade in these regions so as not to 
lose more ground to international competitors.62 
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According to consular reports, the export of machinery and other materials to Siberia 
and the Caucasus was almost entirely in the hands of German and American 
companies, and British firms failed to compete for a variety of reasons. Writing after 
the outbreak of the First World War on the subject of the possibilities opened to 
British companies in the Russian market vacated by German enterprises, R. 
McDonell wrote that trade in Baku and the Caucasian district had been ‘almost 
entirely’ in the hands of Germans, who had studied local conditions and 
requirements, listed their prices in roubles, and were prepared to offer long terms of 
credit, none of which their British competitors were willing or able to do. German 
companies were better organised, often forming combines of non-competing firms 
exporting different goods in order to reduce costs in Baku. These combines were 
well linked to Hamburg trading houses, which commonly re-exported British 
products to the Caucasus via these German companies. German subjects also 
dominated the Trans-Caspian region, due to this region being closed to foreign 
merchants without a special permit. German companies were commonly able to 
make use of Baltic Germans employees, who were Russian citizens, and thus held a 
significant advantage over British firms in these regions.63 
 
German and American competition similarly dominated the export market in Siberia. 
Such was the advantage of the Germans in this market, and the failures of their 
British counterparts, that just before the outbreak of the war the British Engineering 
Company of Siberia was formed in order to advance British engineering exports to 
this region. The company was intended to be a combine similar to the German 
model, with a large number of British firms exporting different non-competing 
engineering products to Siberia under the umbrella of this company. In the 
prospectus, it detailed the failures of British companies in Siberia in comparison to 
their American and German counterparts, which included the unclear knowledge of 
local requirements and needs, and the unwillingness to extend credit. According to 
the management of this company, this was a particularly bad mistake in Siberia. 
‘There are ample natural resources but not much capital there- which makes giving 
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long terms of credit an absolute necessity, as capital is scarce but the need for 
machinery is very great.’64 The British dependency on middlemen or agents to 
market their stock in Siberia also hit British exports, as these individuals typically 
had little engineering knowledge, aimed to make substantial profits thus raising the 
price of British products, and in some cases outright defrauded some British 
exporters.65 It is therefore very difficult to explain the massive movement of British 
capital into the Siberian and Caucasian extractive industries on the basis of trade 
links, when by many accounts British exporters generally failed to make significant 
inroads into these markets during the period. 
 
Similarly, British trade networks inadequately explain the switch from the textile 
industry towards light industry in the 1890s. While British direct investment in the 
1890s increased over the levels of the 1880s, the proportion of investment that went 
into textile firms fell dramatically. If British investment was primarily determined by 
pre-existing trade networks, it is likely that the 1890s would have seen a growth in 
textile investments. The complete collapse of investment in these types of industries 
after the industrial downturn of 1900 to 1904 also indicates that British trade was not 
a predetermining factor in investment decisions. 
 
These discrepancies could be put down to changes in government policy towards 
foreign companies as detailed in the previous chapter. Certainly, Witte’s changes to 
Russia’s tariff policy on foreign manufactured goods could account for the increase 
in British investment in manufacturing and light industry, resulting in the uneven 
proportions of investment in this sector in comparison to textiles. Witte’s 1892 tariff 
was designed to encourage foreign firms to establish manufacturing enterprises in 
Russia behind the tariff wall, instead of simply exporting their goods to Russia. 
However, the tariff regime continued throughout the period, and cannot account for 
the sudden fall in British investment in manufacturing industries after the industrial 
downturn of 1900-1904. 
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Similarly, Witte’s favourable programme of concessions for foreign companies in 
priority industries towards the late 1890s can account for the increase in British 
investment at this time. As previously discussed, Witte’s policies heavily favoured 
British companies in the Caucasian oil industry, and were designed to stimulate 
industries connected to the trans-Siberian railway. This could to some extent explain 
the increase in British investment in Siberia. However, after Witte’s departure from 
the Ministry of Finance this regime of special concessions came to an end, yet 
mining and oil investments came to dominate British investment in the second phase 
of British investment after the industrial downturn. Therefore government policy can 
to an extent explain some of the increases in direct investment in the 1880s, but 
inadequately explains the developments in certain industries and the oil and mining 
booms of the second phase of British investment. 
 
The factor that can be linked to all the above developments is the economic cycle of 
Russia and its impact on how British companies viewed the profitability of Russian 
investments. The economic downturn in the Russian economy from 1900 to 1904 
had such an impact on British investment that firstly the establishment of British 
companies in Russia fell dramatically, and secondly patterns identifiable in the first 
phase of investment are completely different to patterns of investment after 1904. 
Whereas before the crisis light industry and the manufacture of consumer goods 
accounted for over half of British investment in the preceding 10 years, after the 
crisis these industries accounted for only 10 per cent of the total number of British 
companies established in Russia during the second phase.66 
 
We know from the records of two British companies in the textiles industry that the 
textiles trade in St Petersburg was beginning to become less profitable for British 
companies in the 1890s. According to the records and letters of the Anglo-Russian 
Cotton Factories Ltd, run by the Hubbard family, the situation of their three 
enterprises (two cotton mills and a printing plant) were dire in the 1890s. Both mills 
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reported falling profits, and the printing plant was being run at a loss. This acted as 
part of the stimulus to form the above named joint-stock company in 1897, so that 
the profits of the mills could offset the losses made by the printing plant.67 Similarly, 
James Whishaw, the head of an important British family involved in the export of 
Flax from St Petersburg, reported in his memoirs that fewer and fewer British firms 
were established in this industry during the 1890s due to dwindling profits and 
increasing competition from German firms.68 This is in distinction to the general 
trends of the Russian textile industry in Russia, however, which was growing 
throughout the period and was relatively unaffected by the industrial downturn of 
1900-1904.69 This should be set against the fact that textiles made up one of the 
largest growth sectors in St Petersburg in the late nineteenth century, so it is 
significant that British firms ran into trouble in these areas and fewer new 
investments were made in this sector after 1900.70 
 
It is likely that the diminishing economic opportunities in St Petersburg for foreign 
textile firms led to a reorientation in the proportion of British direct investment 
towards other industries. Witte’s tariff must have given some firms that previously 
had a purely export relationship with the Russian market an incentive to commence 
direct investment. However, more recent research into the Russian consumer market 
has shown that as a long term result of the emancipation of the serfs Russia’s 
consumer base grew throughout the last half of the nineteenth century, and 
represented a lucrative market for both foreign and domestic firms, suggesting the 
primacy of economic considerations during this phase of British investment.71 The 
fact that British textile firms did not relocate from St Petersburg to other Russian 
destinations where the prospects of the textile industry were very positive could 
indicate a significant failing of British enterprise in both the first and second phases 
of British FDI in Russia to take advantage of profitable conditions. However, 
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Guruschina and Potkina have also shown that increasing trade costs among textile 
firms significantly ate into the profits of these companies, making investments in 
these sectors less profitable.72 The increase of British FDI in other industries to take 
advantage of these more profitable conditions was strong, indicating that the malaise 
among textile firms was not applicable to other industries. 
 
As will be demonstrated in the next chapter, Siberian and Caucasian mining and oil 
enterprises attracted a disproportionate amount of coverage in contemporary British 
financial literature, focussing mainly on the returns that could be achieved on 
investments due to a large amount of resources in Russia and the comparative lack of 
domestic capital to exploit them. As this section has already shown, British 
companies utilised joint-stock companies more frequently in the second phase of 
British investment in Russia; these were commonly open for public subscription of 
shares and advertised as such. Many companies involved in the initial exploitation of 
Russian oilfields in the second phase of investment took out advertisements in the 
latter paper in order to advertise their shares for general subscription, such as the 
Nerchinsk Oil Company Ltd in 1907.73 Private and commercial investors clearly held 
mining and oil corporations in higher regard, so it is likely that these companies 
found it easier to raise capital via the stock market to fund their investments. The 
lack of British investment in this region during the 1890s, where comparatively 
fewer British oil companies were formed later in the decade, is also partially 
explained by this profit model. In the early 1890s the British oil market was 
dominated by American oil marketed by the Standard Oil Company, and it was only 
due to this company losing its grip on the oil market towards the end of this decade 
that British companies began to exploit foreign oilfields.74 
 
Much less was written about the opportunities in Russia of establishing 
manufacturing enterprises behind Witte’s tariff wall, although the opportunity was 
certainly there. British commercial agents and diplomats throughout the period 
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lamented how British firms failed to take advantage of this emerging market. For 
example, Buchanan in 1912 wrote that British companies had lost ground in the past 
due to competition from other nationalities.75 The failures of British exporting to 
Siberia and the Caucasus has already been documented in this chapter. Therefore it is 
likely that the mere existence of economic opportunity was not enough for British 
companies to engage in direct investment in Russia, and that the level of potential 
profit that could be gained became increasingly more important for British investors 
than government policies or prior experience with a particular market. Many 
companies in Russia, British included, suffered significant losses in the industrial 
downturn of 1900-1904, which may have adversely affected British assumptions 
about investment in Russia apart from in the oil and mining sectors where profits 
were faster to recover.76 It is also possible that the lack of British manufacturing 
firms being set up in Russia was also due to the increased complexity with which 
British firms entered the Russian market at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
For example, in St Petersburg industries there was a tendency towards amalgamation 
between banks, industrial enterprises and between foreigners and Russians, so British 
capital may have entered the Russian market disguised as Russian capital in this 
second phase.77 
 
The body of Russian commercial law, which was never substantially updated in the 
period, continued to act as a hindrance to British investment in Russia. As late as 
1911 the charters issued for oil companies caused much concern for British interests 
in this industry due to the powers given to local officials. According to the records of 
the Anglo-Maikop company, many of the constituent companies of the corporation 
were very wary of the wide powers that their company charters gave to local 
officials, and, importantly, they were unsure of their applications that were still being 
processed, and how much power over their activities the government would give to 
local officials over their activities.78 Therefore even in the partially reformed oil 
industry, commercial law did not result in British companies forming stable 
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assumptions about the Russian regime, and does not indicate that improvements in 
law and its implementation resulted in increased British investment in the oil 
industry in the later part of the period in question. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
The data presented here indicate the existence of two separate phases of British FDI, 
separated by the economic downturn of 1900-1904. Characteristics of these two 
distinct phases indicate that Russian government policy had little effect on the 
pattern of British FDI in Russia. During the first phase, British FDI responded slowly 
to Witte’s policies, and favoured industries and geographical locations that British 
firms had a pre-existing trading relationship with, such as light industry producing 
consumer goods. However, investment in extractive industries did take place, 
although not to the extent of the second phase. 
 
During the second phase of investment, instances of British FDI were more frequent, 
and concentrated mainly in the extractive industries of the Caucasus and Siberia. 
Therefore, while pre-existing trade networks to an extent explains the patterns of the 
first phase, they cannot explain the investment patterns in the second phase. Nor can 
this be adequately explained by government policy, which became less 
accommodating in the second phase. 
 
The overriding factor behind investment decisions by British firms is therefore likely 
to have been the prospect of high returns. Witte’s policies may have influenced this 
perception in the first phase of British investment, but friendly government policy 
was clearly not the determining factor for how British firms gauged the potential 
profitability of a Russian enterprise, given the frequency of British company 
formations in the second phase of investment. This hypothesis is supported by the 
tendency for British investment to focus on industries linked to British trade in the 
first phase, where companies knew there was a good market in Russia following a 
strong previous export relationship, and the focus on the Siberian and Caucasian 
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extractive industries in the second phase, which, as this thesis will demonstrate, were 
widely known to be lucrative investments by the second phase. 
 
On the other hand, the above findings could be indicative of the effect of government 
policy on investment decisions. More British companies opted to incorporate as 
Russian companies in the second phase, and their company structure became more 
complex. The frequency of investments in Siberia and the Caucasus during the 
second phase also demonstrates a level of trust in local laws and regulations, as these 
enterprises would have naturally carried more risk due to their remote nature, arising 
from communication difficulties and the effectiveness of local authorities in these 
areas. Study of the perceptions of the British business community about Russian 
investments and how these changed throughout the period will be able to shed more 
light on these findings, and determine on what basis British companies made 
investment decisions, and how they viewed the Russian government’s treatment of 
foreign business interests.
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Chapter 4: British Perceptions of the Russian Market and 
Russian Investments, 1892-1914 
 
 
To help further determine the relationship between government policy and British 
investment, it will be useful to survey the effects of this legislation and policy change 
on British perceptions of the Russian market and Russian investments. These 
perceptions can be studied through analysis of the financial press, including 
newspapers, journals, and books published during the time period in question. Key to 
this analysis will be whether British business interests had moved away from the 
traditional literary image of Russia that had been established before 1900, which 
characterized the Russian government as the antithesis of English principles of 
freedom, and associated profitable areas such as Siberia with the brutalities of the 
Tsarist penal system.1 The institution of the Anglo-Russian Chamber of Commerce 
and the dispatch of Cooke as a commercial attaché have been cited as evidence of an 
improved British attitude towards the Russian government after the 1907 agreement, 
so it will be significant if this body of literature reflects this.2 
 
Other approaches taken to investigate British business perceptions of the Russian 
regime have looked at the methods used by British businesses to penetrate the 
Russian market. These approaches have found that negative perceptions of the 
Russian regime were still present before the First World War, as British businesses 
missed opportunities due to aversion to complex laws, and were forced to hire local 
agents to deal with the local authorities.3 However, these approaches do not take 
account of the effect of Russian economic policy on the long term development of 
British perceptions of the Russian market. 
 
Two distinct, yet in some respects overlapping, trends can be observed when 
analysing British literature about the Russian government and business environment 
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throughout the period 1892-1914. The success of British and companies of other 
nationalities, such as Nobel, at the Baku oil fields resulted in an acknowledgment, 
and fascination, with the profitability of Russian enterprises. This development can 
be observed to begin at around 1900. The second process was a discussion of the 
nature of the Russian government, with special reference to its treatment of foreign 
business interests within the Empire. Significantly, this discussion largely ignores 
Witte’s contributions and is focused on the government’s attitude to foreign 
enterprise after the period of industrial downturn and revolutionary unrest. Even 
though Witte made more of an effort to attract foreign companies, and implemented 
more policies to attract them, the Russian government after 1907 was seen to be 
friendlier to foreign enterprise, but there is little to link this with investment 
decisions and the perception of profitability. 
 
This chapter will analyse British financial literature on Russia in order to further 
explore this relationship. It will attempt to show that government policy became an 
increasingly dominant reason for the attractiveness of Russian investments and trade 
for British business interests. Firstly, it will then investigate how the actions of the 
Russian government affected these perceptions of profitability, and how the Russian 
government as a whole was perceived to assist or hinder businesses. It will address 
the manner in which Russian investment and trade opportunities were presented as 
being profitable, identifying trends in sectors that were seen as profitable, and the 
economic reasons presented as underpinning this profitability. It will connect this 
analysis to wider trends among British writers at the time whereby old literary 
stereotypes about Russia were re-examined and challenged in the early 1900s. 
Finally, it considers the effect of political instability on British investors. 
 
 
4.1 The Russian government, economic policy and foreign companies 
 
Despite the ending of the concessions of Witte after the industrial downturn of 1900-
1906, the Russian government was perceived to be much more accommodating to 
British businesses and less arbitrary than before the downturn. This suggests that for 
British commercial interests the contradictory policies of the Witte system resulted in 
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the perception of arbitrary government, and that more rigid government policy after 
1907 was interpreted more favourably. 
 
After the first Baku oil rush in the late 1890s the Russian government was seen to be 
relatively friendly towards foreign companies in some sections of the financial press, 
which may have been a reflection of some of Witte’s pro foreign capital policies. 
Henry Norman’s All the Russias, published in 1902, stated that, ‘The official 
conditions of the investment of foreign capital are more liberal than those of the 
United States, and the official attitude is one of sympathy and intelligence.’4 
However, this positive attitude should be taken in conjunction with his indictment of 
the manner in which the Russian government dealt with foreign businessmen, which 
was not up to western standards in his opinion due to procedural delays and 
jurisdictional crossovers.5 
 
However, along with the increased interest in Russian investments that occurred as a 
result of the Baku oil rush, there emerged a number of works that criticized the 
Russian government’s attitude towards foreign companies, as well as the 
effectiveness of local officials to cut down on crime and corruption. These works 
featured a number of similarities with earlier literary traditions; the spectre of the 
repressive Russian government trampling all over the rights of its subjects and 
foreigners, and the corrupt local official both feature heavily, and can be compared to 
earlier works. 
 
Such concerns about the government’s treatment of foreign business and capital is 
evident in Gerrare’s Greater Russia, published in 1903. The general policy of the 
Russian government towards private enterprise was attacked by Gerrare, especially 
in relation to the mineral wealth of Siberia, and indicates that the Russian 
government took arbitrary measures towards foreign business interests. 
 
The Russian government regards the natural resources of Siberia as its most valuable 
asset. It wishes to exploit Siberia in such a manner as will return the largest continuous 
revenue to the state, enrich Russian subjects rather than foreigners, and remain so far 
unpledged that the real estate must revert to the crown. In short, the state will not part 
with its property, but in exchange for Russian labour will relinquish part of this yield. 
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If by any means the natural resources of the country are exploited in such a manner as 
to infringe this principle, or the result in any instance proves contrary to the general 
policy, then that particular method of working is ruthlessly and peremptorily stopped 
by administrative order.6 
 
The Russian state was therefore perceived to act ruthlessly towards foreign interests 
profiteering from Siberian resources. Although this is to an extent to be expected, it 
is Gerrare’s reference to the Russian government using administrative orders to shut 
down such enterprises which has a lot in common with other common negative 
stereotypes in Britain about the Russian government. 
 
This attitude is also present in Thompson’s work on the Russian oil fields in 1904. 
Thompson, the late chief engineer of the European Petroleum Company’s Russian 
properties, claimed that the Russian government was effectively the sole possessor of 
all the mineral wealth in the Caucasus, and that private enterprise was only allowed 
to continue at the government’s behest. 
 
The Russian government is the possessor of most of the mineral wealth of the 
Caucasus, which it jealously guards, and only permits of prospection and 
exploitation on the deposit of substantial guarantees to assure the good faith of the 
promoters, thus giving the Minister of Finance an immense reserve to fall back on 
should occasion demand.7 
 
 
Similar concerns are also evident in British travel literature, even though these works 
do not particularly concern themselves with business matters. For example, Meakin, 
writing just before the 1905 revolution, voiced the opinion that many English 
russophobes were the relations of the large English family trading houses in Russia 
who had been ill-treated by the Russian regime.8 The Russian government was also 
seen as jealously guarding its Armenian and Caucasian possessions from foreign 
interference; for example Lynch’s travel book on the Armenian region described the 
myriad of restrictions placed upon foreigners, such as the need to apply to St 
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Petersburg to be in the region, as well as the restrictions placed upon the movement 
of foreign consular officers.9 
 
Other, more obstructive views were presented of the Russian government in the 
financial press, which fitted into the traditional tyrannical view of the Russian 
government. In 1902 the Anglo-Russian Petroleum Company, a British concern in 
Baku, reported that its poor performance was largely due to, ‘…the tyrannical 
interference with the company’s surveyors by the Government officials, and the 
difficulty of settling the troublesome question of boundaries in the northern 
district’.10 Thus issues of business regulations, in this case complicated land disputes, 
were conflated with the traditional image of the tyrannical local government. 
 
Commercial law and procedural issues represented a significant problem for the 
British financial press when considering Russian investments. The regulations 
surrounding these companies were so problematic that they formed a major section 
of the Russian Commercial Handbook of 1904, published by the secretary to the 
Russian consul-general in London. The author, in the preface, sets out to persuade 
the reader that Russian commercial law was in the process of improving, and that 
antiquated laws were in the process of being revised.11 Therefore this book was 
published as a response to the fact that Russian commercial law was viewed poorly 
in Britain. This is supported by Gerrare’s Greater Russia, in which he pointed out 
that due to the requirement of appointing a Russian trustee to hold real estate, ‘there 
is really no tangible security to offer shareholders as guarantee for their investment, 
and without this the general investor is unlikely to respond liberally’.12 
 
Difficulties surrounding Russian business regulations also often featured in the 
financial press. In the company report in The Times of the Schibaeff Petroleum 
Company of 21 June 1898, the directors aimed to allay shareholder fears over the 
rights of British companies to own oil bearing lands. The directors stated that, 
‘…naturally, all those interested in Petroleum undertakings had been somewhat 
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agitated by the remarks that had been made by His Excellency Count Tatischieff, 
with regard to the rights of foreigners to own such properties in Russia.’13 This 
report, which detailed the action taken by the company to secure legal recognition in 
Russia, was therefore constructed to address this specific fear of British investors. 
 
Significant changes in the way that the Russian government was deemed to interact 
with British business interests occurred in the aftermath of the revolutionary 
disturbances of 1905-1907. There existed many different strands of thought at this 
time. Many members of the liberal government, especially the radicals, felt that the 
Russian government’s treatment of its citizens and undemocratic government meant 
a diplomatic accord between Britain and Russia was impossible. This attitude was 
also prevalent in other sections of society, such as in Tyneside.14  However, there 
also emerged a section of British opinion that recognised the new opportunity that 
Russia offered for commercial investment, and this led to a reappraisal of the 
Russian governments’ dealings with foreign business interests. 
 
Such an emphasis on a reappraisal of the Russian business environment is evident in 
Williams’ Russia of the Russians, in which he states that the Russian business 
environment was becoming modernised, and that the government purchase of the 
railways had done much to ensure stability in the business sphere.15 This revision is 
most clearly present, however, in Barrett’s Russia’s New Era, published in 1908, 
which seems to have been written mostly to allay fear among British investors about 
the Russian government’s treatment of foreign business interests. He produced 
various examples of different companies throughout his book in a variety of different 
industries that reported a good relationship with the Russian government. In the 
public works sphere, he presented the case of the American company, J. F. 
Cummings & Co., who were constructing the St Petersburg underground telephone 
system, and reported no problems with the Russian government. According to this 
company, the Russian government paid them on time, and no difficulties were placed 
in their way.16 In the mining industry, he mentioned two British firms, the Central 
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Siberian Mining Company, and the Spassky Mines Company, both of whom had 
allegedly only received help and assistance from the authorities.17 This theme is 
again repeated in a chapter that deals with trade openings in Russia. Barrett stated 
that, 
 
I do not know of any disappointments, and have never heard a word against the 
treatment meted out, or of difficulties being put in the way by the people or the 
Government. On the contrary, I have hear nothing but praise and satisfaction.’ 
 
It is unfortunate, detrimental to our national interests, and tends to throw cold water 
on our efforts towards expansion of our business in that country, that the reports we 
hear about the general commercial and industrial life of Russia are mostly far from 
correct. The supposed ‘difficulties’ are magnified, and ‘facts’ distorted and 
exaggerated to such an extent that any idea we may have in the way of Russian 
possibilities is absolutely driven from our minds on account of insurmountable 
‘difficulties’.18 
 
In a similar manner, Hodgetts suggested that corruption was becoming much less rife 
throughout the official world, stating that, ‘…it is nevertheless far milder in its forms 
and much less dangerous to the state’.19 An article in The Times also suggested that a 
general distrust of Russia was still harming Anglo-Russian trade, which should not 
have existed in 1909 due to the constitutional reforms in Russia.20 These works in 
conjunction suggests a re-evaluation of the Russian government. It is especially clear 
from Barrett’s work that there still existed in 1908 a certain antipathy towards the 
Russian government’s treatment of business interests, as the second paragraph of the 
above passage seems to be explicitly constructed to address this. But at the same 
time, these works illustrate a certain re-evaluation of the Russian government’s 
attitude towards foreign business interests, and a direct challenge to the status quo of 
the traditional literary image of the Russian government as a tyrannical and 
repressive institution. 
 
Part of this new perception was also due to better technical assurances of the law. 
Some works did raise serious concerns about the adequacy of Russian law, pointing 
out that it was far from unified, and that the unreformed 1836 company statutes 
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carried little weight in the day to day application of company law.21 However, 
Barrett’s work contained technical assurances that foreign joint stock companies 
operating in Russia enjoyed the same privileges as Russian companies. ‘Foreign 
joint-stock companies are allowed to operate in Russia without any hindrance, and, 
since they enjoy this right, their position in no way differs from that of the 
corresponding Russian companies.’22 These technical rights are therefore cast in 
broader terms of foreign companies enjoying a positive relationship with the Russian 
government. The only restriction that he mentions is that in particular fields, 
enterprise was open to Russian firms only, although these difficulties were not 
insurmountable.23 
 
As well as the idea that the Russian government had become more accountable and 
less arbitrary, it was also seen as becoming more encouraging to foreign business in 
general, even though this was not reflected in policy. Kennard, in his Russian Year 
Book of 1911, stated that the Russian Minister of Finance was ‘firmly convinced of 
the necessity of encouraging British companies at Maikop’.24 This idea that a new 
attitude had been adopted by the Russian government is also evident in other sources 
such as the financial press. In the published minutes of a shareholders meeting in The 
Times in 1907, for example, the directors of the Nerchinsk Company, undertaking 
gold mining in Siberia, stated that they had received every assistance from the 
Imperial government in St Petersburg and local officials in setting up their company, 
and that, ‘This courtesy was… extended to all foreign companies who proposed to 
deal legitimately with the Russian government’.25 This sentiment was also repeated 
in the records of the Russian Mining Corporation, established in 1907, whose 
directors stated that, ‘Russia had innumerable resources, but money was required to 
work them; and if friendly foreign capital were embarked in them the Russian 
government would certainly accord all possible facilities for ensuring success.’26 
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The Russian government therefore underwent a change according to British business 
interests. Towards the end of the period it was no longer portrayed as treating foreign 
companies in an arbitrary manner, but according to legal standards. Its laws became 
easier to understand and British companies became more assured of their consistent 
implementation. The government was also regarded to be more accommodating and 
welcoming to British enterprise as a result of its tendency to implement the law 
consistently. This change is significant because it suggests that the effect of the Witte 
system was to inculcate perceptions of arbitrariness within the British business 
community, which the increase in British investment in Russia did little to challenge, 
especially during the period of economic uncertainty when many aspects of the Witte 
system were changed. It was only in the later period that the Russian government 
was able to foster more stable and positive assumptions among the financial press. 
Significantly, these perceptions had little to do with the profitability of Russian 
enterprise, and mainly focussed on the extent to which the Russian government did 
not act as an obstacle for foreign investment. 
 
 
4.2 Considerations of Profitability 
 
The perceived profitability of Russian enterprises closely followed the beginning of 
British involvement in the mining and oil industries of Siberia and Baku. Although 
there existed many successful British companies in Russia before 1900, it was the 
advent of the Baku oil fields, and the lure of the fortunes that could be made from 
them, that excited the British imagination the most. As chapter 3 showed, British 
involvement in these industries increased significantly towards the end of the 1890s, 
and after a lull as a result of the industrial depression in Russia increased 
exponentially after 1906. The key aspect that made Baku so profitable for a number 
of foreign companies was then projected on to Russian investments as a whole from 
1900. This was the wealth of natural resources in Russia, in the case of Baku, oil, and 
the lack of sufficient domestic capital to work them. Therefore, British perceptions of 
the profitability of Russia generally conforms to the model whereby British capital 
was pushed out of Britain due to low interest rates there as a result of an over 
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saturation of the market with capital, to countries with many unworked natural 
resources and a dearth of capital, such as Russia.27 
 
Probably the clearest demonstration of the effect that Baku had on British opinion 
was the sections devoted to the oil trade in Norman’s All the Russias. As an 
illustration of the oil rush at Baku, Norman stated that in 1899, there were 160 oil 
companies in Baku, of which 62 had been formed in the past two years. This was due 
to the enormous profits which Norman described could be made at Baku by just 
hitting oil, let alone the profits, and dividends that could be paid, that could be had if 
one hit a ‘spouter’. While he did acknowledge that it was likely that the Baku oil 
field was becoming exhausted, he also pointed out that there certainly existed other 
good oil fields in the Caucasus.28 
 
This perception was also prevalent in similar works in the period. For example, 
James Henry, the editor of Petroleum World, in 1905 showed a positive attitude 
towards the attractiveness of Russia as a place to invest in, specifically in the 
petroleum industry. He described Baku as a wealthy oil city, and where the 
production of oil had been increasing steadily since 1893.29 Gerrare also paints an 
attractive picture of Russia’s material wealth that could potentially be exploited by 
foreign firms, citing the fact that Baku oil production was increasing at a 15 per cent 
higher rate than American production, and that very high profits could be made in the 
textile industry and logging.30 This positive assessment is balanced out by his 
assertion that the Baku oil fields would soon be exhausted, and that the Siberian gold 
mining industry offered comparatively small and decreasing yields.31 Even 
Thompson stated that, although much British capital would be lost in Baku due to 
exhausted fields there, the transmission of modern methods to Russia via English 
companies would lead to the opening up of new profitable oil fields.32 
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One of the more significant aspects of Norman’s work is that the wealth that was 
available to British companies in Baku was also available for enterprising foreign 
investors willing to exploit the variety of natural resources present in Russia, such as 
gold, magnesium and timber, as a result of Russia’s lack of domestic capital.33 This 
model is also clearly demonstrable in a report by Wynnard Hooper for the Royal 
Statistical Society, published in The Times, which stated that Russian production of 
gold was under performing in the international context in 1900.34 This article 
suggests that there was an opening in Russian gold mining ventures that could be 
exploited by British companies utilising superior gold mining technology. 
 
Other works, such as that of Decle, stressed the importance of foreign capital in 
developing the natural resources of Russia in order to promote the financial stability 
of Russia in the future. 
 
Russia must, therefore, if she wishes to develop her mineral wealth, open her 
doors to foreign prospectors until her own people have gained sufficient 
experience from them. This, of course, leads me to point out that Russia is 
entirely dependent upon foreign enterprise for her future expansion. There is no 
capital in Russia, and for that reason, also, care will have to be taken not to 
overburden large landowners with excessive taxation.35 
 
This view is also repeated in the Economist in August 1909, where it was observed 
that due to funds being siphoned off by the Ministry of War for the army and navy 
there was very little capital in Russia in order to successfully work Russia’s rich 
natural resources.36 Generally, the perception emerges that due to a lack of capital in 
Russia, British investment could result in higher returns. 
 
Works published after the industrial downturn and revolutionary disturbances also 
highlighted the favourable investment conditions in Russia, particularly the richness 
of Russian material resources and the lack of domestic capital. A key development of 
this period, however, is that destinations for profitable investments were perceived to 
be wider than just the extractive industries. This interest in new sources of wealth 
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was particularly strong in the emerging Siberian districts, which were beginning to 
be opened up to foreign enterprise with the lifting (and circumventing) of restrictions 
and the extension of the infrastructure. Hodgetts was particularly keen to press home 
the advantages of Siberian investments. 
 
To the British public, Siberia will for many years to come be interesting 
principally on account of its undoubted mineral wealth, its gold-fields and coal-
fields, its petroleum and similar deposits, and in order that these may be 
economically worked, and thus contribute to the development and wealth of the 
Russian Empire, abundant efficient labour is essential.37 
 
A report in The Times also supported this view of Siberia, strictly in terms of the lack 
of native capital and the abundance of natural resources.38 This was further discussed 
in relation to the copper mining industry, which stated that the domestic supply of 
copper in Russia in 1912 did not adequately supply the home demand, leading to an 
opening for British investment.39 
 
These perceptions are significantly different to the perceptions of the profitability of 
Russia before the increase of British investment in Baku, suggesting that British 
investment in oil and perception of the profitability of Russian enterprises was 
closely linked. Assessments of the wealth of Russia and the potential for investment 
to make large returns was much more mixed in the period 1892-1900, despite Witte 
raising the tariff barrier to encourage foreign investment. The earliest example of 
Russia’s profitability can be found in travel books about Russia, which are indicative 
of a trend towards factual accounts of Russia, as opposed to the demonization of 
Russia present in late nineteenth century fiction. For example, in 1892 Harry de 
Windt described a shift of attitudes in Russia towards Siberia, with Russians 
associating it less with hardship and exile, and more as a road to richness.40 On the 
other hand, other assessments could be quite different. A much more negative view 
of the Siberian gold mining industry is given by the travel writer, Jefferson, in 1897. 
His view of this particular industry is in contradiction to that established by later 
writers who focus on the money that could be made. He stated that the poor 
                                                          
37 Hodgetts, Glorious Russia, 121. 
38 ‘Siberia as a Field for British Capital’, The Times, 4 September 1908, 15. 
39 ‘The Copper Industry in Russia’, The Times, 5 September 1912, 16. 
40 Harry de Windt, Siberia as it is (London: Chapman and Hall, 1892), 475. 
149 
 
techniques used by the current gold mining industries were causing enormous 
damage to the whole area, mainly through the tendency for companies to dump their 
debris on unworked land.41 
 
Reports in the financial press about the profitability of Russian investments were 
scarce, although Russia as a market for British goods was not overlooked. The 
Economist carried articles throughout the 1890s on the demand for British 
agricultural machinery in Russia, particularly in the Southern districts. English 
agricultural machinery was generally regarded as being better quality than its 
German and American counterparts, although British firms generally failed to cater 
to the specific needs of the Russian market and extend sufficient credit.42 
 
However, after the Baku oil rush, the British financial press began to emphasize the 
profits that could be made in industries other than oil and mining. Importantly, they 
began to portray the high resources, or number of consumers, to domestic capital 
ratio. Stephen Graham’s Changing Russia, written in 1913, shows evidence of 
perceptions in Britain that portrayed Russia as a place where good returns could be 
made from a wide variety of investments. ‘We think that Russia is the new America 
which we propose to develop with our capital, becoming millionaires thereby. It is 
for some, even for many, the land where money is invested, the place where the 
treasure is.’43 He also cites a growth in writing about Russia for this reason, 
especially in the liberal press. For Graham, British investments had also taken a 
remarkable number of forms by 1913. 
 
Money has been forthcoming from Britain for all manner of projects- for 
Caucasian oil, Ural gold, copper and platinum, new railways, old railways, for 
making harbours and reconstructing towns, for trams, etc. etc. One of the 
tangible results of the visit of the English delegates was the purchase of the 
whole stock of two Russian home railways. Various other schemes were 
promoted. Moscow, Nikolayev, and Baku have raised money in London. 
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Money has been found for the new railway along the Black Sea shore, and for 
the railway from Vladikavkaz to Tiflis.44 
 
A similar attitude displayed in The Times in 1909, which stated, in an article about 
Russia’s resources in general, that British capital would in the future be entering 
Russia to develop a wide variety of resources. 
 
An important item of importation into Russia in the non-too distant future will 
be British capital, for the country teems with undeveloped resources awaiting 
the investor. Vast deposits of mineral wealth promise handsome profits, while, 
for the more conservatively minded, there are practically unlimited possibilities 
of gilt-edged investments in railways and municipal and public works. British 
interests in Russian mining are already considerable, chiefly in gold (the Lena 
goldfields), petroleum (Baku), copper (Kyshtim), and manganese.45 
 
The main development here is that new opportunities were not simply confined to 
extractive industries. The British literature of this period also stressed the importance 
of investment in manufacturing industries. In fact, this was recognized as early as 
1902, when the commercial agent to Russia, Henry Cooke, visited the London 
Chamber of Commerce in February 1902. This meeting was publicised in The Times, 
and the article detailed how there was an opening for British goods in Russia due to 
the Russo-German tariff war and the boycott of German goods in Poland, resulting in 
a large number of potential consumers with no competition from German products.46 
 
This emphasis on the number of consumers and the size of the market commonly 
centred on the demand for agricultural products. Barrett’s 1908 book presents a very 
positive view of the Russian empire as a place to establish manufacturing industries, 
stating that due to Russia’s large population, it offered British manufacturers an 
unlimited market. He placed particular emphasis on agricultural reports for 1907 for 
Russia, furnished by the foreign office that pointed towards a period of relative 
prosperity for the Russian peasantry.47 Certain regions of Russia were also portrayed 
as being particular havens of British manufacturing success, for example John 
Hubback described the ship building at Nikolaev to have been in the hands of the 
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British to the extent that football was extremely popular, and districts of Odessa with 
many British families who had been established there for a generation or two.48 
Although these reports bear some resemblance to the descriptions of the Russian 
market before 1900, a new emphasis was placed on the size of the Russian market 
and the relative lack of competition from domestic and international firms. 
 
While the improvement of Anglo Russian relations occurred approximately at the 
same time as the changes in how Russia was viewed as being profitable, Diplomatic 
relations had very little effect on these considerations, and are rarely mentioned in 
financial and economic literature. The only mention in the Economist of  the 
economic ramifications of the 1907 Anglo-Russian agreement was the affect that it 
would have on British trade interests in Persia, which according to the author’s 
analysis was limited as British trade interests in Persia were not extensive. According 
to the article the main significance of the treaty was political, not economic.49 In a 
retrospective article on the agreement in the same publication, the Anglo-Russian 
friendship was desirable from an economic perspective, but the article doesn’t 
elaborate on why this is the case, and such a statement could apply to any country.50 
Williams similarly argued that by 1914 efforts to improve commercial relations 
between Russia and Britain had been improved by the formation of the Anglo-
Russian chamber of Commerce, and that as a result English investments had been 
increasing in Russia very prominently.51 Other than these passing references, there is 
very little in the financial literature at the time to suggest that the Anglo-Russian 
agreement of 1907 had much effect on investor perceptions of Russia. 
 
The profitability of Russian investments was instead closely related to the Baku oil 
boom at the end of the 1890s. It was focused on economic conditions in Russia, 
where British companies and the British financial press identified a lack of capital 
and a wealth of natural resources, which would make British enterprise very 
profitable. Identification of the profitable nature of the Baku oil industry translated 
into interest in the Siberian gold mining industry, and later, throughout the first 
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decade of the twentieth century, into a greater interest in the Russian market for 
manufactured goods. Although the wider interest in the Russian market developed 
concurrently with the improvement of Anglo-Russian relations and the Anglo-
Russian agreement, there is little to suggest that this had much of an effect on the 
perceived profitability of Russian investments. 
 
It is important to note the effect of the 1905 revolution on British perceptions of the 
profitability of Russia. The two years of industrial unrest that followed the 1905 
revolution, and the accompanying troubles in the Caucasus understandably dented 
British confidence in the Russian market. The British financial press at the time was 
filled with depressing news of falling Russian industrial stocks,52 and this depression 
had an effect on wider literature surrounding the profitability of Russian investments. 
This can be demonstrated by Rudolf Martin’s study of Russia, published in 1907. He 
stated that the upward rise in shares in Russian enterprises and state bonds was due to 
the behaviour of buyers under the mistaken impression that the 1905 revolution had 
come to an end.53 For this particular writer, it is evident that the revolutionary unrest 
in Russia had created a poor business environment, and did not offer good security 
for investments. He makes reference to the ‘modern fallacy’ that Russia was 
‘boundlessly rich’, and that contemporary English investors generally did not believe 
in this in 1907.54 
 
The problems created by unrest in Russia are evident in later works. Barrett went to 
great pains in the first chapter of Russia’s New Era to emphasize the stability of the 
Russian regime. He initially points out that the third Duma represented a significant 
for the peaceful development of Russia, and that Stolypin was likely to be able to 
implement gradual reform, removing the threat of further revolutionary activity.55 
This stabilizing effect, for Barrett, was also evident in Russian industry. 
 
So far as industrial progress is concerned, the trade returns and reports from 
various manufacturing centers have passed away and that the worst effects of the 
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war and of subsequent disturbances in industrial centers have passed away and that 
a period of material recuperation has set in.56 
 
Barrett’s audience are therefore likely to have harbored concerns about the political 
stability of Russia, and that the recent political instability and revolutionary 
upheavals had had on Russian business. A similar opinion is evident in how Barrett 
characterizes the finances of the state. Barrett states that due to the flotation of the 
Russian loan, it was now no longer fashionable to talk in terms of Russian 
insolvency.57 This could have been designed to allay British fears of the Russian 
government defaulting on its debts, and the resulting economic consequences this 
would have for Russia. 
 
It would seem from comparisons to later works in this period, however, that the 
damage to British perceptions of the profitability of Russia was merely temporary. 
Overall, the picture that emerges of British opinions of the profitability of Russian 
investments is one of continuity with the period before the outbreak of revolutionary 
unrest. Investments were still rationalized in terms of the high wealth of natural 
resources to domestic capital ratio, but in a far wider range of different industries, 
indicating an opening up of the Russian investment market in this period for British 
investors. This strongly corresponds with the financial models of capital being 
pushed out of Britain towards countries with low levels of domestic capital before 
1914. Significantly, this development corresponded with a tendency to include 
positive views of the Russian government’s attitude towards foreign business 
interests in examinations of the profitability of Russia, indicating the Russian 
government in the post-1907 period was viewed less in terms of its traditional 
tyrannical image in this period by business interests. 
 
 
4.3 Attacking old literary stereotypes 
 
These perceptions of Russia as a place to invest did not exist in isolation, and may 
have been influenced by wider trends in British society about the nature of the 
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Russian regime. Although there was a re consideration among British society of the 
Russian government, it did not substantially resemble the changes among the 
financial press, which were quite distinct to developments among wider society. 
 
During the 1890s, there was a well-established literary perception of Russia as a land 
of an arbitrary, repressive government that sent its citizens to Siberia or summary 
execution, and the anarchists and revolutionaries who wreaked havoc with their 
bombs and assassination attempts. Particularly striking are novels published towards 
the end of the nineteenth century depicting a fictional war between Britain and 
Russia, depicting Russia as the antithesis to British values of freedom and 
democracy.58 These depictions influenced British perceptions of certain aspects of 
the Russian government that were connected to business. 
 
A general indictment of the Russian bureaucracy can be found in Joubert’s Russia as 
it Really Is, published in 1904, which  claimed that Russia only possessed the 
outward signs of justice, and that the Russian courts, juries, and regulations were 
really just for show for the outside world.59 Further, corruption also ran rife within 
Russia. 
 
From the Baltic to the Yenisei the whole country is corrupt. From governor to 
urgadnik every man has his price, and is anxious to be offered it. The government, 
the synod, the army, and the bench are putrid with corruption. Every man preys on 
his poorer neighbours and cozens his superiors if he can.60 
 
Joubert, in his later work, further repeated his assertion of corruption, and attributed 
the defeat of Russia to Japan to the effect of widespread corruption on the Russian 
war effort.61 
 
This view of the corrupt local official is one that is comparable to earlier 
characterizations of Russia that are not concerned with business. For example, 
Stadling and Reasons’s In the Land of Tolstoi characterized the local Russian official 
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as colluding with local money lenders for the purpose of ‘stripping the peasants to 
the bone’, by taking a portion of their gains for their tacit support.62 This sentiment is 
comparable to Hare’s travel book, published in 1896, which claimed that bribery was 
rampant throughout the Russian Empire, and that, ‘All the public offices in Russia 
are full of civilised robbers who have not courage to work in open day. How the 
people hate and despise the official world which pillages them!’63 Further, in a 
discussion of the obstacles that the first Duma faced in 1906, Decle claimed that 
officials in Russia, ‘Must be made to understand that the system of the past- bribery, 
oppression and arbitrary proceedings will no longer be tolerated’, in order to promote 
the further political stability of Russia.64 Thus this particular stereotype permeated 
many different branches of British opinion about Russia. 
 
The Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 heralded a new discussion of the Russian 
government in British public opinion. There existed many different strands of 
thought at this time. Many members of the liberal government, especially the 
radicals, felt that the Russian government’s treatment of its citizens and 
undemocratic government meant a diplomatic accord between Britain and Russia 
was impossible.65 On the other hand, many general works on Russia after the 
revolutionary period attacked this previous depiction of Russia. The barbaric actions 
of the Russian government in retaliation to unrest were reassessed by Dearmer. In his 
pamphlet Russia and Britain, he rationalised Russia’s methods in terms of its rapid 
development and extremes of opinion that existed in the country.66 Williams also 
rationalised the incompetence and exploitation of the Russian bureaucracy in terms 
of the impossibility of exercising popular control over it in a country the size of 
Russia.67 Similarly, Hume argued in 1914 that Russia should not be viewed through 
English eyes, at is was ‘still a country in the making’.68 
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A more direct challenge was posed by Stephen Graham, who wrote widely about his 
travels in Russia, in his Undiscovered Russia and later works.69 In the preface to his 
work, Graham pointed out that contrary to certain sections of popular opinion Russia 
was not the land of, ‘...bomb throwers, intolerable tyranny and unhappiness’.70 
Maurice Baring also alluded to this tendency, stating that many people formed their 
opinions of Russia in terms of, ‘English fiction such as is written by English 
journalists and novelists’.71  Similarly, Stewart in Provincial Russia stated that the 
Russian authorities had been portrayed to be worse than they actually were in 
relation to the peasantry. 
 
Sentimental and sensationalist writers have been so successful in blurring the real 
outlines that in England the term moujik too often seems to connote at once the 
darkest and deepest degradation and the victim of a crushing tyranny. The facts are 
otherwise. On the one hand, the Russian authorities are not so black as they are 
often painted, and the taxes are comparatively light.72 
 
This misunderstanding of the Russian government was due, according to a pro-
Russian pamphleteer publishing after the outbreak of World War One, to ‘distorted 
legends’ arising from fiction. 
 
Not only is there great ignorance of Russia in England, but, as always is the result 
of ignorance, great misunderstanding. The popular notions about Russia are not 
only imperfect but absurd. They are derived partly from a distorted legend of the 
Crimean War, partly from sympathy with nationalities or causes which the Russian 
government has treated badly, and very largely from fiction.73 
 
These authors were therefore challenging the old stereotypes of the Russian 
government, both in a general sense, and in its relationship with the Russian 
peasantry, in a similar way to which other authors challenged the prevailing notion of 
the Russian government’s treatment of foreign business interests. 
 
However, the traditional literary images of Russia, most noticeably the corrupt 
government official, still crop up in the later period. For example, Kennard in his The 
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Russian Peasant stated that in 1908, the greatest cause of all Russia’s problems, and 
especially those of the peasant, was the corrupt bureaucracy. 
 
Till Russia has been swept of the last vestiges of Bureaucracy, it will remain 
stagnant as a state, its policy a party one born of the self-seeking motives of its 
corrupt officialism, incapable of being trusted, respected, or carrying real weight 
amongst the powers of the word, incapable of being accepted as the true expression 
of the feeling of the true, great Russian people.74 
 
For Kennard, local officials, especially, tended to be ‘devoid of all pretensions to 
education, intellect, culture, or natural refinement’.75 According to Walter, who 
published a travel book about Russia in 1910, this was due to local officials being 
poorly paid. ‘They are poorly paid, and are, amongst all Europeans, the men most 
notorious for receiving bribes.’76 
 
These wider perceptions vary significantly from the perceptions of the financial press 
and business community. Although there was a certain re-imagining of Russia in 
general among wider society, the Russian government continued to be portrayed as 
anachronistic, repressive and corrupt, whereas the in the business and financial press 
it was generally portrayed as efficient and welcoming to foreign enterprise. Thus 
wider perceptions prevalent in Britain about Russia probably had little effect on the 
perceptions of the business community, and it must be assumed that these 
perceptions were primarily formed through experience of the Russian business 
environment, either directly or indirectly. 
 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
British business interests began to view Russian investments more favourably from 
the beginning of the twentieth century, and this was mainly linked to the advent of 
the Baku oil boom. Such profitability was viewed very narrowly in terms of the 
significant availability of natural resources in Russia and the lack of domestic capital 
and expertise available to work them. Interest in the Baku oilfields, after an interval 
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due to the revolutionary situation in Russia from 1905 to 1907, translated into wider 
interest in investments in other industries, initially in related extractive interest such 
as Siberian mining, but then progressing into other sectors such as manufacturing. 
 
These findings correlate roughly with the expansion of British controlled companies 
in the extractive industries as investigated in chapter 3. Thus increased perceptions of 
profitability in these industries led to sustained British investment in various oil and 
mining concerns, to the very high levels observed towards 1910. Similarly, towards 
the end of the period many companies diversified their activities into other industries 
such as municipal contracts for lighting and sewers. Where it does not match the 
previous findings is in patterns of manufacturing industries. Although there was a lot 
of interest in Russian manufacturing companies in the financial literature described 
above, alongside the opportunities that were identified in oil and mining, it did not 
translate into increased investment into these industries. It is possible that this is 
because British companies entered these industries indirectly, or did not begin 
manufacturing operations in Russia and engaged in exporting materials to Russia 
instead. This may have been a result of the Russian government introducing policies 
in the latter half of the period in question that heavily favoured Russian owned 
companies, so it is possible that British manufacturing companies entered the 
Russian market through participation in Russian companies, a method which is 
practically impossible for the historian to trace on the macro-level. 
 
At the same time, there was a reconsideration of the Russian government and its 
attitude towards foreign businesses. Instead of being portrayed to act arbitrarily 
towards foreign business interests in order to guard its national interests, assets and 
security, the Russian government was increasingly seen as being more welcoming to 
foreign businesses. This was perceived to have a limited impact on the profitability 
of Russian investments, although these perceptions were predominantly focused on 
the wealth of natural resources in Russia, the lack of domestic capital and the large 
consumer base. This could also have been due to a general reassessment of the 
Russian government that occurred as a result of closer Anglo-Russian relations after 
1907. Typical literary tropes of the Russian government of the 1890s were 
reassessed, and the spectre of repression and the violation of citizens’ rights were 
downplayed. This could have underpinned the reassessment of the Russian 
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government according to British business interests, although it is difficult to identify 
the link between these wider societal perceptions and the perceptions of the former 
group. Most likely it was a complex interaction of this wider reassessment and the 
effect of actual experience of the Russian government through business operations in 
Russia. 
 
The impacts of the Anglo-Russian agreement and the revolutionary unrest were 
limited. While the revolutionary unrest of 1905-1907 produced a noticeable effect on 
investors while it was occurring, it had a limited long term effect, and this is 
supported by the data on British company formations, 1907-1914. Similarly, while 
there is a correlation between improving Anglo-Russian relations and British 
investment, there seems to be little causal link from this analysis of the financial 
literature. It is reasonable to assume that as it became clearer that Britain and Russia 
would not be drawn into a war against each other that British companies would be 
more likely to make Russian investments. However this idea was never articulated in 
any of the financial publications or even company records consulted in this study. 
Thus it is reasonable to conclude that Russian investments were rationalised mainly 
in terms of the potential profits that could be made due to the unique conditions of 
the Russian business environment, and later in the period, the pro-foreign business 
attitude of the Russian government. The remainder of this study will attempt to ask 
why this attitude developed, especially given the fact that it was not backed up by 
Russian economic policy, and only partially by changes in the law. 
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Chapter 5. British use of the Diplomatic and Consular Service 
 
 
As the preceding chapters have indicated, despite an inadequate system of 
commercial law and an inconsistent policy towards foreign companies, Russian 
investments became an attractive prospect for British companies from the late 1890s 
onwards because of their perceived profitability, particularly in the oil and mining 
sectors. As a result, the period saw a substantial increase in British investment after 
1900. At the same time, the British diplomatic service underwent several 
fundamental changes in Russia and the rest of the world, becoming larger and more 
professionalised, and more concerned with offering commercial assistance to the 
rapidly increasing number of British companies undertaking foreign investment 
before 1914. In Russia the size and commercial orientation of the British diplomatic 
service increased in size after the increase of British investment in Russia, and the 
relationship between these two bodies can offer significant conclusions about the 
approach that British businesses took towards Russian investments and the Russian 
government. 
 
To this end, this chapter analyses the fundamental assumptions that lay behind 
British requests for diplomatic intervention in disputes between British companies 
and the Russian government. Requests for assistance are analysed in terms of what 
they tell us about the experience of these companies in Russia: what did they think 
that British diplomats and consuls could achieve on their behalf, and how did they 
think they could achieve these requests? What do such requests tell us about British 
companies’ wider perceptions of the Russian government, as a result of continued 
exposure to the Russian business environment? This chapter analyses two categories 
of requests for diplomatic assistance: requests for assistance in court cases, and 
requests for assistance in order to avoid or modify unfavourable Russian economic 
regulations and policies. 
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This chapter examines the extent to which these requests were underpinned by stable 
assumptions about the Russian government. How far did British companies possess a 
reasonable knowledge of Russian economic regulations and law? To what extent did 
they expect the Russian government to act in a lawful and non-arbitrary manner?  
The chapter seeks to determine whether negative stereotypes about the Russian 
government held in Britain, and the tendency of the government to follow an 
inconsistent economic policy towards foreign companies throughout Witte’s tenure 
as Minister of Finance, resulted in British companies basing their assumptions about 
the Russian government on arbitrariness, or being unable to form consistent 
assumptions about the Russian government. It will also consider to what extent these 
perceptions arose out of an Anglo-centric worldview among British investors and 
businessmen, and an expectation that they be treated according to similar principles 
to British commercial law. 
 
5.1 The British diplomatic service in Russia, 1892-1914 
 
 
The diplomatic and consular organisation in Russia consisted of officials at the 
British embassy in St Petersburg, and a network of consular officials spread 
throughout the country in cities that the Foreign Office viewed as commercially 
important to British interests. Most notably, these included St Petersburg, Moscow, 
Odessa, Kiev, Warsaw and Batumi. These included both salaried and unsalaried 
consuls who attended to their official duties alongside their own business interests. 
There were roughly seven to eight senior diplomats at the British embassy in St 
Petersburg at any one time, alongside a collection of more junior officials, including 
a commercial attaché from 1908.1 
 
The addition of a commercial attaché to the St Petersburg embassy was a feature of 
the changing functions of the Foreign Office and diplomatic service towards 
professional commercial support for British exporters and companies based overseas 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This development took place in a 
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context of increased professionalism and concern with information gathering as well 
as increased specialization within the Foreign Office and diplomatic service in the 
late nineteenth century.2 In response to a similar development among its European 
counterparts and concerns over Britain’s industrial and export performance, 
diplomatic and Foreign Office officials began to take on a number of different 
responsibilities such as producing reports on regulations, maintaining good relations 
between British companies and host-country regimes, and interceding on behalf of 
British companies.3 A significant result of this process was the outcome of the 
Walrond Committee, which in 1903 set new grounds for the appointment of suitable 
consuls with the required amount of commercial knowledge, in response to 
complaints by British businesses.4 As a result of this reform the role of the consuls 
changed to offering support to individual British companies, providing that their 
competitors were not British. This support included information on local trading 
conditions, the introduction of British firms to local firms, and offering advice to 
British litigants in commercial disputes.5 In Russia, the British ambassador Charles 
Hardinge established a system in 1904 whereby consular reports on local conditions 
played an important part in diplomatic intelligence gathering and the subsequent 
dispersal of commercial information.6 
 
Despite these developments, historians’ treatment of the Foreign Office and 
diplomatic service has been somewhat negative, and it is important to bear in mind 
the limitations that they highlight. These interpretations stress the professional 
isolation of the Foreign Office that resulted in a reactive outlook, and receipt of 
deficient information, which ultimately contributed to its inability to adequately deal 
with the rising threat of Germany.7 Certainly, the capabilities of diplomats and 
consuls were limited due to intense time and financial pressures. Since the 1906 
reform of the Foreign Office only indirectly affected the diplomatic service, 
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diplomatists continued to be burdened with clerical work.8 The lower ranks at the 
British embassy were also notoriously underpaid, and had a large number of other 
tasks to complete as well as commercial intelligence gathering. Consuls found 
themselves in a similar position; they were usually part-time which would have 
affected how well they carried out their duties.9 Where they were salaried, they were 
often overworked and not given the financial resources to employ assistants.10 It 
must be recognised, therefore, that their perceptions of the Russian business 
environment would have been limited by these working conditions. 
 
Historians have also pointed towards the diplomatic service and Foreign Office’s 
limited social composition as a source of weakness. Even though the Foreign Office 
introduced entrance examinations in 1905, the service was still dominated by 
individuals from aristocratic or wealthy landowning backgrounds; from 1908 to 
1914, 25 out of 37 new entrants to the diplomatic service came from Eton.11 Social 
exclusivity is likely to have been particularly accentuated in Russia, where living 
expenses in St Petersburg far outstripped the meagre salaries of most officials, who 
were forced to supplement their earnings with other sources of income, or request a 
less expensive posting, and where high social standing conveyed particular 
advantages in the court-orientated capital.12 Even in the Balkans, this social 
homogeneity resulted in a significant social gap between the members of the British 
business community and the members of the diplomatic service who were supposed 
to be assisting them.13 
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This background to some extent applied to salaried consuls. There was a prevailing 
attitude among the senior consular staff that consuls should have a high social 
standing amongst the community.  Smith regarded this as an important factor in the 
process of appointing a replacement vice-consul in Theodosia in mid-1907. In the 
case of one candidate Smith wrote to the British ambassador, Arthur Nicolson, that 
‘Nothing definite has been alleged to his discredit, but on the whole my conclusion 
was that his standing was hardly as well established as is desirable for a vice-
consul’.14 Another candidate, the then current vice-consul at Warsaw was turned 
down on the basis that ‘If appointed, he proposes to set up business at Theodosia, but 
he has no private means and is not well established there... I fear he may be 
unsuitable’.15 
 
The British diplomatic service underwent a significant change in this time period, 
and became more concerned with commercial considerations, largely due to the 
influence of Hardinge and as a result of the Waldron Committee’s findings, as 
opposed to the expansion of British trade and investment in Russia. Despite it 
becoming more sophisticated and attuned to commercial matters, the diplomatic 
service in Russia still operated under a set of difficult conditions and with limited 
resources, especially in the case of the consuls in the provinces, and came from a 
limited social sphere. At the same time it included a great many officials with a lot of 
experience in Russia, who were adept at navigating the social circles of the Russian 
court and ministries. Such a service provided British companies with an important 
and knowledgeable tool with which to pursue their interests in this period, as this 
chapter and the next explores. 
 
5.2 Economic regulations and British companies 
 
During the period 1892 to 1914 British companies often requested British diplomats 
acting on their behalf to mould Russian economic policy. This reveals a set of twin 
assumptions held by British business interests in Russia: the extent to which the 
Russian government was perceived to act arbitrarily towards foreign business 
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interests, and the extent to which British companies expected British diplomats to be 
able to effect change to Russian economic regulations on their behalf through use of 
their influence and personal connections with the Russian government. This section 
analyses this trend among British shipping companies throughout the first stages of 
British engagement with the Russian market in the 1890s, before exploring the 
persistence of these assumptions among British companies undertaking direct 
investment in Russia. 
 
British shipping companies and customs regulations 
British shipping companies had significant expectations of the ability of British 
diplomatic staff to influence Russian customs regulations throughout the period 
1892-1900. These expectations can be linked to inconsistent government economic 
policy towards foreign companies in this period, whereby various companies were 
granted exemptions to shipping rules in order to stimulate particular industries. 
However, Russian customs regulations in the 1890s were clearly spelt out in the code 
of laws, and prescribed clear requirements for documentation, including certificates 
of origin and the right of customs officials to board vessels and inspect cargoes. The 
process for appealing customs fines was also clearly defined in the code of laws; an 
appeal should be addressed in a particular format to the Ministry of Finance, 
accompanied by the relevant stamps. Appeals against the decision of the Ministry of 
Finance could then be directed to the fourth department of the Senate.16 Despite the 
fact that these rules were contained in the code of laws, and generally only changed 
when tariffs were altered by the Russian government, an analysis of British 
diplomatic requests in the period suggests that a number of British companies 
believed these rules to be malleable and open to the influence of British diplomats. 
However, as this section will explore, the majority of these cases were not resolved 
by either the diplomatic service or the Russian government. 
 
Over the period 1892 to 1902, there were 47 different incidents of British shipping 
companies writing to the foreign office requesting diplomatic action in order to have 
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customs fines remitted. The embassy in St Petersburg decided to take diplomatic 
action in 11 of these cases, all but one of which were successful. Of these 11 cases, 
four occurred in 1899 and two in 1900; the latter two being the last successful cases 
of diplomatic action in the period 1892-1914 over customs disputes. 17 Not all of 
these cases involved shipping companies; some involved companies that had 
undertaken investment in Russia. For example, in 1900 Kodak unsuccessfully 
applied to the foreign office to have a customs fine on photographic materials 
remitted, which they had been attempting to import into Russia for use in their 
camera factory.18 These types of request were therefore not just limited to shipping 
companies who may not have had much experience of the Russian market, but also 
manufacturers who had undertaken manufacturing operations behind the tariff 
barrier. 
 
The most common request was when the British shipping company claimed to have 
made a clerical error in their bill of landing and had subsequently been fined. These 
companies requested diplomatic involvement in order to resolve their cases, instead 
of taking the proscribed steps of presenting a petition to the Ministry of Finance. For 
example, the British insurance company, the North of England Protecting and 
Indemnity Association contacted the Foreign Office in April 1892 on behalf of one 
of its ships, the Fitzroy, requesting that the British ambassador intervene in the case 
at Batumi, where the ship had been fined due to an error over the amount of tin plates 
that had been unloaded. The permanent under-secretary, Phillip Currie, noted that 
this request was inappropriate, adding that it was due to mismanagement by the 
English shippers and there was not much that the diplomatic office could do about 
the Russian fine.19 Currie was well placed to make such a judgement; before 
becoming PUS in 1889, he had worked on a number of diplomatic missions 
involving eastern affairs and Russia.20 A similar case occurred a year later 
concerning the ship Sandal, where the owners contacted the foreign office with a 
request for the remittance of a fine that arose as a result of a clerical error. The 
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owners of the Sandal believed both that the fine was unlawful, and that diplomatic 
intervention could be used to have it remitted.21 In both cases it appears that the 
British ships had been in contravention of Russian customs regulations, but the 
companies assumed that the customs authorities had applied the fines illegally, and 
that diplomatic intervention could be used to have them overturned. 
 
A case involving the British ship Exe indicates that such companies also 
overestimated the reach of British officials over the day to day work of customs 
offices in Russia. In 1892 the British shipping company Glover Bros. contacted 
the Foreign Office to request that the ambassador at St Petersburg make sure that 
the Exe should not be obstructed at Batumi on its way to Japan. The owners 
admitted that it was within the rights of the port authorities to inspect the cargo 
and to take all necessary steps to ensure that none of it was disembarked illegally, 
but requested that British diplomatic staff prevent any further obstructions to the 
ship.22 The British owners initially contacted the Foreign Office due to concerns 
that the Russian customs authorities as Batumi were unnecessarily holding up 
cargoes of foreign vessels passing through the port. According to later 
correspondence, the Exe passed through the Russian port without any problems, 
but this was not due to British diplomatic assistance.23 
 
These examples illustrate a much wider tendency among British shipping companies 
to resort to diplomatic intervention. The tendency for British companies to request 
diplomatic assistance when faced with customs fines in Russia led Morier to write a 
memorandum to Roseberry in February 1893 on the subject, stating that the correct 
form of procedure in these instances was to petition the Minister of Finance directly. 
I fear that it is not sufficiently well known in England that in cases such as the above 
and also in others where a fine is enforced for a breach of customs regulations the 
proscribed form of procedure, is for the owner or the agents of the ship or goods upon 
which the fine is imposed, to send a petition -- drawn up in the Russian language and 
furnished with the required Russian stamps --  to the imperial Minister of Finance, 
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setting forth all the facts of the case and praying for the remission or reduction of the 
fine.24 
Rosebery shared Morrier’s opinion, that the ‘proper mode of procedure seems to be 
insufficiently known to British ship owners’.25 This illustrates the distinctive and 
widespread assumption among British shipping interests that they would have more 
success in resolving customs disputes through diplomatic intervention than through 
the proscribed system of petitioning the Russian government. Although it is possible 
that many of the companies that made such requests simply did not know the 
proscribed method, British companies clearly identified Russian customs regulations 
to be flexible and open to diplomatic intervention in this time period. 
 
The 10 cases where diplomatic action was successfully taken indicates the instances 
where British officials believed they could take action. In the majority of the cases, 
British officials only took action once the companies had lodged petitions with the 
Ministry of Finance in the correct manner, and then acted in support of these 
petitions. This support involved using their personal connections within the ministry 
of Finance in order to draw Witte’s attention to the incidence of the fine to get it 
remitted.26 While this did not constitute an extra-legal aspect of the process of the 
appeal of customs fines in Russia, it does indicate the importance of personal 
connections in the successful completion of this process. The only case where 
diplomatic action was overtly taken before the company had launched petitions was 
in the case of the SS Mauritius in 1899, where Russian customs authorities in Reval 
confiscated the ship’s anchors, because they were not included on the cargo manifest. 
In this case, British diplomats did not wait for the company to lodge a petition in St 
Petersburg, and privately met Witte in order to have the ship’s anchors returned.27 
This exception was due to the fact that the customs authorities at Reval had clearly 
acted illegally and that the British ship was in the urgent situation of not being able 
to leave port without its anchors. The role that personal connections played in the 
way that diplomats supported the petitions of British shipping companies is 
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important, however, as they supplemented the existing legal process in an 
undocumented and unregulated manner, meaning that British companies could not 
form concrete expectations about how the system of redress for customs fines 
worked. 
 
The perceived influence of the Foreign Office and the British embassy in St 
Petersburg over Russian shipping regulations also extended to matters of maritime 
insurance. English insurance companies attempted to induce the Foreign Office to 
influence Russian economic policy covering statements of average, a document 
stating the financial liabilities of the insurance company and the owners. Due to a fire 
on the English-owned ship Winchester, a statement of average was compiled by the 
owners of the ship at Sevastopol at a rate that favoured the owners of the ship over 
the insurance company. The insurance company, Lloyds, had lost a subsequent case 
in the Russian courts, and therefore requested diplomatic assistance in order to 
persuade the Russian government to revise its rules on statement of averages as it 
inflicted ‘great injustice’ on the underwriters. Other associations from Liverpool and 
Glasgow also shared their concerns.28 The secretary of the embassy, R. Howard 
replied that the Russian commercial code was ‘very antiquated’ on the subject of 
statements of average, and was currently being revised, but that some time would 
elapse before the modified version would be published.29 The owners and the 
associations therefore made these requests on the assumption that Russian 
regulations on insurance were malleable by outside influences in the interest of 
economic development of the Witte period. However, in the particular case of the 
Winchester the company was unsuccessful in their appeal, because according to 
Russian law statements of average were legally binding once they had been 
compiled. Any further changes to the law in this area would also have not benefited 
the company due to these regulations.30 
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Russian laws surrounding the importation of goods into Russia that were covered by 
Witte’s new tariff regulations were also considered to be susceptible to diplomatic 
influence. In order for British merchants to pass goods not manufactured in Britain 
through Russian customs houses, they were required to possess a certificate of origin, 
which British shipping companies believed was in many cases impossible to obtain. 
As a result, London, Bradford and Manchester Chambers of Commerce wrote to the 
Foreign Office in order to have these regulations modified, which they attributed to a 
misinterpretation of the law by the customs officials, or an attempt by Russia to 
hinder German exports to Russia that also hit British trade.31 Throughout the 1890s, 
therefore, British shippers tended to view Russian shipping regulations as open to 
influence from members of British diplomatic staff, due to a tendency for Russian 
business regulations to be flexible under Witte. While this could be due to an 
arrogant view of the failings of the Russian government, the fact that requests were 
based on the assumption that Russian customs regulations could be modified through 
diplomatic pressure speaks to the perceptions that British companies had of the 
system of economic regulation in Russia, and not a judgement on its arbitrariness or 
backwardness. 
 
British investment companies and customs tariffs 
These assumptions were sustained and further developed among British companies 
undertaking foreign direct investment in Russia, and the Witte system contributed 
heavily towards this. This is significant, as during the period of increased British 
investment in Russia, Russian practices surrounding imports and customs changed 
dramatically. With Witte’s departure from the Ministry of Finance in August 1903 
and the economic downturn of 1900-1904, Russian economic policy became much 
more conservative towards foreign companies, which included allowing fewer 
exceptions to individual companies to import items such as machinery from abroad 
in order to protect Russian domestic industry. This shift was generally not observed 
by British companies, which continued to request British diplomats to intercede on 
their behalf in order to secure favourable import exceptions for their businesses, 
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usually to import higher quality machinery and materials from abroad for their 
operations, such as mining equipment. Thus the environment of the 1890s and the 
early 1900s had a long term impact on the assumptions of British businesses after 
Witte’s departure from the Ministry of Finance. 
 
A key part of the Witte system was the granting of privileges and exemption to 
companies in industries that were regarded to be particularly important for Russian 
economic development, such as industries connected to the trans-Siberian railway. 
The British company, Vesty & Co., obtained a concession from Witte to import 
components for a cold storage facility in Riga for the export of Siberian butter 
without paying import duties or tariffs in 1900. However, Witte’s departure from the 
Ministry of Finance meant that Vesty & Co. was unable to gain a remittance for 
import duties paid on cold storage equipment imported in 1902 to meet the growing 
demand for Siberian butter. Vesty then went on to request diplomatic assistance in 
his case. 
 
It seems to me that when the facts are explained to the proper authorities they cannot 
in justice refuse to pay me what they would have undoubtedly have given me for the 
asking. My house in Riga has already made three applications but they do not seem 
able to make any progress, as they have not any influence.32 
 
According to Vesty British diplomats should have been able to use their personal 
connections with the Russian government in order to get the customs duties remitted 
by illustrating the benefits to the Russian economy by doing so. This constituted an 
appeal to an arbitrary intervention in Russian economic regulations, as it appears that 
the Ministry of Finance under Eduard Pleske and Vladimir Kokovstov simply 
followed existing customs regulations on cold storage components. 
 
Excise duties were clearly seen to be open to diplomatic influence in other sectors, 
and diplomatic assistance was often called upon when British investment companies 
in Russia had suffered fines, or when Russian customs regulations changed in a 
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manner that would affect their business. For example, Hepburn & Gale, Ltd made a 
request to the Foreign Office in 1901 in connection with their leather belting factory 
in Moscow. After having undertaken investment in Russia in order to be able to 
market their goods behind the tariff wall, the Russian government had imposed a 
higher import duty on leather hides, which the company imported to Russia from 
Britain in order to produce leather belting in Moscow. The company requested 
British diplomats to conduct inquiries in St Petersburg as to the possibility of 
obtaining a remission of these export duties, which it considered to have been 
temporary due to the Manchurian war. The British company attempted to 
demonstrate how it would have been in the Russian government’s interests to change 
the import duty, as it had initially been to attract British investment. However, no 
diplomatic action was taken in this case.33 
 
Similarly, a British insecticide factory in Rostov attempted to utilise British 
diplomatic assistance in order to obtain duty free importation of tobacco tailings, 
sweepings, and damaged leaves used in the production of insecticides. Such 
permission would have taken the form of a specific exemption from importation 
regulations, which the company clearly believed that British diplomats would be able 
to effect in this case because the company was involved in the development of a 
factory. The company’s successful operations seem to have hinged upon being able 
to successfully apply for an importation concession, as the British interests stated that 
without the concession it would be impossible for the company to continue its 
operations.34 This case is particularly illustrative of the attitude of British companies 
towards Russian economic regulations. As they were involved in developing industry 
in a particularly underdeveloped region of Russia, and therefore furthering the goals 
of Witte’s economic programme, the company assumed that they would be able to 
take advantage of largesse shown towards such companies by Witte and the Russian 
government and that British diplomatic staff could effect this through use of their 
personal connections. 
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Such withdrawal of special exemptions granted under Witte continued to cause 
British companies to appeal for diplomatic assistance after the upheavals of 1904-
1907. In 1908, the Troitzk Oil Fields Company, a British mining company located 
south of the Urals, attempted to import mining equipment duty free. This privilege 
had been granted to them since they had begun mining operations there. However, 
the Russian customs authorities claimed that import duty on the machines was 
payable, and levied a significant fine on the machinery. This case therefore stems 
from these two British gold mining companies attempting to induce the British 
diplomatic service to pressure the Russian government into withdrawing the customs 
fine, and to preserve their privileges to import mining machinery from Britain free of 
duty. The company also believed that the action of the customs authorities in this 
matter was ‘against published enactments’, and asked for embassy assistance because 
they believed that the authorities had acted in an unlawful manner.35 According to 
Hugh O’Beirne, who had been an attaché to the British embassy since 1892, and 
who’s opinions on the Russian economy were well respected by the Foreign Office, 
the company did not receive the benefit of their special privileges because the 
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Trade and Industry had formed a committee 
to consider the advisability of the future of the provisions of customs regulations that 
allowed the free importation of mining machinery to the Urals.36 Even though such 
exemptions and privileges were in the process of being withdrawn throughout the 
period, the management of the Troitzk oilfields clearly assumed that diplomatic 
pressure could be applied to gain special exemptions to rules that had been malleable 
under Witte. The Troitzk Oilfields Co. also assumed that the customs authorities had 
acted illegally. As late as 1907, therefore, British companies still connected arbitrary 
actions of local officials with weak economic regulation that could be easily 
modified through diplomatic pressure to suit their needs. 
 
Other British companies also attempted to induce the British government to make 
representations to the Russian government in order to circumvent regulations on the 
importation of mining machinery. The Central Siberia Company attempted to import 
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foreign mining machinery in 1909, and requested the British embassy in Russia to 
make representations and to present a petition to the Russian government, in order to 
have the customs fine rescinded.37 In a report on the matter Cooke stated that ‘Big 
British interests involved in mining in Siberia are unlikely to let this matter drop; 
they do not want to utilize inferior Russian gold dredgers, and put the change in 
policy down to powerful protectionist agencies within Russian government.’38 Cooke 
also reported that British companies involved in cold storage had made 
representations to the Russian government in order for them to import cold storage 
duty free, which the Minister of Commerce had informed him was only possible if 
passed by the legislative chamber.39 This demonstrates how widespread the 
assumption was among British companies that Russian commercial regulations were 
open to modification through direct pressure by British diplomats. 
 
Clearly, the tendency to view Russian customs regulations as flexible and open to 
diplomatic influence was also exhibited by British companies undertaking 
investment in Russia after Witte’s reforms, and has much in common with the 
attitude of British shippers in the 1890s. British companies still regarded Russian 
economic regulations relating to import duties as flexible if it could be demonstrated 
that they were contributing to the industrial development of Russia, and expected 
British diplomats to be able to intercede with the Russian government in order to 
gain exemptions. Where regulations had interfered with their business, they often 
attributed these events to unlawful handling of their case by customs authorities. 
Although to some extent the later change in Russian economic policy reduced the 
arbitrary nature of exemptions and concessions of the Witte years, the Russian 
government had not been able to foster concrete expectations among British 
companies that their customs regulations were above external influence by 
diplomats. 
 
Joint-stock companies regulation 
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These findings can be replicated across other Russian business regulations pertaining 
to British companies. There were similar assumptions held by companies in many 
industries, particularly those that played an important part in the Witte programme, 
and were thus more susceptible to the regime of special concessions and exemptions. 
In 1898, Samuel and Co., a precursor company to the Royal Dutch Shell group, 
attempted to induce the Foreign Office to use its influence in St Petersburg to reverse 
recent regulatory changes in the Russian coasting trade. After having sunk large 
amounts of capital into their operations at Batumi and Vladivostok the Russian 
government was in the process of introducing new legislation whereby all vessels 
involved in the coasting trade would be required to fly the Russian flag, and be 
owned by Russian companies, under Russian statutes. As a result, the company wrote 
to the Foreign Office to request that the British diplomatic staff in St Petersburg, 
‘induce the Russian Government to except from the regulation which they have 
formulated, steamers carrying petroleum in bulk’.40 Samuel clearly believed that 
Russian shipping regulations in this instance were open to a level of flexibility given 
the application of diplomatic pressure. The Foreign Office also received a letter from 
the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom, and several other ship owners’ 
societies, urging that representations should be made to the Russian government with 
regard to the Russian coasting trade to the Far East. This body emphasised the 
importance of the potential amount of trade that might develop between Batumi and 
Vladivostok.41 
 
Diplomatic staff at the foreign office seemed to concur with Samuel’s assessment 
that an exception in the Russian regulations could be obtained for tank steamers 
specially constructed for the transport of petroleum. In the minutes on Samuel’s 
initial letter to the Foreign Office, T. Jacceron wrote that it would be impossible to 
induce the Russian government to relax its regulations on the coasting trade, but that 
it might be possible to persuade the Russian government to make an exception for 
tank steamers. This was relayed to Samuels, stating that the British ambassador in St 
Petersburg had been given instructions to ‘endeavour to obtain some relaxation of the 
restrictions in question in the case of tank steamers specially constructed for the 
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carriage of petroleum’.42 However, it was later confirmed that no such relaxations of 
the laws could be obtained, as the laws existed in order to develop Russian 
navigation, shipbuilding, and other branches of industries related to shipping in the 
Russian empire.43 
 
This case also demonstrates underlying negative assumptions about the arbitrariness 
of the Russian government in its dealings with British business. Batumi had been 
designated a free port under the provisions of the 1878 treaty of Berlin. Batumi 
became a Russian port in 1886 through a separate treaty, and therefore the Russian 
government was perfectly legitimate in imposing restrictions on foreigners engaged 
in coasting trade. However, Samuel & co. cast this decision in terms of the arbitrary 
actions of the Russian government.  The company accused the Russian government 
of disregarding the positive impact that their company had made in the region, 
putting undue and illegal pressure on their company to reform under Russian statutes, 
and of disregarding the Treaty of Berlin. 
 
We do not know how far this step is within the rights of the Russian government, 
seeing that an assurance was given by them that Batoum should be considered a free 
port when they annexed it; but be that as it may, the position is this. If the Russian 
Government insist on enforcing this regulation no bulk oil can go to Vladivostok, 
because this port only takes about 2,000 tons per annum, and this small quantity can 
only be delivered by a steamer discharging the balance of her cargo of bulk oil at other 
ports not under Russian jurisdiction. 
 
We have embarked a capital of about £16,000 in the tanks at Vladivostok, and as 
British subjects we will not consent to transferring our steamers to the Russian flag; 
although we can assure you (in confidence), great pressure has been constantly 
brought to bear on us to do this.44 
 
Samuel & co therefore portrayed the Russian government as acting arbitrarily in 
order to force their company to reform under Russian statutes. The fact that Russia 
was perceived by the British company to be going back on promises that the Russian 
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government made at the Congress of Berlin was cast in terms of typical Russian 
intransigence and arbitrariness. 
 
[…] but we would earnestly impress upon the Marquess of Salisbury in view of the 
position which we now complain, how utterly impossible it is to place any reliance 
upon Russian promises, and that if therefore Talienwan and Port Arthur are allowed to 
fall under Russian jurisdiction, it seems quite certain that in process of time British 
steamers will be refused equal rights with Russian, which they now enjoy.45 
 
This assessment of the Russian government’s actions has much in common with the 
stereotyped view of the Russian government that was common in the 1890s and 
much earlier; the Russian government was seen to act with contempt towards 
international obligations respected by more ‘civilised’ nations. That Samuel & co. 
came to these conclusions is of particular significance given their involvement in 
Russian business. 
 
In a similar fashion to this case, a group of oil interests contacted the Foreign 
Office in 1898 to protest about the insistence of the Russian government under 
Witte that British companies employed in the petroleum trade in Baku should 
register their companies in Russia, instead of purchasing land via Russian subjects 
and holding it in their name. According to Consul-General Michell, registering a 
British company in Russia carried with it requirements that were quite onerous for 
British companies, such as the requirement that two Russian citizens must sit on 
the board, and that the majority of shares should be nominative and not made out 
to the bearer. Michell seemed to believe that a Russian company ‘would not 
labour under the latter restriction’. According to Michell, the Russian government 
also had a tendency to insert into the statutes of foreign companies a clause that 
stated that the government could withdraw permission to operate at any time for 
no reason, which had an adverse effect on investor security.46 O’Connor warned 
Salisbury that there was little that British diplomats could achieve in this case on 
behalf of British oil interests because Witte had confirmed the new regulations to 
him and stated that they were designed in order to induce British capital to move 
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into Russia.47 There is evidence that in the 1890s not all British companies 
looking to enter the Russian market were aware of the system of the Russian 
government granting permission for foreign companies to operate in Russia, and 
the process of forming a Russian company if required.48 
 
Often, while attempting to have economic regulations modified British companies 
requested that diplomats draw attention to the economic benefits that their 
companies had. This was a particular product of the Witte system, whereby 
companies operating in industries deemed to be important often were more likely 
to receive special exemptions. In 1899 the Tank Storage and Carriage Company 
applied to Salisbury to make representations to the Russian government over the 
government’s decision to dismantle petroleum storage facilities erected by the 
company in Batumi. According to their request the lease for the land held by the 
company contained a clause that if the land was repossessed by the government 
the leasers had no right to put forward a claim for compensation. According to the 
company, their agent in Batumi had informed them that the government was 
contemplating preventing the construction of further tank storage, and to also 
remove existing storage, which could interrupt or destroy the companies’ 
business. The company therefore requested the British ambassador at St 
Petersburg to ‘make strong representations with regard to the hardships which it is 
in contemplation to inflict upon the trade, especially after the late announcement 
of the Russian government encouraging the investment of English capital in 
Russian industries’.49 According to the enclosed letter from their agent in Batumi, 
Wagstaff & Bley, this had been effected by the military commander of the district 
sending around circulars cancelling permission to construct tanks, which had 
made it difficult to do business in Batumi as companies were fearful for their 
investments. He urged the English company to seek diplomatic assistance in the 
matter.50 
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These new directives by the military commander at Batumi utilized existing 
regulations surrounding government control of land leased for petroleum storage 
in order to secure the defense of Batumi. According to a report by the British 
consul there, Stevens, the commander sent the memorandum because in the event 
of a bombardment, the petroleum reservoirs would form a source of danger to the 
forts, and that the smoke which would be produced by the burning mineral oil 
products would completely obscure an attacking fleet.51 Thus the regulations 
existed for a legitimate purpose, which the British company attempted to use the 
influence of British diplomats in St Petersburg to circumvent, invoking the 
damage that it would do to the economic development of the region. It is likely 
that such action was countenanced in the first place because of the overproduction 
crisis that was beginning to threaten the Baku oil trade by severely depressing 
prices, yet the attempt to induce the Russian government to abandon its plans in 
this area aptly demonstrates that the Russian government under Witte failed to 
foster concrete expectations of the way in which it dealt with foreign businesses 
among British companies. 
 
There also seems to have been a degree of inter-ministerial disagreement about 
the plan; Stevens reported that the commission had been divided between those 
who recognized that Batumi was the only place that Caucasian oil could be 
effectively exported, and the influence of the military who argued that the 
presence of oil storage units represented a danger in times of war.52 Such disunity 
obviously contributed to the perception of the malleability of government policy 
and its susceptibility to outside intervention, especially given the amount of 
confusion caused by the overlapping jurisdictions of the Ministry of Finance and 
the Ministry of War in this area. 
 
The apparent irregularity of the application of Russian economic regulations 
therefore helped to persuade British companies that the Foreign Office and 
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diplomatic staff could influence the implementation of such regulations in Russia. 
British companies throughout the period regularly requested these bodies to 
intervene when Russian regulations proved to be contrary to their interests. This 
could have been the result of an Anglo-centric world view among British 
companies and the expectation that they be treated according to British legal 
standards. However, the shift of Russian economic policy away from granting 
concessions and exemptions after the economic downturn bought these 
expectations that had arose as a result of Witte’s policies into further relief as 
British companies’ expectations further clashed with official policy. It is also 
evident that British companies engaged in industries that they considered to be 
favoured by Witte’s industrialising policy, i.e. extractive industries and industries 
connected to the trans-Siberian railroad, attempted to stress the importance of 
their companies towards Russian economic development when making their 
appeals, further indicating a connection between the concessions given by Witte 
and the expectations of British companies. 
 
5.3 British diplomatic involvement in court cases 
 
The assumption of the flexibility of Russian economic regulations and their 
susceptibility to British diplomatic influence was closely matched by similar 
assumptions about the power of British diplomats to intervene in commercial 
cases before the Russian courts. Many British companies throughout the period 
requested that British diplomats intercede in court cases, or to support appeals 
made to the higher courts in Russia, most usually the fourth department of the 
Senate and the office of petitions. These requests took two separate forms: 
requests for interference in ongoing court cases, and requests for British diplomats 
to circumvent Russian courts, usually through direct appeals to the Ministry of 
Finance or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. By making requests for diplomatic 
involvement in court proceedings, British companies usually sought to utilize the 
personal contacts that British diplomats possessed within the Russian government 
to act within their interests. Such requests throw light on the ways in which 
British companies viewed the implementation of commercial law in Russian 
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courts, and on their views of the government’s capacity for intervention in the due 
process of law. 
 
Requests for diplomatic assistance in cases ‘sub-judice’ 
The case of the Penyghent arose as a result of the court of Odessa in 1892 finding 
that both parties were to blame in a collision at sea between the steamships 
Penyghent, belonging to Myers Brothers, and the Tsar, belonging to the Russian 
Steam Navigation and Trading Company. The English owners, along with their 
assurance body, the Newcastle Steam Ship Insurance Association (NSSIA), felt 
that a miscarriage of justice had occurred, as their vessel had taken the correct 
evasive action as per the international rules of the road at sea, and had displayed 
the correct signals, whereas the Tsar had not. As a result, they proceeded to refer 
the case to the IV department of the Senate, and when this was unsuccessful, 
submitted a petition to the Tsar. Their petition was ultimately unsuccessful, and 
later records indicate that the owners of the Penyghent were never able to recover 
damages from the Russian company.53 
 
During the course of the case, the NSSIA wrote to the Foreign Office to ask for 
diplomatic assistance with their case. In their original letter, the NSSIA stated that 
the court at Odessa had referred the case to the opinion of a board of five naval 
experts, three of whom found both parties to blame. The NSSIA stated that this was 
necessary because the Russian Steamship Navigation Company probably influenced 
the experts in some way, and that the ruling at Odessa violated the international rules 
for the prevention of collisions at sea.54 
 
When the Senate eventually upheld the judgment of the Odessa court, the NSSIA 
requested further diplomatic assistance for their petition to the Tsar, on the advice of 
their solicitor in Odessa, a Mr Antonini. Antonini stressed that the intervention 
should take place in a non-official manner. The British representative at St 
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Petersburg should ‘call the attention of General Richeter… to the importance of the 
case, on the irregularities of the judgement of the IV department of the senate and on 
the necessity to submit it to the general assembly of the ruling senate’.55 It appears 
that during this case, the NSSIA and their agents expected that the British diplomatic 
service in Russia could achieve reasonable results in support of their case whilst it 
was before both the Senate and the Office of Petitions. In this case both Antonini and 
the NSSIA assumed that diplomatic intervention in a case before the courts could 
have positive results; in reality such action was never countenanced by British 
diplomats while cases were sub-judice. 
 
British companies that undertook direct investment in Russia expressed similar 
confidence in the power of British diplomats to intervene in court cases. In March 
1899, Colonel John Denny, of the shipbuilding firm Denny & Co., contacted the 
Foreign Office regarding some difficulties that his business partners, the Amur 
Steam Navigation Company, had encountered in their dealings with the Russian 
government. According to Denny, this company had been contracted by the 
Siberian Railway Committee in 1895 to build and operate a fleet of five 
steamships and fifteen steel barges on the Amur River.56 In return they had been 
given a loan of 500,000 roubles, as well as a contract guaranteeing a certain 
volume of government railway traffic amounting to over three million poods over 
a period of five years. The Amur Company proceeded to purchase and construct 
the required shipping from British companies. The fifteen barges were furnished 
by Denny & Co., and one steamer was purchased from Armstrong & Co. and 
Alley Maclellan & Co., respectively.57 However, due to the Sino-Japanese war 
and the subsequent rerouting of the Manchurian railway, Denny claimed that after 
the company had erected the required shipping at a total cost of 1,400,000 roubles, 
during 1896 and 1897 the company only carried 1,000,000 poods worth of railway 
goods. During 1898 this dropped sharply to 100,000 poods, as opposed to the 
contracted 670,000, and in 1899 the company was informed by the Siberian 
Railway Committee that no more goods could be assigned to them.58 
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Accordingly, a commission was convened in order to determine the amount of 
compensation that was due to the Amur Company on account of this breach of 
contract by the Russian government. Denny stated, however, that the work of this 
commission was being held up by counter-charges bought by the government. The 
government claimed that the shipping season on the Amur from 1897 to 1899 had 
been shorter than usual, and that the government was therefore not responsible for 
a dip in the profits of shipping companies on the Amur in these years.59 Colonel 
Denny, in a letter to the Foreign Office, requested that the British ambassador at 
St Petersburg should make diplomatic representations to the Russian government 
on the subject of the amount of compensation due to the Old Amur Company due 
to the Russian Government’s breach of contract and seizure of the company’s 
ships, which was at that point being determined by the commission.60 
 
In response to this request, Hardinge’s position was that the Foreign Office could 
not intervene in such a case that was still before the special commission. 
I consider that under the circumstances the only action which I can properly take is to 
seek the first fitting opportunity of calling M. Witte’s attention privately to colonel 
Denny’s letter to His Excellency’s representative in London, and to the importance 
and influence of the interests at stake, and to urge the advisability of a prompt and 
generous settlement of the Company’s legitimate claim.61 
 
Hardinge was later able to call Witte’s attention to the case in a private manner 
and to draw his attention to the ‘commercial interests directly involved in the 
prompt and equitable settlement of a claim, which I understood, was not disputed 
by the Imperial Government…’62 There clearly existed an information gap in this 
case between the influence Colonel Denny and his company believed British 
diplomats could use on their behalf, and the constraints that British diplomats 
operated under in the period. 
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Further legal complications in the Russian courts led to further appeals for 
diplomatic assistance in this case. In 1902, its passage through the Russian courts 
had been delayed by government obstruction. The government claimed that the 
paperwork guaranteeing the amount of railway traffic to be connected with the 
steamship concession, a crucial feature of the contract undertaken by the Old 
Amur Steamship Company, was not legally in the company’s possession and 
could not be used as evidence for the amount that the company was owed in 
compensation.63 It was because of the arguments advanced by counsel on behalf 
of the Russian government that Denny believed that diplomatic action was 
required.64 Citing the delay and the cost associated with the length of time the 
case had been before the Russian courts Denny wrote to the Foreign Office, 
demanding further diplomatic intervention in the Russian justice system. 
The English Bondholders of the Amur Company urgently begs the Foreign Office to 
use its immediate and most urgent endeavours with the Government of H.I.M. to 
prevent the very serious losses with which they, being British subjects, are threatened 
owing to the acts of local officials for whom the said government is undoubtedly 
responsible. Nothing short of the immediate payment to the Company of a very 
considerable sum of money say from 3/4 to a million roubles can save it from disaster 
and if the exact amount of compensation cannot be settled (as is probable) at once, this 
need cause no difficulty as the whole fleet and other property of the company to a far 
greater value is at the command of the Russian government.65 
This clearly shows how powerful the perception was among British capitalists that 
Russian courts could be influenced by ministers and diplomats, especially when 
such companies operated in areas of the economy that Witte held to be important, 
in this case industries connected to the trans-Siberian railway. 
 
Other requests for British diplomatic intervention into cases before the Russian 
courts indicate that similar assumptions to those of the Amur Company were held 
by other British companies operating in Russia. In February 1895 the British 
engineering firm Thomas Wilson & Sons sought assistance from the British 
ambassador in St Petersburg in support of a petition before the Senate that arose 
as a result of disagreements with another British company, Bailey Leatham & Co. 
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The two firms had initially decided to share a government contract for municipal 
works, but disagreements between the firms had caused the former company to 
petition the Russian government to undertake the contract on their own. 
According to Lascelles, the only action that he could take was to raise the issue of 
the petition with the Minister of Ways and Communications.66 The British 
company in this instance seems to have assumed that British diplomats could 
influence the passage of a case, and that the successful acquisition of contracts for 
municipal works depended upon successful use of personal contacts, and that only 
firms with contacts with the British ambassador in St Petersburg could 
successfully bid for government contracts and move into the Russian market. 
 
The increase in British investment, especially in Caucasian oil and Siberian 
mining industries, brought about a new host of court cases surrounding taxation of 
properties and profits of these companies. For example, in 1908 the Troitzk and 
Orsk gold mining companies contacted the Foreign Office regarding taxation by 
the Russian government. These two mining concerns had been purchased from 
their Russian owners that year, and were operated as English companies registered 
in Russia. In 1907 the Russian tax authorities taxed the companies on the basic 
gold production projections for the whole of 1906, even though they had only 
acquired the properties in October 1906, and as such had not made any profits that 
year.67 This action is similar to that of another British financed manufacturing 
firm, Hilferich-Sadet, in Kharkov. This company stated that additional taxes had 
been applied to their firm that included capital expended on the cost of new 
buildings and plant. This firm also advocated the strategy of British diplomatic 
staff pointing out to the Minister of Finance that the enforcement of such taxes 
would have the effect of driving foreign investment away from Russia, and did 
not request assistance with their appeal to the Senate.68 
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However, unlike previous cases in the 1890s and early 1900s there was a very 
clear distinction between the actions that the British company took in the Russian 
courts against the tax assessments of the local authorities, and the diplomatic 
assistance that the British company requested from the Foreign Office. The 
Troitzk and Orsk gold mining company drew the Foreign Office’s attention to the 
phenomenon of the Russian tax authorities using irregular methods to calculate 
income tax, pointing out the prejudicial effect this would have on British interests, 
‘If English capitalists are subject to these exactions, they will certainly cease to 
invest in Russian enterprises.’69 Therefore although they recognized that British 
representatives could not interfere in cases before the courts, they still assumed 
that appeals to the importance of British investment in Russia could produce 
effective results. 
 
Although it was noted that the process of obtaining redress might be protracted, the 
case of the Troitzk and Orsk Oilfields Companies does not indicate a lack of 
confidence in Russian commercial justice. According to the British consul at 
Kharkov, Charles Blakey, the company had not asked for assistance in the case: it 
had ‘the right to appeal to the Senate, but in the meantime the extra assessment has to 
be paid, and the decision in the senate takes years’.70 Although the application of the 
tax was deemed to be unfair, the company mainly blamed the ‘extremely vague 
lettering of the law that makes it possible for the allocation board to draw up 
arbitrary calculations’.71 Although local authorities had implemented the law in the 
case in a way that was deemed to be unfair, this was not associated with a more 
general arbitrary government of the affairs of companies by the Russian government 
in the period after the industrial downturn and before 1914. 
 
Where British businesses attempted to involve British ambassadors in incidences that 
had been before the courts, they attempted to invoke British influence after the case 
had been heard. For example, in the case of Briskin Brothers, the British company 
attempted to involve British diplomats after the court case had been concluded. The 
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British company acquired two timber concessions in the Crimea in 1911, but did not 
obtain permission to undertake operations in Russia until 1912. Part of the original 
agreement was that the Russian landowners would sign over the concession upon the 
British company gaining their charter, however after this date the Russians refused to 
sign over the land or even let British representatives examine company books and 
documents. The British company took the case to the Simferopol court, but lost the 
case due to legal technicalities in the original contract. They applied to the Foreign 
Office requesting that they use diplomatic influence in St Petersburg in the hope that 
diplomats could use their influence with the Russian government in order to resolve 
their situation, as they recognised that the letter of the law had been applied in their 
case, but on the basis of a technicality that they regarded as unjust.72 The British 
company was eventually unsuccessful; the Foreign office replied that they could not 
take any action in such cases until all of the company’s legal avenues had been 
exhausted, and even then there was little that they could do. Cooke commented on 
the case that it was typical of many British companies in the later part of the period 
in question, who entered into agreements and investment in Russia with little care an 
attention.73 Therefore the British company did not attempt to involve the Foreign 
Office in a case before the courts, and understood the impartiality of the Russian 
courts to outside influence. It indicates that they believed that British influence could 
be used to alter Russian economic policy in order to make such a judgement on a 
technicality invalid, a significant change from earlier cases covered in this chapter. 
 
It is important to note that many requests from British companies in the period arose 
as a result of an expectation that their companies should be treated in accordance 
with British law, as a result of an Anglo-centric world view among some British 
companies. In the case of the Amur Company, this perception can be connected to 
underlying assumptions that the Russian government would act arbitrarily in order to 
protect its interests, regardless of the law. Although the Russian government 
admitted the breach of contract in this particular case, the subsequent complications 
that occurred in the case regarding the amount that would be due to the company and 
the delay caused to the company obtaining redress as a result were often cast in terms 
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of the arbitrary nature of the Russian government. This can be observed in Denny’s 
request for diplomatic intervention to determine the level of compensation to be 
awarded to the company. 
 
Since then [The government’s admission of wrongdoing] matters have not progressed 
in any way except insofar as bringing the case before the Courts of Justice. The 
Russian government freely admit the claim, and have made a ridiculous offer of 
compromise, and the matter has therefore had to come before the Courts. There are 
several other instances of gross ill treatment over and above this particular one, but 
the last has occurred since the war [the Manchurian war] broke out. The Russian 
government have seized a number of the company’s steamers for their service, and 
have done nothing in the way of compensating the company. This treatment is so 
opposed to what ought to have been expected, and to what our own government, for 
example, metes out to its own citizens, that I am sure you will not hesitate to 
represent on our behalf.74 
 
Their treatment is directly compared to the treatment that would have been accorded 
to them at the hands of the British government, suggesting that they believed that 
their company should have received the same treatment in Russia as it would do in 
Britain. Denny further stated that, ‘Whatever be the absolute truth, the case as made 
out by Mr Hardinge is to my mind bad enough to make any government thoroughly 
ashamed of itself’.75 After the submission of Hardinge’s official representation to 
the Russian government, Denny requested that the British representatives in St 
Petersburg should remind the Russian government of their official representation, 
stating that, ‘You will never get much out of them unless you keep poking them 
up.’76 Therefore, some British companies certainly compared their treatment to what 
they would have received in Britain, and it is likely that many requests arose out of 
these expectations, although this is the only example of a company comparing 
Russian justice to British justice in the diplomatic archives. 
 
Whether or not a request arose due to the expectation that the company should be 
treated according to British law, it is significant what sort of action British 
companies believed the diplomatic service should take, which in most cases before 
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and during the industrial downturn amounted to diplomatic involvement in cases 
that were sub judice. This suggests that the inconsistencies of the Witte system had a 
knock on effect on the assumptions held by British companies about the Russian 
justice system and the role of the state in the justice system. These perceptions were 
altered as a result of stricter government policy after the end of the industrial 
downturn of 1900-1906. 
 
The circumvention of the Russian courts 
British companies at the beginning of the period also believed that British consuls 
and diplomatic staff could completely circumvent the Russian law courts in 
certain cases. Unlike the requests for diplomatic involvement in cases before the 
courts, requests for British diplomats to assist British companies in circumventing 
the Russian courts occurred throughout the period in question, suggesting that 
even though British companies formed stable assumptions about the Russian 
judicial system, there still remained a great deal of uncertainty about the actions 
that the Russian government could take in cases outside of the court system. 
 
Many of these requests resulted from distrust in the ability of local Russian courts 
to enforce the law, especially in peripheral provinces of the Russian Empire. In 
1894 the Foreign Office became involved in a case that arose as a result of 
Samuel & Co.’s attempt to load oil onto their tanker, Clam, from a government 
railway pipeline, to which Nobel claimed sole right of use. According to Samuel 
& Co., Nobel fixed a padlock to a section of the valve, and refused to give up the 
key. When the captain of the Clam appealed to the local stationmaster, this 
official ordered the padlock to be broken in the presence of a gendarme. 
Undeterred, Nobel proceeded to uncouple the Clam in the night, and to attach the 
railway pipeline to one of their steamers. The whole process caused a great loss to 
the British company, who pointed out to the Foreign Office that they had sunk 
capital amounting to over £2 million into the distribution of Russian oil to the Far 
East.77 The first traces of the case appear as part of a request by Samuel & Co. for 
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diplomatic assistance in St Petersburg in conjunction with its legal proceedings 
against Nobel. 
We are much gratified to inform you that the opinion of Mr. Bienstock (the lawyer 
with whom Her Majesty’s Consul General at St Petersburg placed us in 
communication), is unequivocally in favor of the fact that the action of Messrs. Nobel 
in interfering with the loading of our SS Clam is absolutely illegal, and that they have 
rendered themselves liable for damages and to a criminal prosecution. 
We crave the assistance of the Foreign Office in placing these facts before the Russian 
Government.78 
It is worth considering what Samuel & Co. wanted the British Embassy to do in 
this case. It is evident from further correspondence that the company was going to 
initiate legal proceedings in Russia against Nobel.79 The British company in this 
case clearly assumed that for their litigation to be successful, diplomatic action in 
St Petersburg would be required. In the end, Samuel & Co. decided to abandon 
legal proceedings having been informed ‘…that there would not be the slightest 
chance of getting justice done there’.80 This particular case also points towards a 
very inadequate enforcement of the law in areas such as Batumi, where central 
governmental control was weak and the activities of companies often went 
unchecked. According to Stevens, the British consul at Batumi, Nobel had 
managed to obtain exclusive use of the pipeline in the area by forming an illegal 
syndicate of major oil producers in the region. Yet Nobel seem to have been able 
to act with impunity according to a telegram from L. Samuel in Batumi.81 It is 
worth noting, however, that in this instance the British diplomatic service in St 
Petersburg initially declined to offer diplomatic assistance to the firm, because it 
was believed that that there was every reason to have confidence in the court at 
Batumi, and that they could later carry the case to St Petersburg if the court at 
Batumi found against them. There was also a recognition that British diplomatic 
staff could not interfere with the Russian legal system, however this attitude was 
clearly not shared by the company involved.82 
 
                                                          
78 TNA, FO 65/1503, f. 259, H. Samuel to FO, 9 September 1895. 
79 TNA, FO 65/1503, f. 266, H. Samuel to FO, 13 September 1895. 
80 TNA, FO 65/1503, f. 274, Samuel & Co. to FO, 24 September 1895. 
81 TNA, FO 65/1496, f. 302 Joseph Bienstock to M. Samuel & Co., 12 August 1894; f. 291, Telegram 
from L. Samuel to Samuel & Co., 20 July 1894. 
82 TNA, FO 65/1503, f. 325, PUS to H. Samuel, 2 November 1895. 
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Lack of confidence in the Russian courts in the peripheral areas of the Russian 
Empire is also evident in the case of the Anglo Continental Produce Company 
Ltd. In August 1905 the company wrote to the Foreign Office concerning a 
shipment of butter that the company had ordered from Messrs Brandt Bros. of 
Petropavlovsk. Brandt was obligated to supply the British company with 10,000 
barrels of Siberian butter. However, part of the shipment was defective and not to 
the standard of the original contract. The British company subsequently took court 
action and were issued with a writ from the British courts for £1,558 in damages. 
Brandt then returned to Siberia and obtained a judgement from the Siberian courts 
against the English company for the sum of 14,061 roubles. According to the 
English company, this was obtained because of the defective nature of the Russian 
courts. 
How such judgement was obtained is not known. My clients have no agent in Siberia, 
and there is no person representing them upon whom any summons or like paper from 
the Russian Court could be served, and they have had no notice whatever of any claim 
having been made against them, so that they could defend it. It is thought that the 
judgment has been obtained by Messrs. Brandt by a false statement of facts, and also 
of bribing the Court Officials. The result it, that about £1,400 worth of butter which 
was being dispatched from the railway station at Omsk to my clients has been seized 
by Messrs. Brandt under the authority of their judgement.83 
Further, if Siberian courts could pass such a judgement so easily on the basis of 
such false statements, trade to Siberia would become quite impossible, according 
to the company.84 It therefore requested that British diplomats intervene in a 
dispute that had already been before the courts, as they felt that it would be 
impossible to overturn such a decision using normal legal means of appeal in the 
Russian legal system. British diplomatic action in this case was able to secure the 
release of the goods, through the use of a diplomatic note to the Russian 
government, illustrating the reach and influence of British diplomatic action with 
the Russian government in 1905.85 
 
Revolutionary turmoil in 1905 affected some peripheral parts of the Empire 
particularly severely, and in many areas such as the Caucasus became conflated 
                                                          
83 TNA, FO 65/1723, ff. 225-26, J. W. Browne to FO, 9 August 1905. 
84 TNA, FO 65/1723, f. 226, J. W. Browne to FO, 9 August 1905. 
85 TNA, FO 65/1711, f. 238, Hardinge to Lansdowne, 18 August 1905. 
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with ongoing banditry and organised crime.86 In the aftermath of these 
disturbances, British companies in search of redress looked not to local courts but 
rather to the diplomatic mission in St Petersburg and to its local consular officials. 
In the case of the Chatma Oil Fields Company, the Cossack guards posted at the 
approaches to the oil fields left their posts during the upheavals, and the 
company’s property was destroyed in revolutionary disturbances, at an estimated 
cost of £35,000.87 At the point at which the company began its correspondence 
with the Foreign Office, the company was still maintaining engineers at £10 a 
day, but was unable to carry on with its work until it had obtained assurances that 
the Russian Government would grant compensation or furnish with a loan. 
Diplomatic action was requested by the Chatma Oil Fields Company because it 
assumed that there was little prospect of being able to obtain the immediate 
redress through the local courts, the company only just having set up business 
paying significant overheads.  In this case, the company’s aim was to circumvent 
the Russian courts entirely.88 
 
The ambassador’s subsequent correspondence with the Russian foreign minister 
indicates that the British diplomatic mission in St Petersburg concurred with the 
view of the company that there was little prospect of getting redress from the local 
courts. Nicolson stated that even if the culprits were caught, ‘the company is well 
aware that no compensation can be expected from any legal proceedings which 
may be instituted against the marauders’.89 Due to the unrest prevalent in the 
region in 1907, and the immediacy of the case, diplomatic action in this case 
cannot be viewed as an interference in the Russian justice system. However it 
does indicate that British companies placed little trust in the effectiveness of local 
justice. 
 
British attempts to circumvent the courts partly arose out of misunderstandings of 
the jurisdiction of various Russian government bodies. This can be demonstrated 
                                                          
86 Ascher, The Revolution of 1905, 223. 
87 TNA, FO 368/123, f. 11906, Nicolson to Izvol’sky, 27 March 1907. 
88 TNA, FO 368/123, f. 10739, Ernest Scott to Law, 3 April 1907. 
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in the case of Thomas Garfitt &Son, who contacted the Foreign Office in 1906 
due to the non-payment of a contract by the Novouzensk zemstvo in Samara 
province for agricultural machinery, requesting that British diplomats pursue the 
Russian government for payment of the contract. On further investigation of the 
case by Nicholson, he was informed by the Russian foreign minister that the 
zemstvos were a separate body from the government, and that Messrs Garfitt’s 
proper course of action was to bring an action against the debtors under the 
zemstvo articles. The Ministry of the Interior was able, however, to contact the 
governor of Samara province, requesting him to urge the zemstvo to discharge 
their obligations to the company.90 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
 
Requests by British companies to the Foreign Office and diplomatic mission in St 
Petersburg indicate a number of significant continuities over the period 1892 to 
1914. Most significantly, Russian economic regulations were viewed as being the 
product of a highly arbitrary system that was not necessarily bound by law. British 
shipping and trade companies requesting British diplomats to intervene in customs 
disputes in the first half of the period attests to this view; it was common for 
British companies to view these regulations as being arbitrarily imposed to hurt 
British trade, or on the whim of the local customs authorities without 
authorization from St Petersburg. The perception of the flexibility of regulations 
in this particular field was sustained among British companies that undertook 
direct investment in Russia, influenced by Witte’s tendency to grant special 
concessions and exemptions for various companies. Although this practice did not 
outlive Witte’s tenure as Minister of Finance, British companies continually 
requested British diplomats to obtain exemptions from customs throughout the 
period. This phenomenon was translated to British companies throughout the 
period requesting special exemptions from a large amount of various regulations 
surrounding foreign joint-stock companies in various industries. 
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This perceived arbitrariness in regulations was also mirrored in the way that 
British companies treated the courts in Russia. Before the revolution of 1905 
British companies commonly expected British diplomats to intercede on their 
behalf in cases that were before the courts. Although this trend disappeared with 
the new conservative economic policy direction of the government after 1905, 
British companies continually used the Foreign Office in order to attempt to 
circumvent the Russian courts throughout the period. This was partly due to the 
way that Russian justice was perceived to be deficient, especially in peripheral 
areas, and slow to act. However, it also indicates a widespread opinion among 
British companies that the Russian court system was open to manipulation by the 
government. Although it was recognized that British diplomats could not 
intercede in court cases towards the end of the period, it is likely, and the evidence 
bears this out, that British companies altered their tactics to circumvent the court 
system entirely instead. 
 
These findings have several implications for whether a law governed state in the 
field of government-industrial relations evolved in Russia before 1914. The first is 
that the Russian government failed to foster concrete expectations among British 
companies of Russian rules and regulations relating to various aspects of trade. 
This could in part be due to common perceptions of Russia in Britain in the 1890s, 
however, Witte’s tendency to grant various special exemptions in an arbitrary 
manner certainly made an impact on British companies and did not work to the 
fostering of any expectations of due process or the building of trust. Secondly, it 
highlights the importance that personal connections had in doing business in 
Russia; British companies appealed to the foreign office to use their personal 
connections with the Russian government in order to pursue a successful outcome 
of their cases. This is an aspect of these particular appeals that appeared 
constantly throughout the period, as well as requests to provide assurances to the 
Russian government of particular firms’ respectability. This indicates that British 
companies placed little or no trust in Russian regulations and commercial law, 
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instead tending to rely on the effectiveness of the personal contacts of British 
diplomatic and consular staff in Russia to resolve their cases. 
 
A limitation of these findings is that it is difficult to determine to what extent 
these requests were conditioned by perceptions of the Russian government 
common in British society at the time, or whether this lack of trust resulted as a 
direct consequence of business activities in Russia.  This requires an analysis of 
how the Russian government provided redress to British companies throughout 
the period, as will be examined in the next chapter.   
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6. The Provision of Redress for British Companies 
 
 
Of central importance to this study is the ability of British companies to claim 
redress from the Russian government where it overstepped the law. A key aspect of 
the power of individuals against the state is that such methods of holding the 
government to account are publicly declared, widely disseminated and consistently 
applied.91 This approach has been applied to the study of trust in past societies. 
Hosking, for example, recently suggested that when the modes for the provisions of 
redress from governments break down or become unclear, a ‘trust breakdown’ within 
society emerges along with a division between the government and the general 
population. Breakdowns of trust are instrumental in exacerbating tensions between 
the government and civil society, a process that has much significance for the study 
of the Russian government’s relations with the emerging civil society between 1892 
and 1914.92 
 
This chapter asks whether such a framework of redress and accountability based on 
law existed in the relationship between the Tsarist government and British 
multinationals in Russia before 1914. As this thesis has already shown, an important 
component of Witte’s project to encourage foreign investment in Russia was the 
promotion of the rule of law in government-industrial relations. In doing so, Witte 
faced considerable opposition from many governmental agencies that sought to 
preserve the use of arbitrary power in order to protect state interests against the 
perceived threat posed by foreign owned companies, as well as the inherent 
contradiction in the autocratic manner in which he implemented his system. This 
chapter addresses two interrelated questions:  to what extent did Witte’s reforms 
affect the provision of redress for British companies in the period, and to what extent 
                                                          
91 Formalistic definitions of the law governed state focus solely on the framework of procedural 
guidelines of the law, whereas substantive definitions assumes the justness of the law itself, 
proscribing certain conditions that are derived from the rule of law such as the freedom of the 
individual. Both assume that the law in a law governed state is implemented uniformly and is widely 
disseminated and understood. Paul Craig, ‘Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: 
an Analytical Framework’, Public Law (1997), 1-15; Mathew Stephenson, ‘Rule of Law as a Goal of 
Development Policy’, World Bank Research (2008). 
92 Geoffrey Hosking, Trust: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014).  
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was such a framework recognized by the British industrial community in Russia as it 
attempted to claim redress from the Russian government. 
 
This section focuses primarily on two cases: the case of the Amur Steam Navigation 
and Trade Company 1899-1903, and the case of Vickers’s construction of the cruiser 
Riurik, 1907-1913. Both cases involve questions over a similar point of law, that of 
the validity and applications of terms of contracts agreed between a company and the 
government. In the case of the Amur Company, the case revolved around a breach of 
contract by the government on two points:  it under-delivered stipulated amounts of 
military freight due to geopolitical changes caused by the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, 
and undercompensated the company for the requisition of its vessels for the 
transportation of troops during Russian military operations in Manchuria in the same 
period. In the Vickers case, the Russian government was deemed by the British 
company to have penalised the company excessively for the delayed construction of 
the Riurik, contrary to the stipulations in the contract agreed in 1907. In both 
instances the British companies were able to obtain redress from the Russian 
government, but as the following section demonstrates, this process was strewn with 
significant obstacles. 
 
These two studies are supplemented by a selection of cases concerning British 
companies involved in the Caucasian oil industry and shipping on the Black Sea. 
These sectors were particularly sensitive for the Russian government since it viewed 
these oil- rich lands as a particularly important national asset. The companies in 
question also commonly sought the aid of British diplomatic staff in their disputes 
with the Russian government, whose intervention provides a unique perspective of 
the provision of redress for British companies. 
 
Both of the major case studies covered by this chapter involved the intersection of 
the lawful observation of contracts and the interests of various departments of the 
Russian government, generally characterised as being in the interest of the Russian 
state as a whole. Although an attempt was made by Witte and the Ministry of 
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Finance to make the provision of redress to foreign companies dependent upon the 
law, discussions of contextual considerations of state interests in the cases played a 
significant, if not decisive role in the interpretations of the relevant contractual 
stipulations involved in each case. 
 
The law on government contracts in Imperial Russia was first codified, along with 
laws on property, by M.M. Speranskii between 1825 and 1830 in an attempt to 
contribute to the development of a modern economy.93  A fairly standardized system 
of contract law therefore existed in the period 1892-1914 comprising a loose 
collection of legislation and rulings of various courts that had been promulgated 
before 1826, and in some cases as early as the seventeenth century.94 Of these laws 
the significant points were that the stipulations of an agreement signed by two 
parties, including the government, were legally binding so long as the terms of the 
agreement did not contravene the laws of the Russian Empire. Of course, given the 
multiple sources of law and the contradictory nature of the PSZ, with its multitude of 
overlapping statutes, considerable scope still remained for the negation of 
contracts.95 The historian therefore needs to examine the process by which 
companies were granted redress, considering whether contracts were disputed due to 
procedural issues, i.e. because the terms of the contract contravened a particular law, 
or whether they were disputed on grounds of state interests. 
 
6.1 The case of the Amur Steam Navigation and Trade Company 
 
In 1895 the Ministry of Ways and Communications put out to tender a government 
concession of a steamship company on the Amur River. As well as being responsible 
for the delivery of postal freight the company was guaranteed by the government to 
receive a minimum of one million poods of government freight a year relating to the 
construction of the trans-Siberian railway and other governmental construction 
                                                          
93 M. Raeff, Michael Speransky: Statesman of Imperial Russia, 1772-1839 (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 
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94 SZ Tom. X Kn. 4, 1528-53. 
95 Pipes, Russia Under the Old Regime, 298; Zyrianov, ‘The Development of the Russian State 
System’, 115. 
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projects in the region, in return for the company undertaking a stated capital 
investment in the region of five steam ships and twenty barges of a certain tonnage. 
Crucially, because this project was aimed at attracting foreign capital, the contract 
included penalty clauses for the non-delivery of this stated amount of freight on 
behalf of the government. Of significance for the following investigation, the 
contract also included a clause detailing the compensation to be paid to the company 
in the event that the company’s ships should be requisitioned for military purposes. 
 
This concession was taken up by the British company, subsequently named the Amur 
Steam Navigation and Trade Company, drawing its capital primarily from the City of 
London. According to the documents on the case presented by the Ministry of Ways 
and Communications, in 1896 the government exceeded its freight obligation, and in 
1897 it under-delivered by a very small margin. However, between 1898 and 1903, 
the government delivered on average only 150,000 poods of freight, substantially 
less than the contracted amount.96 This was due to the re-direction of the trans-
Siberian railway as a result of Russian military intervention in Manchuria during the 
Boxer rebellion in China. The Boxer rebellion also resulted in the requisition of some 
of the company’s ships and barges for the transportation of Russian troops in the 
region in 1900. Under the terms of the 1895 contract, the Russian government was 
therefore obliged to compensate the company for the non-delivery of freight from 
1897 to 1902, and for the requisitioning of its ships in 1900.97 
 
In 1903 both the Amur military council, Witte, and the State Comptroller agreed that 
the company had the ‘indisputable right’ to receive compensation as set out in the 
terms of the 1895 contract, and that the company’s carriage of private freight should 
not be considered as deductible from the total amount of undelivered government 
freight. From this point forward, discussions between the Ministry of War, the 
Ministry of Ways and Communications, and the Ministry of Finance were based on 
disputes of the company’s calculations of the amount of freight delivered, and the 
                                                          
96 RGIA, f. 1203, op. 1 d. 1, l. 5, Petition of the Amur Company to the Ministry of Finance, 9 
February 1903. 
97 RGIA, f. 1203, op. 1 d. 1, l. 5-8ob, Petition of the Amur Company to the Ministry of Finance, 9 
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distance that the freight was transported, the latter two ministries asserting higher 
figures than the company had submitted.98 Witte and the State Comptroller also 
intervened in the separate case of the calculation of the remuneration to be paid to the 
company for the requisition of their ships for the purpose of transporting Russian 
troops in 1900, both stating that the company should be remunerated according to the 
terms of the original contract.99 These interventions show the influence and effect of 
Witte’s attempts to create a defined legal framework for the provision of redress for 
foreign companies from the government, and his success in forcing the government 
to act according to the law and the 1895 contract is significant, especially in 
comparison to earlier cases from the 1890s where state interests received more 
weight in government and judicial decision making, as discussed below. 
 
Witte’s interventions in this case, however, were symptomatic of the fact that there 
was a significant level of opposition to the observance of contract law within the 
other ministries and organs of the Russian government, and that despite his success 
in enforcing the rule of law in this case, his goal of a clear legal framework for 
government-industrial relations was not quite a reality at this stage. In the case of the 
Amur Company’s claim for the non-delivery of freight, the Minister of War initially 
claimed that to compensate the company at the level of the 1895 contract would not 
only be ruinous for its own budget, from which compensation would be taken, but  
‘against the interests of the Russian government in general’.100 This suggests that 
according to the Ministry of War, specific state interests, here defined as the 
protection of its own budget, should override the law of contracts in this case; the 
Minister did not attempt to make the legal argument that the contract was legally 
invalid. It is worth noting, however, that this intervention was in response to the local 
Primorsk military council, which had previously decided that the Amur Company 
should be compensated according to its original contract, suggesting Witte’s efforts 
had a limited initial effect on local organs of government.101 
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Similarly, the Amur Company’s claim for compensation for the requisitioning of 
their vessels hit extra-legal obstacles of considerations of state interests. According 
to the company’s petition to the Tsar in 1903 the local military council set the levels 
of remuneration for all ship owners on the Amur well below the level stipulated in 
the company’s original contract. This finding was later reviewed by a military 
commission, which found that although the company’s charter stipulated the level of 
remuneration it should receive, the company should receive the level set by the local 
military council.102 When a separate commission convened for the purpose of 
transporting Russian troops to the Far East suggested that the company should be 
paid compensation as per its original charter, the Minister of War overruled this 
decision on the grounds that it was impermissible to do so for the entire fleet of the 
Amur Company; and that in any case the levels of remuneration should be lowered 
because the company had recourse to private shippers to carry out their freight 
obligations.103 
 
The Minister of War objected to Witte and the State Comptroller’s intervention in the 
case, asserting first that his ministry and its local organs had the right to set the 
amount of compensation in cases of requisitioning, and secondly that the amount of 
compensation to be given to the company would be ‘unprofitable and ruinous’ for the 
ministry, and unnecessary because by 1903 the company had effectively ceased to be 
operational. 104 Other extra-legal arguments, unrelated to the provisions of the 1895 
contract, were advanced, such as the assertion by the Primorsk military council that 
the water levels of the Amur and Shilk rivers were very low during the navigation 
season of 1900 making freight operations particularly unprofitable that year. On this 
basis Lieutenant-General Nidermisler suggested a reduction of 2 per cent of the 
contracted figure of compensation.105 
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As a result, although the Amur Company was eventually awarded compensation for 
the breaches of contract that occurred as a result of the Russian government’s 
military activities in Manchuria to the levels stipulated in the original contract, there 
was still considerable opposition to the adhesion to the contractual obligations of the 
Russian government towards the company. Led primarily by the Ministry of War, 
these objections were not concerned with the technical terms of the contract itself 
and whether they contravened Russian law. Instead they were based on concerns that 
originated from the ministries’ perception of the best interests of the state, which 
here can be equated with protection of the military budget in the Far East. 
Immediately after Witte’s efforts to attract foreign capitalists, this case suggests that 
there was still significant conflict between Russian ministries over the state’s ability 
to act arbitrarily in pursuit of its interests. 
 
The resistance of some government departments to the implementation of the law in 
this case arose due to problems caused by jurisdictional crossovers in the Russian 
government. As we have seen, Russian commercial law gave various different 
ministries considerable oversight of the affairs of foreign companies, and this was 
extended to questions over the provision of redress to them. Although the case of the 
Amur Company was eventually determined by Witte and the State Comptroller, a 
substantial role in the process was played by the local Primorsk military councils. 
The company’s initial claims for redress for the non-delivery of freight and the 
requisition of their ships were handled by the Primosrk military council and a 
specially convened military council respectively. Further appeals to the Ministry of 
Finance and the State Comptroller were constantly hampered by the interference of 
the Ministry of War, which was vehemently opposed to the Amur Company 
receiving compensation in line with the stipulations in its contract. 
 
Even within the Ministry of War there appeared to be jurisdictional crossovers 
between the main office and the local commissions. For example, the commission 
headed by Colonel Volkivinsky found that the company should have been subject to 
special considerations in the determination of remuneration for the confiscation of its 
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vessels in 1900 to 1901, but was subsequently overruled by the Ministry of War.106 
The number of government agencies involved in the calculation of the losses 
incurred by the Amur Company as a result of the change of direction of the Trans-
Siberian railway is also instructive in this matter; although the contract was 
originally under the purview of the Ministry of Ways and Communications, the final 
committee for the decision was composed of members of this ministry as well as the 
office of the State Comptroller, the Ministry of Finance and the management of the 
Trans-Siberian railway.107 
 
 
6.2 Vickers Ltd and the construction of the ‘Riurik’ 
 
A similar process of negotiation between the perceived interests of the state and the 
necessity of following the law on contracts arises from the case of Vickers’s 
construction of the cruiser Riurik, which was agreed in 1907 and finally settled in 
1913. In this case, state interests worked in both directions between the various 
ministries involved; while the Admiralty was keen to protect its budgets, it seems 
that other elements of the Russian government including the State Comptroller 
sought to secure preferential treatment for the company, on the grounds that it 
possessed an important relationship with the Russian government for the supply of 
arms and associated expertise within the context of growing international tensions 
before the outbreak of the First World War. However, in this case, the Russian 
government followed the rule of law more consistently than it had done in the case of 
the Amur Company. However, there remained some key continuities, such as the 
problem of overlapping jurisdictions within the Russian government leading to 
inconsistent action in the case, and the British company attempting to appeal to state 
interests in their pursuit of redress. 
 
Vickers, after an existing export relationship to Russia, was originally awarded the 
contract to construct the Riurik in the aftermath of the sinking of the Russian Far 
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Eastern fleet at Tsushima in May 1905. However, due to the Russian government’s 
insistence on the use of Russian materials and Russian labour, the construction of the 
ship was significantly delayed. As these delays were mostly outside of Vickers’ 
control, and lay, as the company argued, with Russian managers, workmen, and 
materials, the size of the penalty incurred was protested by Vickers. It was reduced in 
1913, the difference between the original penalty and the reduced penalty being 
repaid to Vickers in the same year.108. 
 
Although this case was eventually decided upon the provisions of the company’s 
contract with the government, there was substantial opposition to the adherence to 
the contract by certain sections of the Russian government on the basis of 
safeguarding the interests of the state. In particular, the State Comptroller argued that 
it was in the state’s interest to remit a portion of the fine. In their reasoning, the 
council of the State Comptroller cited the ‘exceptionally difficult’ circumstances of 
the delivery of the Riurik, and the firm’s ‘faithful execution’ of the project. Thus the 
State Comptroller saw the company’s good conduct and difficult circumstances as 
sufficient to reduce the financial penalty due to the firm by half. Here it is clear that 
the State Comptroller recognized the importance of acceding to the wishes of the 
company in part; during the deliberations on the case Vickers was in negotiation with 
the Russian government for the construction of a new arms factory in Tsaritsyn, 
clearly there were elements within the Russian government that felt that as a result 
Vickers should get special treatment as far as the rule of law was concerned. 
 
On the other hand, the Admiralty advocated preserving the original level of the 
financial penalty applied to Vickers, on the grounds of protecting its budgets, while 
also making reasoned legal arguments relating to the contract itself. The Admiralty 
insisted on applying the letter of the contract and including the initial delay in the 
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fine while the State Comptroller attempted to have the fine only imposed from the 
time it took to make corrections to the towers.109 This reasoning was eventually 
supported by the State Comptroller and the Ministry of Justice in 1913, on the 
grounds that to not adhere to these conditions would be against the law of contracts, 
given that it concerned the implementation of the terms of the 1907 contract.110 
However, while the actions of the State Comptroller does indicate a respect for the 
necessity of upholding the law on contracts, in its final verdict on the case, ruling 
against a reduction in the size of the financial penalty, the State Comptroller pointed 
out that such a reduction would not be in the interests of the treasury.111 These 
developments represents two conflicting conclusions: while the State Comptroller 
eventually overruled any attempt by other government agencies or the company itself 
to reduce the financial penalty due to the recognition of binding contractual 
regulations, it also stated that to do so would be against the interests of the treasury, 
implying a level of flexibility where government interests were involved. This 
suggests that the Admiralty in the Vickers case pursued the strict implementation of 
the contract for purely altruistic reasons of adherence to the rule of law. 
 
Vickers were therefore unable to obtain any form of redress for the delay that they 
felt had been applied to them in a harsh or unfair manner, although the final 
resolution of the case was governed by the law on contracts. However, there was still 
a persistent trend from the earlier period of deference to state interests, both by the 
State Comptroller and the admiralty. In particular, the track record of hostility to 
foreign companies by the various ministries concerned with military matters where 
their interests clashed is a particularly significant continuity from the case of the 
Amur Company and the attitude of these ministries before Witte’s reforms. 
 
In contrast to the case of the Amur Company a more legalistic relationship between 
the ministries involved in the Vickers’ case existed. In a letter to the governing 
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Senate in August 1912, the Minister of the Marine stated that on the basis of the most 
recent statues of the management of the Naval Office the Senate did not have the 
ability to cancel such agreements made between the admiralty and third parties. 
Secondly, the referral of the case from the office of the State Comptroller to the 
Senate for review was incorrect, as the case did not meet the requirements for referral 
to the Senate set out in Statute 969 of the laws of the institution of the governing 
Senate, as the case did not require any clarifications of the general law. Thirdly, the 
case clearly fell within the remit of the Admiralty, and according to the guidelines on 
the matter cases did not qualify for removal to the Senate when the Admiralty was 
authorised to make a judgement on the case. Thus the Minister of the Marine in 
attempting to preserve the purview of his department drew on the institutional statute 
law of the governing Senate.112 
 
6.3 Caucasian Oil and Siberian Mining 
 
The Caucasian oil industries represented a similar intersection between state interests 
and the need to encourage foreign investment. Especially at the beginning of the 
period in question Russia lacked the domestic capital needed to exploit the oil 
reserves in the Caucasus and Witte recognised the need to employ foreign capital. 
However, the Russian government clearly had no wish to allow Russia’s reserves of 
natural resources to fall entirely into the hands of foreign capitalists, and legislated 
strictly against foreign landholding in these areas. Moreover, the Caucasian oil fields 
were located in a strategically sensitive area close to the Ottoman and Persian 
borders. Although foreign and British capital moved into these regions much later, 
the Siberian mining industry exhibited a similar problem. While foreign capital was 
encouraged to enter these regions in order to develop Russia’s natural resources, 
geopolitical tensions in the Far East led the Russian government to attempt to restrict 
the activity of foreign companies in Siberia. Throughout the period 1892-1914, the 
Russian government therefore acted according to a complex consideration of 
adherence to the rule of law and the protection of state interests when resolving 
disputes with British companies in these industries. The general picture that emerges, 
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however, is one that follows the trends of the above two cases. During the 1890s, the 
government decided cases based upon state interests and to a very limited extent on 
the law, whereas after the industrial downturn cases were decided according to the 
law. 
 
Before Witte’s modernising reforms, the government in the oil-producing regions of 
the Caucasus clearly prioritised government interests above those of the law. For 
example, the British Anglo-Petrovsk Oil Company was unable to expand its share 
capital and land holdings in 1899; because, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
informed Witte, notwithstanding provisions allowing foreigners to engage in the oil 
business in the Dagestan region on the production of trustworthy certificates, such an 
increase in share capital and land for a foreign company was ‘not appropriate to our 
interests in the region.’113 
 
Such adhesion to state interests as opposed to the law before Witte’s reforms led to a 
sense that the provision of legal redress was unobtainable, especially when it clashed 
with state interests. In the case at the beginning of the period involving the sinking of 
the British ship Penyghent by the Russian ship Tsar, both British diplomats and 
consuls believed that the decision in the case at the local court at Odessa, and the 
outcomes of appeals lodged at the fourth department of the Senate and the office of 
petitions were motivated by preserving the interests of the Russian state. According 
to the British consul at Odessa, both ships were found to be at fault by the courts 
because the owners of the Tsar, the Russian Steam Navigation and Trade Company, 
had very close ties to the Russian government. The company was originally set up to 
arrange pilgrimages to the Holy Land and had not lost its benefaction and ties to the 
Romanovs.114 According to Stevens, ‘It was quite evident that the Tzar was entirely 
to blame, nevertheless both steamers were condemned in order to prevent the owners 
of the Penyghent from recovering damages from the Russian Company.’ He hoped 
that diplomatic influence could be exercised in St Petersburg, otherwise in his 
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opinion, ‘a grave miscarriage of justice would occur’.115 Further, according to 
Stevens, the Russian company had also been involved in two other incidences where 
the courts had arrived at conclusions favourable to the Russian company, at odds 
with the facts of each case. 116 Clearly, Stevens believed that state interests had 
overridden the observance of the law in these cases, and this opinion was shared by 
Lascelles in 1895.117 While it is difficult to analyse the legal validity of the rulings of 
the Russian courts on the basis of diplomatic reports, these reports show that the 
primacy of state interest over the law before Witte’s reforms led to a reduction in 
confidence in the effectiveness of justice and of obtaining redress in Russia due to 
the interaction of state interests and the law in its determination. 
 
This situation can be contrasted to disputes between British companies and the 
Russian government in the Siberian mining and oil industries in the period after 
Witte’s reforms and economic downturn. British companies, while clearly being 
unaware of the procedures involved in the provision of redress, were generally 
treated according to the law. The Russian government, although taking a less friendly 
line towards foreign capital, also dealt with disputes with British companies 
according to the law much more commonly than in the 1890s.  For example, in 1909 
the British management of the Troitzk and Orsk goldfields petitioned the Russian 
government to dispute tax assessments on their properties in 1906, before their 
investments had begun to turn profits.118 The Russian government, however, ruled 
that Russian law had been applied in these cases, and that further diplomatic efforts 
by British diplomatic and consular staff on behalf of the company were beyond the 
competence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, because the mines were subsidiaries 
of the British companies held by local Russian subjects.119 William Goldie in his 
request for diplomatic assistance with the case described the application of the law as 
arbitrary. However, the response of the foreign office was that his company ought to 
have been aware of the legal tax frameworks in place in Russia at the time; 
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From the petition presented it appears that the ground for complaint is not so much the 
failure to apply the law as laid down as that in this particular case its literal application 
has borne hardly on your companions. If this appears to be the case Sir E. Grey fears 
that it will not be possible for HMG to intervene to protect your companies from the 
result of a situation which they might have foreseen.120 
However the initial application of the company for diplomatic assistance in the case 
belies a certain lack of confidence in the legal process for the provision of redress, 
and that state interests in this case, i.e. the collection of taxes, had overridden the 
correct application of the tax laws in question. This suggests a certain continuity in 
the expectations about the Russian government’s treatment of foreign businesses 
from the 1890s as detailed in the previous chapter. 
 
Disputes between British companies and the Russian government also became 
centred on questions of legal jurisdictions, as opposed to state interests. For example, 
in 1909 the British Spassky Mining Company contested the tax assessment carried 
out on its properties by the regional mining board. The company argued that the 
assessment was too high, due to its inclusion of the necessary infrastructure for its 
workers, and that the evaluation should have been carried out in conjunction with the 
mining engineer and the district tax inspector.121 The argument of the company, that 
infrastructure such as dormitories, the hospital and the school had been included in 
the assessment against the regulations on the subject, was also an argument based on 
jurisdiction. In this region it was therefore unclear which authorities had jurisdiction 
over tax evaluations, something which the company clearly felt it was able to 
challenge the government on. It was subsequently decided that the Akmolinsk 
regional mining board did have the authority to carry out property evaluations by the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, and that if the company wished exceptions to be made 
for its building it should apply for a motion in the Omsk district court.122 
 
Jurisdictional crossovers commonly caused conflict for companies in the oil industry 
with local government in the process of granting British companies authorisation to 
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begin work in Russia. This was a particular problem for the companies operating 
under the umbrella of the Anglo-Maikop Corporation, whose operations were 
delayed due to such jurisdictional crossovers. According to the progress reports from 
June 1911, officials of the local Oblast administration delayed authorising company 
charters because they were unhappy about the wide range of powers that they granted 
to the companies, and that further they needed to be approved by the Tersk Cossack 
administration. The author of the report, C. Agnew, stated that he did not know why 
this should be the case, and that there was considerable uncertainty as to when their 
permits would be issued, ‘and that the ways of the chancelleries in the Caucasus are 
mysterious’.123 While the legal requirements of the permission system for foreign 
companies in this region may have seemed difficult to comprehend for British 
companies, it is important to note that in the above cases the government agencies 
involved followed the law, and did not refuse applications based on state interests. 
 
While it is evident that after Witte’s reforms cases were decided on the basis of the 
rule of law, for example the law of contracts, there was a convoluted process of 
considerations of state interests, usually fiscal but also geopolitical, that had a 
bearing on the outcome of the case in each incident. Thus it is evident that British 
companies never developed confidence in the infallibility of legal means of redress 
from the Tsarist government, although it appears that the Russian government 
behaved in a more legalistic way after his departure. This can be further examined 
through an analysis of the strategies used by British diplomats, consuls and 
businessmen in order to pursue redress from the Russian government. 
 
6.3 Strategies for gaining redress 
 
That Witte’s reforms had a limited effect on the pervasiveness of a legal system of 
regulation for the provision of redress is evidenced by the strategies that the British 
companies in question followed in order to gain redress. Even after the introduction 
of Witte’s new policies around 1900, British companies, and to a lesser extent 
diplomatic and consular staff, still attempted to impress upon the relevant sections of 
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the Russian government the interests to the Russian state in providing redress to the 
companies.  Such attempts usually consisted of statements to the effect that a positive 
outcome for the British company would encourage more British investment in 
Russia. Linked to this, common among all of these strategies used by British 
companies was an appeal for arbitrary intervention to the respective ministries, as 
opposed to an elaboration of a legal argument. 
 
British companies and diplomatic staff attempted to highlight the significance of 
positive outcomes for British companies on the Anglo-Russian trade relationship and 
British direct investment in Russia throughout the period. Companies, in particular, 
rarely advanced legal arguments, even after 1906 when a legal argument might have 
been more successful, due to the Russian government’s orientation towards 
regulation and lawfulness over the granting of arbitrary largesse. In the case of the 
Penyghent, British diplomats emphasised the benefit of a ruling in favour of the 
Penyghent in terms of an improvement in Anglo-Russian trade. When the case was 
transferred from the Senate to the admiralty for a professional opinion on the case, 
the British ambassador, Robert Morier, called the attention of the Minister of the 
Marine unofficially to ‘the extreme gravity of the case and its bearing on the 
international laws in question’. Morier attempted to persuade the Minister of the 
Marine of the importance that the case had for the future of British and Russian 
trade, calling for the international rules of the road at sea to be, ‘administered in good 
faith and without bias by the local court called upon to carry out an invidious task as 
that of administering international laws’. This would, according to Morier, be in the 
interests of the furtherance of profitable commercial relations between the two 
countries, 
Every decision arrived at in this manner, even to the detriment of the country whose 
tribunals decide strictly in accordance to the rules, is so much solid ground to be 
gained for the future regular establishment of the rules. It is clear that this is of 
importance in regard to any maritime state, but now infinitely more does it apply to a 
country of the maritime significance and importance of Russia in the present, and still 
more in the future. A sound judgement laid down by the state of this magnitude may 
be of infinite use, just as an unsound precedent may cause infinite mischief.124 
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Morier evidently believed that the Russian legal system in relation to foreign 
commercial interests was perceived to be very weak and susceptible to pressure from 
the state, and that an unfair ruling in this particular case would do much to 
exacerbate this. While he mentioned international laws of the sea, which were 
incorporated into the Russian commercial code, he emphasised the benefits that 
would be gained by the state in following these regulations, suggesting a level of 
flexibility surrounding these regulations. 
 
A very similar process was followed by R. Howard, when the case of the Penyghent 
was rejected by the Senate, and as a result formed the basis of a petition to the Tsar. 
Howard met the director of the Office of Petitions, General Richeter, and attempted 
to persuade him, in a similar fashion to Morier, of the importance of the international 
regulations involved to Russian and British commerce. After explaining at length 
how the decision of the Senate circumvented these rules by assigning more weight to 
an erroneous translation of the order ‘Stand By’ by the crew of the Penyghent than 
the incorrect course correction and incorrect signals given by the Tsar, Howard 
explained the positive effect of a decision that favoured the British ship. 
His Excellency received me on the 10th instant, when I told him that two petitions had 
been presented within the last few days to the emperor in the case of the Penyghent vs. 
the Tsar, which were of interest to me not simply on account of the nationality of the 
petitioners but likewise from an international point of view, I had of course no 
intention to intervene between his majesty and the petitioners, but His Excellency... to 
ask permission to bring the case to his notice in a private and unofficial manner.125 
Therefore British diplomatic action taken on behalf of the company in this case 
tended to aim at attempting to persuade the various ministers involved in the case of 
the importance to Russia’s commercial interests of a positive ruling for the British 
company. Although the argument was effectively for the upholding of the rule of law 
and its effect on Russia’s international trade, it is significant that this was purely 
couched in terms of the interests for the state and no purely legal argument was put 
forward. 
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A similar tactic was followed by the Amur Steam Navigation and Trade Company 
and British diplomats acting on their behalf. Although the company in its petitions 
pointed out specific areas where the government had acted against the law, it also 
attempted to appeal to state interests by highlighting the benefits to the state that 
would be gained by a fast and favourable provision of redress. The initial petition 
seems to suggest that upon the conclusion of the initial contract with the government, 
the administration and its shareholders had placed a significant amount of trust in the 
Russian government to follow through in their obligations under the contract. This is 
heavily emphasised in the first section of the petition, which details the belief among 
the shareholders and the administration of the company of the commercial viability 
and of the significant costs and resulting credit obligations the company had 
undertaken to furnish the required ships and barges. Therefore, the petition also 
appealed on the basis of the dissatisfaction of foreign creditors, and implying the 
poor affect delays in the compensation of the company may have on the standing of 
Russian investments. The administration of the company claimed that the position of 
foreign investors was ‘desperate’, given the fact that none of the foreign creditors 
had received any dividends of profits from their investment, and that the price of 
foreign shares had fallen dramatically due to the slowness of the government’s 
actions in providing redress for the company’s losses. As a result, the foreign 
creditors ‘could not be expected to support the administration for any great length of 
time’, and therefore the company requested the ‘timely receipt of the sums that the 
company should receive from the treasury’, essentially requesting that the Tsar 
intervene in the legal process of granting redress to the company. 126 The company 
also attempted to draw attention to the positon of foreign creditors in a later 
statement to the commission in May 1903, stating that the administration had found 
it necessary, in the interests of saving the business, to pay the wages of workers and 
outstanding debts of the company instead of paying dividends to stockholders and 
interest to foreign creditors.127 
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The case was drawn to the attention of the British embassy in St Petersburg by 
Colonel Denny, one of the main financiers of the company in 1899. British 
diplomatic assistance and representations to the Russian government were similar to 
the representations of the company in that they emphasised the benefit to the Russian 
state of a favourable outcome for the British company. Hardinge reported that when 
he discussed the subject to Witte, he called Witte’s attention to the effect that a 
reasonable settlement would have on Witte’s plans to attract foreign capital to 
Russia: 
I also spoke to him generally in the sense of Mr. Denny’s view that Monsuier Witte’s 
well known desire to attract British capital to productive undertakings in Russia could 
best be advanced by giving no ground for any want of confidence in the permanence 
and stability of the security offered.128 
 
Hardinge does not seem to have put forward any sort of legal argument on the basis 
of the Amur Company’s contract to Witte, instead focusing purely on the effect that a 
decision in the company’s favour would potentially have on the movement of British 
capital to Russia. 
 
This theme of appealing to state interests relating to British investment redress was 
also a feature of the petition of the Spassky Copper Mining Company in December 
1909. The company’s petition stated that the evaluation had caused significant fiscal 
hardship to the company, and that the Spassky mining company was the only foreign 
venture in this steppe region, located far from the railway, had built the only smelter 
in the region, and provided jobs for several thousand workers, as well as the 
necessary infrastructure such as schools, hospitals and even a bath house. It also 
stated that this venture held the attention of many English capitalists interested in 
mining investments or speculation, implying that special treatment would benefit the 
economy of the region and the increase the inflow of British capital into Russian 
mining ventures.129 
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Benefits to the Russian economy in general were also used to justify the granting of 
redress to British enterprises. For example, in the case of the Amur Company, the 
company alleged that in 1902 the Ministry of Finance should have entered into a 
review of the level of freight on the Amur. This was alleged to have been on the 
advice of the Primorsk General-Governor, who recommended increasing the level of 
governmental freight on the Amur in the interest of developing trade and industry in 
the region.130 These extra considerations are an important part of the petition as they 
are not concerned with statute law or the original contract, but instead appeal to state 
interests in the Amur and Primorsk regions. It is clear from such content of the 
appeal that an insistence on the original contract being upheld would not be sufficient 
to guarantee restitution to the company; other factors that directly affected the state 
should be taken into account. Further, in their attempts to persuade the government 
on the importance of their claim, they emphasised the positive effect of the 
company’s postal operations on the Amur for the economic development of the 
region.131 
 
Hardinge was also involved in the drawing up of the company’s 1903 petition to the 
Russian government, and advised the company to point out that the old Amur 
Company, who held the steamship concession until 1895, had already received 
compensation for the seizure of their ships and as a result were financially healthy 
enough to continue their operations. He also suggested requesting an initial payment 
of 100,000 roubles with the remaining balance to be paid over a longer time 
period.132 This indicates two strategies of appealing to the discretionary power of the 
Tsar; on the one hand a properly compensated shipping company could be operating 
fruitfully on the Amur, and on the other hand a fiscal strategy designed to lessen the 
impact on the Russian state. Both appealed to Russian state interests, and that this 
came from Hardinge, a diplomat with a wealth of experience in Russia who would 
later become the British ambassador, speaks volumes about the importance of state 
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interests in cases of British companies attempting to obtain redress from the Russian 
government. 
 
British companies also pointed towards the maintenance of a positive working 
relationship between the government and the particular companies involved, and this 
was particularly evident in the case of Vickers. Balinskii attempted to deploy 
Vickers’ strong record as an arms supplier to the Russian government as a reason for 
the company obtaining a reduction in their financial penalty. He explained that after 
the technical committee at Kronstadt made their recommendations Vickers’ 
engineers immediately began effective works on the tower, deploying the chairman 
of the technical committee, General-Lieutenant Krilov’s opinion that, 
At the end of the test, I congratulated the company on their progress, and in the 
presence of the commander of the cruiser promised the representatives of the 
company on behalf of the Marine Technical Committee to request the 
reduction of the penalty… it is clear that the main purpose of the fine was to 
enable the admiralty to complete the necessary modifications to the tower 
reinforcements, but thanks to the energy and diligence of the firm ‘Vickers’ 
this is not necessary.133 
 
Balinskii then referred to the fact that during the Russo-Japanese war, Britain’s 
neutrality and alliance to Japan notwithstanding, Vickers continued to supply 
Russian armed forces with arms and ammunition, and were privy to secret 
information regarding their overall strength. Thus on the strength of this past record, 
the petition suggests that Vickers could be due some sort of special consideration 
given their past track record in business with the Russian government, as referenced 
above. He then made reference to an incidence of another arms company, 
Schwartzkopf, who were able to get a penalty for non-fulfilment of contract of two 
million Roubles completely forgiven.134 Thus Balinskii sought to highlight the 
positive relationship between Vickers and the Russian government, suggesting that a 
resolution that was not favourable towards Vickers might jeopardise that 
relationship, which would have been critical to the Russian government in the run up 
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to 1914. His mention of the case involving Schwartzkopf contains an appeal to the 
exercise of discretionary power. 
 
As a result of the unclear relationship between the law and the maintenance of state 
interests in granting redress to foreign companies, and further confusion caused by 
the overlaps of jurisdiction caused by the autocratic system, British companies 
appealed to the exercise of arbitrary power in their cases. When doing so they rarely 
made legal arguments, and instead sought to highlight the benefits to the Russian 
government of a favourable resolution of their case. This continued to be the norm 
even when, as the above sections demonstrate, from 1906 to 1914 a legal argument 
would have been more successful, and generally carried more weight in the relevant 
ministries. Most commonly, this argument was linked to a favourable perception of 
Russian investments and trade in Britain, a point that British companies were aware 
was complex as Russian investments began to be seen as financially attractive but 
risky due to negative perceptions of the Russian government in Britain. However, 
they also took the form of highlighting the positive economic effect of their 
companies in Russia, and in the case of Vickers, their important role in Russian 
defence industries. 
 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
 
Witte’s attempts to create a law governed system of redress for foreign companies in 
Russia can be seen as only a partial success. From the case studies above, it is 
evident that the law, and especially the law on contracts, was the eventual basis for 
the resolution of disputes between British companies and the Russian government. 
However, the wider goal, to be able to construct a clear, regulated, and predictable 
system of redress, as in a law governed state must be seen as a failure. The 
considerations of various state interests constantly competed with the application of 
the law in the cases post 1900, in several ways that mirrored the situation pre-Witte. 
This was exacerbated by significant problems of overlapping jurisdictions of various 
ministries in these disputes; a product of the autocratic system that Witte had 
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attempted to impose legal regulation upon. The twin effects of the considerations of 
state interests and the multiple layers of overlapping jurisdiction between 
government agencies led to British companies pursuing extra-legal strategies in order 
to obtain redress from the Russian government, through appealing to state interests 
and the exercise of discretionary power over lawfulness. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has attempted to test the hypothesis that over the period 1892-1914 the 
Russian government began to follow legal guidelines and regulations in its relations 
with British companies undertaking trade and direct investment with Russia. In order 
to test this hypothesis, Russian law and economic policy was analysed in order to 
better understand the legislative and regulatory framework, and to better understand 
the relationship between commercial law and the legal basis of economic policy. In 
order to further understand the ways in which the Russian government put this policy 
and law into practice, this thesis tracked the development of British investment in 
Russia, including the amount of capital invested, where it was invested, and in which 
industries it was invested. It also attempted to analyse these trends and connect them 
to investor perceptions of the Russian government among British business interests, 
in order to investigate the effect that Russian business interests had on British 
perceptions of the Russian market. Finally, it investigated the experience of British 
companies in the Russian market, how they interacted with British diplomatic 
interests and the Russian government, and whether this indicates that the Russian 
government followed the rule of law and economic regulations in dealing with 
British business in Russia throughout the time period in question. 
 
It finds that there was a significant change in the development of Russian economic 
policy and treatment of foreign companies after the industrial downturn of 1900-
1904. Before this period, the Russian government under Witte attempted to attract 
British capital to Russia using a system of industrialisation and offering a system of 
special concessions and privileges to British companies. At the same time, the 
Russian government acted arbitrarily and extra legally in order to protect their 
geopolitical and material interests. After the industrial downturn of 1900-1904, the 
Russian government attempted to engage with British businesses in a more regulated 
manner. Although the Russian government no longer favoured foreign investment to 
the extent that it did under Witte, in attempting to regulate the activities of foreign 
companies it abandoned the arbitrary system under Witte and enforced laws and 
regulations in a more consistent manner. However, this had little impact on British 
investment decisions; although British investment in Russia increased sharply after 
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the economic depression and the government’s switch to a more regulated system, a 
closer analysis of the patterns of British investment and the way in which British 
companies interacted with the Russian government indicates that British companies 
invested in Russia due to the potential profits. Government policy did, however, 
produce some changes in how British companies attempted to gain redress, and there 
is evidence that in the second half of the period in question there was a recognition of 
a more law based relationship between government and industry, although this did 
not translate into any effect on investment decisions. 
 
Russian commercial law and economic policy 
Russian commercial law went through very few moderations in the period in 
question, but the body taken as a whole is of significance for the study of the 
relationship between the government and foreign investment. Russian commercial 
law gave significant arbitrary power over the affairs of foreign companies to the 
Russian government, specifically requiring foreign companies to apply for official 
permission from various government agencies in order to incorporate, begin 
operations, change various aspects of their business operations, and in order to 
liquidate or amalgamate. The law also gave the Russian government other 
discretionary powers such as the ability to revoke a company’s permission to operate 
in Russia without notice or reason. Foreign companies were also severely 
disadvantaged in comparison to native companies, for example in bankruptcy 
proceedings. Further strengthening the hand of the Russian government was the lack 
of well-educated and organised lawyers available in commercial cases, as 
traditionally these were taken by advocates that did not belong to the Russian bar. 
 
Although the majority of this body of commercial law was not updated during the 
period in question, some significant aspects were updated following the expansion of 
British capital into the Siberian mining and Caucasian oil industries, as well as 
regulatory changes following the industrial downturn of 1900-1904. New laws 
introduced into the oil industry after 1904 were intended to introduce increased 
regulation and government control over foreign oil companies, but effectively 
introduced much clearer rules and regulations surrounding their operation. Although 
these developments were not replicated in any other industries, they indicate a 
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significant advance in the rule of law and a movement away from business-
government relations being based on the discretion of officials. 
 
At the same time, Russian economic policy evolved over the period to move away 
from the exercise of discretion over the encouragement of foreign companies towards 
the stricter application of Russian law. Although this was due to anti-foreign 
enterprise tendencies among members of the Russian government, this translated into 
a legal environment that was to an extent more governed by the consistent 
application of the law. Although Witte had stressed the importance of this in his 
private correspondence with Nicholas II, it is evident that he was not able to put 
these ideas into practice during his tenure as Minister of Finance. Evidently, it took 
the industrial downturn of 1900-1904 for Russian economic policy to become more 
regulated, and the granting of the various special concessions and privileges became 
more limited. Thus the regulatory and policy environment for foreign businesses 
arguably became more consistent and less based upon the discretionary power of 
local officials, although many arbitrary aspects of the original company law 
remained intact. 
 
It is difficult to determine whether this was an intentional outcome or not. Certainly, 
the end of the concessions of Witte and the greater regulation of foreign companies, 
especially in the oil and mining industries, was to an extent due to the fact that many 
sections of the Russian government blamed the industrial downturn of 1900-1904 on 
foreign capital. This gave rise to the Russian government attempting to introduce 
foreign capital to Russia in a more controlled manner, hence the new regulations in 
the oil and Siberian mining industries. However, the government evidently attempted 
to put an end to the system of ministerial discretion in the granting of special 
conditions and privileges to companies, and to proscribe their activities more closely 
by law in order to avoid a repeat of the industrial crisis of 1900-1904. While this was 
intended to control the activities of foreign companies, a side effect of this policy 
seems to have been to improve the legal regulation of foreign companies to a more 
consistent basis. 
 
The pattern of British investment and investor perceptions of Russia 
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Whether this increase in regulation at the expense of discretionary power affected 
British investment and investor perceptions of Russia was the main question 
concerning the next two chapters of this thesis. Mapping the patterns of British 
investment over the period 1892 to 1914 indicated that there were two distinct phases 
of British investment in Russia, separated by the industrial downturn of 1900-1904. 
In the first phase, British investment entered Russia conservatively, and fewer 
companies were formed during this period than after 1904. British companies were 
predominantly established in geographical regions and industries that had prior 
connections to British trade, for example in the St Petersburg textile industry. 
Companies were generally structured around traditional structures, and complex 
business operations such as diversification that would have required multiple levels 
of authorisation from the Russian government were generally avoided. The 
exceptions to this trend were companies established in the Caucasian oil industries 
around Baku, and the handful of British companies that began operations in the 
Siberian mining industry. This conservatism suggests that Witte’s policies towards 
foreign companies did not result in the development of trust in the Russian 
government among the British business community. 
 
This is corroborated by analysis of British perceptions of the Russian government 
and business environment. Before 1900, the Russian government was portrayed as 
autocratic and arbitrary in its pursuit of its interests in its dealings with foreign 
business interests. These perceptions had much in common with wider societal 
perceptions of Russia in Britain at the time. Therefore, the comparatively 
conservative market penetration of British companies into the Russian business 
environment is likely to have been due to the fact that in acting arbitrarily to 
encourage foreign investment, the Russian government did not foster consistent 
expectations of how it would interact with foreign business interests in the future, 
and therefore did not engender trust among the British business community. The 
much more dynamic investment that occurred in this period in Caucasian oil and 
Siberian mining was predominantly driven by the perception of the large profits to be 
made in these industries due to the lack of domestic capital in Russia available to 
work them, as opposed to any kind of governmental assistance, although other 
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studies have illustrated that this assistance was forthcoming from Witte on an 
arbitrary and discretionary basis.1 
 
Both perceptions and the pattern of British investment changed following 1900. 
British investment predominantly favoured areas that had had little connection with 
earlier trade links, most notably the Caucasus and Siberia. The rate of expansion in 
Siberia was particularly significant; the remoteness of these regions indicates that a 
substantial change had occurred in the way in which British investors viewed the 
security of Russian investments. Similarly, British companies also adopted more 
complex structures and diversified their assets more frequently in this later period, 
which due to Russian commercial law would have required multiple authorisations 
from the Russian government. Investment in more traditional areas of British 
enterprise was far lower in this period, and this is difficult to reconcile with the 
expansion of British companies in the Caucasus and Siberia. This casts a level of 
doubt on the contention that British companies viewed the Russian business 
environment as more attractive in the period following the industrial downturn due to 
improvements in its regulation. However, this lack of engagement could have been 
due to a myriad of other factors such as the market for British goods. Certainly, there 
seems to have been significant concern among British diplomats and the British 
financial press that British companies had lost the Russian market for manufactured 
goods to their German and American counterparts towards the end of the period in 
question. The existence of complex British investments in Siberia and the Caucasus 
suggests that one of these alternative reasons could have been the case as opposed to 
the persistence of a conservative mind set among British manufacturing firms. 
 
This is further supported by a significant change in perceptions of the Russian 
government among British commercial interests and British society in general after 
the economic downturn, and the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian treaty of 1907. 
While this treaty itself was viewed as being of little commercial importance, the 
Russian government was seen to be more welcoming to British capital and less likely 
to behave arbitrarily in its dealings with British capital than before the industrial 
downturn, despite the fact that many sections of the Russian government at this time 
                                                          
1 Chshieva, Istoriia neftianago sopernichestva, 114. 
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were against the encouragement of foreign capital and enterprise. However, there is 
little to link this improved view of the Russian government to investment decisions 
taken by British companies, given that many of these investments in the second 
phase of British investment were concentrated in high profit areas, which took 
advantage of the abundance of natural resources to domestic capital. There is also 
little evidence that investment decisions were made on the basis of Russian economic 
policy, or that Russia would be more profitable because of the new economic policy 
followed by the government after 1906. 
 
The Russian government and British companies 
This proposition is further demonstrated by the way in which it can be shown that the 
Russian government acted towards foreign business interests through study of certain 
aspects of disputes between the Russian government and British businesses 
throughout the period. This study analysed how British companies attempted to 
utilise the diplomatic service in order to resolve their cases, how British diplomats 
acted in these cases, and how successful British companies were in gaining redress 
from the Russian government based on the rule of law. 
 
Analysis of the use of the diplomatic and consular service by British companies in 
the resolution of disputes with the Russian government and some of their normal day 
to day operations in Russia indicates that towards the end of the period in question 
British companies possessed a more stable set of assumptions about how the Russian 
government interacted with foreign companies. This was due to a greater knowledge 
of their legal position and the ability of British diplomatic and consular officials to 
intervene on their behalf. British companies during the 1890s expected British 
diplomats to be able to influence Russian economic policy and to be able to change, 
alter or obtain exemptions from regulations such as tariffs. This indicates a direct 
link between the haphazard and inconsistent policies for Witte and the expectations 
of British companies, and it remained common throughout the period, indicating that 
the effect of this policy was long term and that later Russian regulations did not 
affect these expectations. 
 
However, in other areas of British contact with the Russian government, British 
expectations underwent significant changes. In the 1890s, British companies 
225 
 
expected British diplomatic representatives to be able to intervene in cases that were 
before the Russian courts. This indicates that in this initial period the Russian justice 
system was seen to be very easily undermined by representatives of the Russian 
government, who could be encouraged to do so by British diplomatic representatives 
utilising personal contacts and putting forward arguments based on Russia’s national 
interest as opposed to adherence to legal norms and standards. After the industrial 
downturn and the tightening of Russian regulations concerning foreign companies, 
British diplomatic officials stopped receiving these kinds of requests, but British 
companies continued to use the foreign office in their attempts to circumvent the 
Russian courts. This particular line of enquiry therefore suggests that the changes in 
Russian policy and law did not have much of an effect on British assumptions about 
the Russian government, aside from a change in the way that they viewed the 
independence of the Russian court system. 
 
It also highlights the importance the representatives of British companies placed on 
the possession and use of personal contacts within the Russian government in order 
to conduct business successfully. Multiple requests for British diplomats and consuls 
to use their influence with the Russian government indicates the prevalence of the 
belief that such efforts could have successful consequences for businesses, and a lack 
of trust for such results to occur due to the normal, regular functioning of 
government. The prevalence of such ideas has been demonstrated to indicate a lack 
of trust in society in recent studies, and is similar to the system of blat in the USSR, 
where citizens used an array of personal connections in order to obtain various 
everyday items that were not available in state retailing outlets.2 
 
It is difficult to determine why these perceptions persisted after Witte’s departure 
from the Ministry of Finance. As the analysis of the provision of redress to British 
companies demonstrates, although the Russian government treated British businesses 
arbitrarily before 1900 the cases that occurred after 1900 tended to be dealt with 
according to the rule of law. There is a stark contrast in the conduct of the Russian 
government in the case of the Penyghent vs the Tsar, and the case of Vickers Ltd’s 
construction of the Riurik. In the latter case although certain sections of the Russian 
                                                          
2 Hosking, Trust: a History; Yoram Gorlizki, ‘Structures of Trust after Stalin’, The Slavonic and East 
European Review, 91, 1 (2013). 
226 
 
government, such as the admiralty, advocated the use or arbitrary power in order to 
pursue state interests, the case was decided according to the law on contracts 
between the government and companies. This was in clear distinction to the former 
case, and cases similar to it before 1900, where the Russian government aggressively 
protected its interests regardless of the legal ramifications. 
 
There was therefore a significant gap between the perceptions of British companies 
and the conduct of the Russian government in the cases examined especially towards 
the end of the period. Why did such actions of the Russian government, such as 
putting a stop to the arbitrary system of privileges and following the rule of law in 
commercial cases not result in the formation of stable assumptions among British 
companies that invested in Russia? Certainly, it is not because of the strength of 
underlying attitudes in Britain about the Russian government and the Russian 
business environment, as this thesis has demonstrated that they underwent a 
significant revision among wider British society and the British business community. 
It is therefore to be concluded that the Russian government was not able to foster 
stable expectations among the British business community actively conducting 
business in Russia purely through its attempts to act in a more consistent and lawful 
way. 
 
To explain this, we should return to the legal basis of the Russian government’s 
interaction with foreign companies, which gave various government officials almost 
unlimited discretionary power over the affairs of foreign companies. This body of 
commercial law was never revised or updated in the period in question. As the 
chapter on British companies’ use of the British diplomatic service indicates, British 
companies never managed to gain an effective knowledge of Russian commercial 
law and regulations. This should be viewed as a result of the discretionary powers 
given to Russian officials by the law; as for the most part they did not contain any 
guidelines as to how such power should be used, it was very difficult for British 
companies to form stable assumptions and a good working knowledge Russian 
economic regulations, despite the efforts of the Russian government to improve its 
accountability, consistency and control over foreign companies in the period. It is 
therefore a typical account of the dilemmas of most attempts to reform the Tsarist 
system; while attempts were made to introduce modernisation in aspects of 
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government interaction with business interests in order to fuel foreign investment and 
economic growth, the autocratic basis of state power was never abandoned. This 
fundamental contradiction prevented the formation of stable assumptions and the 
development of trust in the government among British business interests in Russia. 
 
Wider Significance 
Like many of the ways in which the Russian government attempted to modernise 
itself in the decade before 1914, its changing relationship with British business 
interests remained underpinned by the exercise of arbitrary state power. The 
persistence of this proizvol, which was never completely abandoned, meant that 
although in many respects the Russian government did modernise its relationship 
with British businesses, these businesses never formed stable assumptions and a 
strong working knowledge about the Russian government. Despite this, British 
companies did engage heavily with the Russian market, establishing a greater 
number of increasingly complex companies in areas such as Siberia, but this was 
primarily driven by the profits that could be obtained in Russia, and they still 
harboured many negative perceptions about the Russian regime that were based on 
the government’s use of its arbitrary powers. 
 
This thesis has demonstrated the effects of the interaction and conflict between 
different economic, political and business cycles in a specific historical contexts. The 
world economic cycle saw capital moving from oversaturated capital markets in 
developed economies to economies such as the Russian empire where there was a 
dearth of domestic capital in proportion to the natural resources available. In reaction 
to this economic cycle, the face of international business changed, with multinational 
companies adopting new business structures and financing models in order to exploit 
these new opportunities in emerging economies. As this thesis has demonstrated in 
the case of British business, these two cycles did not occur at the same time or in a 
clearly defined relation to one another, as many British multinationals fell behind 
their international counterparts in various industries. 
 
Despite the differences between economic and business trends, the main area of 
conflict between the above three cycles was caused by the political cycle, which was 
largely opposed to the other two cycles. While Witte recognised the importance of 
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foreign investment in Russia during his tenure as Minister of Finance, and attempted 
to match the government’s stance to the demands of business and economic change, 
he was opposed by a political system that favoured multiple levels of strict autocratic 
control over the affairs of foreign companies. While aspects of this system did evolve 
over the period, the underlying stance of the Russian government towards foreign 
business interests always lagged behind the state of the Russian economy and the 
requirements of foreign capital and business, such as a law based structure of 
government-industrial relations, and consistent government policy towards foreign 
companies.  
 
At the beginning of the period 1892-1914, companies moving their operations into 
Russia in increasingly complex investment patterns and new industries were faced 
with hostility from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of War, while 
receiving welcome but haphazard and inconsistent assistance from the Ministry of 
Finance. After economic downturn resulted in the government as a whole adhering to 
the rule of law in a more consistent fashion, it still weighed adherence to the rule of 
law against the protection of state interests as defined by the various ministries, often 
to the detriment of its relations with foreign capital. Meanwhile, British companies 
invested in Russian industries such as mining and oil extraction in increasingly 
modern and complex ways, which required substantial underpinning by the rule of 
law in government-industrial relations, resulting in a series of disputes that have been 
covered by this thesis. 
 
The unsynchronised nature of the above political, economic and business cycles 
suggests that the Russian government’s intervention in the economic development of 
Russia caused a large amount of uncertainty for British companies engaged in direct 
investment, and therefore did not act as a strong stimulus for economic development. 
While the Russian government began to recognise that it was important to follow the 
rule of law in government industrial relations if it was to be able to encourage foreign 
investment, its steps to do so were not reflected in the way in which British 
companies approached Russian investments and conflicts with the Russian regime.  
 
This has implications for the development of the Russian government’s relations 
with the developing middle classes in Russia that were engaged in business before 
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1914. This research suggests that such relations were progressing towards a law 
governed basis, but the government’s failure to modernise commercial law and the 
persistence of autocratic power over the affairs of companies fundamentally 
undermined the emergence of the law governed state in this particular field of 
government-society relations before 1914. 
 
Potential leads and openings for further research 
This research suggests some further questions. Firstly, it opens up the question of 
how the changing relationship between Britain and Russia facilitated British 
investment and trade in Russia. This thesis has shown that, alongside wider 
economic trends, British investment in Russia followed the pattern of Anglo-Russian 
relations during the period; gradually increasing during the 1890s, abruptly tailing 
off in 1904 when Anglo-Russian relations plummeted due to the Russo-Japanese war 
and the Dogger Bank incident, where the Russian Baltic fleet sank a convoy of 
British fishing vessels after mistaking them for Japanese torpedo boats. British 
investment after the 1907 Anglo-Russian agreement improved dramatically, to far 
higher levels than before in the period in question. 
 
There is little in the research presented here that can connect these two 
developments. The signing of the Anglo-Russian agreement did not produce a 
perception in the British business community that the Russian government would be 
especially supportive to British business interests as a result of improved relations. 
One can speculate that as the continental alliance systems began to take clearer shape 
in the aftermath of this treaty British investors felt more secure about making 
Russian investments, however this view was never found to have been articulated in 
this research. 
 
A closer examination of Anglo-Russian relations in terms of the importance of 
nurturing commercial relations between the two countries might be able to shed 
further light on the correlation between Anglo –Russian relations and British 
investment. Specifically, how did joint Anglo-Russian projects to stimulate trade 
between the two countries result in improved relations? How did British diplomats 
work to facilitate trade and investment? Studies into the British diplomatic service in 
general have shown that British diplomats and consuls became more concerned with 
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supporting British trade and investment, but how did this manifest itself in the 
Russian business environment? This thesis primarily concerned itself with cases 
where British diplomats and consuls acted on behalf of requests made by British 
companies, but did not look at attempts by diplomats and consuls to better facilitate 
Anglo-Russian trade, such as the creation of the Anglo-Russian Chamber of 
Commerce in 1909. Such an investigation could help to explain the sudden increase 
in British investment after 1907. 
 
This study has focused on many areas of British investment in Russia across a 
variety of industries, but could be supported by in-depth studies of the experience of 
single companies. This exercise has been done before by others, but these studies do 
not usually look at the company in question’s relations with the Russian regime, 
instead focussing on their interaction with the market, and the social backgrounds 
and experiences of the various English families involved. Unfortunately due to the 
nature of the preservation of company records, it is rare to find the records of 
companies that had substantial dealings with the Russian regime. The use of free 
standing companies and Russian incorporation and management further complicates 
this, as the records of these companies were rarely transferred back to Britain, and 
for the most part were lost or destroyed after 1917 and the eradication of private 
enterprise by the Soviets. 
 
It also leads to questions about how the Russian government treated other foreign 
business interests, such as French, Belgian and German companies. It would be 
significant if there was a discrepancy between the way in which the Russian 
government treated French enterprise and German enterprise in this period, as 
capitalists of both nationalities were heavily involved in the Russian market. Such an 
investigation would help to further examine the effect of diplomatic relations on how 
the Russian government treated foreign business interests, and whether the attitude 
that it adopted towards British businesses in the period after 1904 was due to 
improved relations or due to a commitment to the upholding of the law and acting 
consistently. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table 1: British Companies Established in Russia before 1892.3 
Company 
Name 
Region Date 
Established 
Products Profits 
(1902) 
(Roubles) 
Hands 
(1903) 
William 
Hartley 
St 
Petersburg 
1881 Textiles 315,000 130 
William 
Hartley 
St 
Petersburg 
1883 Textiles 134,000 180 
Henry 
Small 
St 
Petersburg 
1889 Textiles 115,772 55 
Nevsky 
Thread 
Mills 
St 
Petersburg 
1890 Textiles 5,270,30 813 
L. 
Southman 
St 
Petersburg 
1888 Leather 
belting 
113,400 389 
L. E Yates Komishlov 1891 Paper 349,000 240 
Lingard & 
Co. 
St 
Petersburg 
1881 Paper 459,000 128 
Charles 
Stewart 
Archangel 1882 Saw mill 823,600 450 
A. 
Bohtlingk 
St 
Petersburg 
1888 Metal cables 10,000 6 
George 
Easty 
St 
Petersburg 
1881 Nails 41,300 18 
L. V. Tovey St 
Petersburg 
1885 Files 30,700 75 
James 
Pulman 
St 
Petersburg 
1889 Machinery - - 
                                                          
3 TNA, FO 65/1672, ff. 285-87, Mackie to Lansdowne, 21 November 1903; ff. 374-75, Hunt to 
Lansdowne, 6 July 1903; FO 65/1671, f. 269, Murray to Lansdowne, 2 July 1903; FO 65/1670, ff. 
234-37, Smith to Lansdowne, 5 August 1903; Wirt Gerrae, Greater Russia: the Continental Empire of 
the Old World (London: MacMillan, 1903), 31. 
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L. King St 
Petersburg 
1884 Varnish 167,000 50 
The New 
Russia 
Company 
Taganrog 1869 Iron  292 
Greenwood 
& Co. 
Warsaw 1873 Machinery   
E. Leigh 
Harris 
Odessa 1884 Railway 
points and 
signals 
200,000 60 
R & T 
Elworthy 
Kirov 1880 Agricultural 
machinery 
 800 
Imperial 
Russian 
Cotton & 
Jute Factory 
Odessa 1887 Textiles  1,300 
Azoff Coal 
Company 
Rostov-on-
Don 
1873 Coal mining 3065 
(1910) 
The Mining 
Year Book, 
(1911), 601 
 
Holzapfel & 
Co. 
Sevastopol 1889 Paint  8 
 
 
 
Table 2: British Companies established in Russia, 1892-1914. 
 
Source Key 
T   The Times 
FO The National Archives, Kew, Foreign Office. 
XX XX XXXX Russian State Historical Archive (RGIA) 
 
 
Year Co. Name Location Industry Source Date Closed 
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1893 L. Knop, 
Ferster and 
Rootman & 
Co. 
Odessa Shipping 20 4 3059 
 
1894 Reddaway Co. Moscow Leather 
Belting 
Machinery 
FO 65/1671 
 
1894 W. Gerhardi Smolensk Saw mill FO 65/1672 
 
1894 James Beck 
Ltd 
St 
Petersburg 
Textiles FO 65/1672 
 
1895 F. Cheshire St 
Petersburg 
Machinery FO 65/1672 
 
1895 The New 
Amur 
Company 
Amur Shipping 
  
1896 Bromley 
Brothers 
Moscow Engineers FO 65/1671 
 
1896 The Russian 
Engineering 
Company 
St 
Petersburg 
Machinery FO 65/1672 
 
1896 The European 
Petroleum 
Company 
Caucasus Oil T >1914 
1896 A. D. Brown 
 
Aluminium 
products 
20 3 1896 
 
1897 W. Gerhardi Smolensk Saw mill FO 65/1672 
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1897 The Russian 
Petroleum and 
Liquid Fuel 
Co. 
Caucasus Oil T >1914 
1897 The Baku 
Russian 
Petroleum 
Company, Ltd 
Caucasus Oil T >1914 
1897 G. Smith & 
Co. 
  
20 4 4048 
 
1897 N. E. Bromley 
& Co. 
Moscow Ship building 
and 
mechanical 
factory 
20 4 4056 
 
1897 M. Edwards & 
Co. 
St 
Petersburg 
Glassware FO 65/1672 
 
1897 F. Hill St 
Petersburg 
Bricks FO 65/1672 
 
1897 Voronin, 
Lutsch and 
Cheshire Ltd 
St 
Petersburg 
Textiles FO 65/1672 
 
1898 Starley St 
Petersburg 
Cycles 20 4 4132 
 
1898 Shibaev Co. Baku Oil 20 4 4158 1913 
1898 Kavkaz Oil Baku Oil 20 4 4179 
 
1898 Anglo-
Russian 
company Ltd 
Tersk Oil 20 4 4181 
 
1898 W. Cuchton & 
Co 
St 
Petersburg 
Shipbuilding FO 65/1672 
 
1898 Hepburn & 
Gale 
Moscow Leather 
belting 
FO 65/1638  
1899 T. Eales & 
Son 
St 
Petersburg 
Shipbuilding FO 65/1672 
 
1899 J. Beliayeff Archangel Saw mill FO 65/1672 
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1899 Singer Moscow Sewing 
machines 
20 4 3096 
 
1899 Anglo-
Russian 
Copper 
Mining 
Syndicate Ltd. 
 
Copper 
mining 
20 4 4283 
 
1899 Eastern Oil 
Ltd 
Baku Oil 20 4 4290 
 
1899 Anglo-
Petrovsk Ltd. 
 
Oil 20 4 4296 
 
1899 R. Druce St 
Petersburg 
Retail 20 4 4300 
 
1899 Sakhalin-
Amur Oil and 
Mining Co. 
Amur Oil 20 4 4316 
 
1899 Kodak St 
Petersburg 
Photography 
equipment 
20 4 4339 
 
1899 Ural Gold 
Mines of 
Western 
Siberia 
Urals Mines 22 4 289 1902 
1899 Terek 
Cyndicate 
Terek Oil 20 4 4343 
 
1899 South Russian 
Petroleum 
Company 
Caucasus Oil 22 4 267 1902 
1899 Romani 
Syndicate 
Caucasus Oil 22 4 258 1902 
1900 The Kovda 
Company 
Archangel Saw mill FO 65/1672 
 
1900 Voronin, 
Lutsch and 
Cheshire Ltd 
St 
Petersburg 
Textiles FO 65/1672 
 
1900 The Caucasus 
Copper 
Company Ltd 
Caucasus Mining T 
 
1900 Bibi-Eybat 
Petroleum 
Company, 
Ltd. 
Caucasus Oil T 
 
1900 Research in 
North-East 
Siberia 
Siberia Mining 22 5 371 1901 
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1900 Klema, 
Gladiator and 
Gumber 
St 
Petersburg 
Car parts 
manufacture 
20 4 4362 
 
1900 Anglo-
Russian Flour 
Mills Co. 
St 
Petersburg 
Flour mills 20 4 4363 
 
1900 Balakhani 
Syndicate 
Caucasus Oil 22 4 372 1904 
1900 Grozny 
Kerosene 
Caucasus Oil 22 4 373 1901 
1900 Baku 
Kerosene 
Caucasus Oil 22 4 376 1904 
1900 V. G. Kovno 
Water Supply 
 
Waterworks 22 4 379 
 
1900 Neva Rope 
Manufacturing 
Co. 
St 
Petersburg 
Rope FO 65/1672 
 
1900 F. Cheshire St 
Petersburg 
Textiles FO 65/1672 
 
1900 Baltic Cotton 
Spinning & 
Weaving Mill 
Reval Textiles FO 65/1672 
 
1900 Wigglesworth 
& Co. 
Karachev, 
Bryansk 
Rope spinning 22 2 1443 
 
1901 Charles W. 
Gerhardi & 
Co. 
St 
Petersburg 
Textiles FO 65/1672 
 
1901 The Baku 
Wire Rope 
Cable Ltd 
Caucasus Wire ropes 
and Cable 
FO 
 
1902 Vesty & Co. Riga Butter export FO 
 
1902 Russian 
Camel File 
Cloth Ltd 
Odessa Textiles FO 65/1670 
 
1902 Birkin & Co. Warsaw Cotton Lace FO 65/1671 
 
1903 Mattievich & 
Co. 
Caucausus Waterworks FO 
 
1903 Thomas Firth 
& Sons 
Riga Steel Works FO 65/1672 
 
1904 Nerchinsk 
Gold 
Company 
Siberia Mining T 
 
1905 Anglo-Terek 
Petroleum 
Company 
Caucasus Oil T 
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1905 The Siberian 
Proprietory 
Mines, Ltd 
Siberia Mining T 
 
1905 United 
Transport Ltd 
 
Railways 23 12 19 
 
1905 V. M. Bush & 
Co. (LtD) 
  
23 12 20 
 
1906 The Caucasus 
Silver Lead 
Mines 
Caucasus Mining MYB 1911, 
655. 
 
1906 Kaneika 
United 
Goldfields Ltd 
Siberia Mining T 
 
1906 Spassky 
Copper Mines 
Omsk 
(Siberia) 
Copper 
mining 
23 12 114 
 
1906 Orsk Gold 
Mins 
Siberia Gold mining 23 12 117 
 
1906 Kutan Mining Siberia Mining 23 12 119 
 
1906 Copper 
Company of 
the Mughal 
River 
Siberia Copper 
mining 
23 12 125 
 
1906 Caucasian Ltd 
Co. for the 
processing of 
Liquorice 
Caucasus Liquorice 23 12 129 
 
1907 The Alabaster 
Copperfields, 
Ltd 
Siberia Mining T 
 
1907 The Kutais 
Mining and 
Timber 
Concessions, 
Ltd 
Siberia Mining/timber CP 
 
1907 Siberian 
Wasteland 
Siberia Mining 23 12 225 
 
1907 Siberian 
Syndicate 
Siberia Mining 23 12 229 
 
1907 Central 
Siberia 
Siberia Mining 23 12 231 
 
1907 Kluch Gold 
Mines 
Siberia Mining 23 12 232 
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1907 Russian 
mining 
corporation 
 
Mining 23 12 236 >1914 
1907 Perm 
Corporation 
Siberia Mining 23 12 242 1910 
1907 Siberian 
Vladamir 
Mines 
Siberia Mining 23 12 247 
 
1907 Chita-
Nerchinsk 
Company 
Siberia Mining 23 12 329 
 
1907 Anglo-
Siberian Co. 
Siberia, 
Urals 
Mining T >1914 
1908 Palace Hotel St 
Petersburg 
Hotel 23 12 336 
 
1908 Sugar 
Products 
Syndicate 
 
Sugar 23 12 347 
 
1908 Caucasus 
Manganese 
syndicate 
Caucasus Mining MYB 1911, 
655 
 
1908 Koalit   23 12 351  
1908 Altai Gold 
Concessions 
Siberia Mining 23 12 353 April 1910 MYB 
1911, 585 
1908 London-
Petersburg 
Syndicate 
  
23 12 361 
 
1908 Nevaya 
Central 
Siberia 
Siberia Mining 23 12 362 
 
1908 Sabunchinsk 
Oil 
Baku Oil 23 12 364 
 
1908 The Vagliano 
Athracite 
Coileries Ltd 
Rostov-
on-Don 
Mining and 
Coileries 
T January 1913 
(London Gazette, 7 
January 1913, 180) 
1908 EMBA 
Caspian Oil 
Company, Ltd 
South 
Urals 
Oil T 
 
1908 The Kyshtim 
Corporation 
Siberia Mining MYB 1911, 
799 
 
1908 Lena 
Goldfields 
Siberia Mining MYB 1911, 
807 
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1908 Mount 
Elborus 
Mines, Ltd 
Caucasus Mining MYB 1911, 
846 
 
1909 Lanston 
Association 
  
23 12 458 
 
1909 Scotland 
Company for 
the Impot and 
Export of 
Herrings 
St 
Petersburg 
Fisheries 23 12 464 
 
1909 English New 
Rusian 
Company of 
Coal, Iron and 
Rail 
Production 
Yekaterin 
Gyb. 
Heavy 
industry 
23 12 469 
 
1909 Mining 
Company of 
the Mount 
Elbrus 
Caucasus Mining 23 12 471 
 
1909 Shilkinsk 
Gold 
Concessions 
Siberia Mining 23 12 478 
 
1909 Worthington 
Steam Pumps 
 
Steam pumps 23 12 480 
 
1909 Anglo-
Russian 
Incineration 
Furnaces Co. 
 
Furnaces 23 12 481 
 
1909 Black Sea Oil 
Industries 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 482 
 
1909 Eastern 
Forestry 
Company 
Siberia? Forestry 23 12 494 
 
1910 Caucasus 
Gold Mining 
Syndicate 
Caucasus Mining MYB 1911, 
656 
 
1910 The Keya 
Syndicate, Ltd 
Altai, 
Siberia 
Mining MYB, 1911. 
792 
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1910 The 
Consolidated 
Oil Trust, Ltd 
Caucasus Oil T 
 
1910 Maikop Areas 
Ltd 
Caucasus Oil T  
1910 The Ural 
Caspian Oil 
Corporation, 
Ltd 
North 
East 
Caspian 
seashore 
Oil T 
 
1910 The Maikop 
Valley Oil 
Company 
Caucasus Oil T 
 
1910 New Oil 
Properties 
Caucasus Oil T 
 
1910 The Celeken 
Oil Fields, Ltd 
Caucasus Oil T 
 
1910 West Ural 
Petroelum 
Company 
Urals Oil T 
 
1910 Maikop-
Shirvansk Oil 
Company 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 648 
 
1910 Maikop Spies 
Company 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 650 
 
1910 Russian Chain 
and Anchor 
Factory 
 
Heavy 
industry 
23 12 657 
 
1910 Russo-British 
Company Ltd 
St 
Petersburg 
Mining 
agency 
23 12 664 
 
1910 Russian Oil 
Bearing Lands 
Ltd 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 670 
 
1910 International 
Maikop Ltd 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 672 
 
1910 Maikop 
Premier Oil 
Company, Ltd 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 673 
 
1910 Maikop Oil 
Industries 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 676 
 
266 
 
1910 Bakinsk 
Russian Oil 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 679 1917 
1910 Australian-
Maikop Oil 
Company 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 682 1917 
1910 Oil Industries 
Company Ld 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 683 1917 
1910 Maikop 
Standard Oil 
Industries Ltd 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 686 1911 
1910 Maikop Oil 
Company Ltd 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 691 1912 
1910 Second 
Sakhalin 
Syndicate 
Sakhalin Mining 23 12 693 1911 
1910 Oil Industry 
Company Ltd 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 695 1913 
1910 Maikop-
Apsheron Oil 
industriesLtd 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 699 1913 
1910 London And 
Maikop Oil 
Corporation 
Ltd 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 703 1911 
1910 Maikop 
Russian Oil 
Company Ltd 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 704 1911 
1910 English 
Company for 
Obtaining 
Mines and 
Development 
of Industry in 
Russia 
Siberia Mining 23 12 707 1911 
1910 Maikop 
Pipeline and 
Transport 
Company, Ltd 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 710 1916 
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1910 Bagran 
Goldmining 
Company 
Siberia Mining 23 12 715 1915 
1910 Company for 
Obtaining 
Russian Oil 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 718 1914 
1910 Maikop-
Tamansk Oil 
Company Ltd 
Caucaus Oil 23 12 722 1913 
1910 Maikop 
Midland Oil 
Industries 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 725 1917 
1910 Scottish-
Maikop Oil 
Company, Ltd 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 727 1914 
1910 Fergansk Oil 
Company 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 728 1914 
1910 Mynell 
Syndicate, Ltd 
Caucasus Oil MYB 1911, 
849. 
 
1911 Russian 
Anthracite 
Mines 
Siberia Mining 23 12 934 1915 
1911 Maikop Oil 
Company Ltd 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 935 1914 
1911 Russo-Kuban 
Industrial and 
Oil Company 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 939 1917 
1911 Maikop 
Mutual 
Company for 
the 
Transportation 
of Oil 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 942 1911 
1911 Russian 
Mining 
Corporation 
Ltd 
Siberia Mining 23 12 943 1916 
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1911 Maikop 
Cooperative 
Oil Industry 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 945 1911 
1911 Maikop 
Company, Ltd 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 947 1911 
1911 Northern 
Maikop Oil 
Company, Ltd 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 948 1911 
1911 Chelekensk 
Oil Company, 
LtD 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 949 1915 
1911 Inca 
 
Cotton 23 12 951 1913 
1911 British 
Maikop Oil 
Company 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 955 1914 
1911 United 
Maikop Oil 
Company 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 959 1916 
1911 Pobeda Caucasus Oil 23 12 961 1916 
1911 B. Briskini 
  
23 12 972 1913 
1911 Chitinsk 
Natural Soda 
Siberia Soda 23 12 976 1912 
1911 Northern Ural 
Mining 
Company Ltd 
Urals Mining 23 12 977 1912 
1911 National 
Products 
Company 
 
Retailing? 23 12 982 1914 
1911 Kuban-Black 
Sea Oil 
Company, Ltd 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 986 1914 
1911 Black Sea Oil 
Industries 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 997 1912 
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1911 Maikop-
Moscow Oil 
Company, Ltd 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 1135 1912 
1911 Maikop-
Shirvansk Oil 
Company 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 1304 1913 
1911 The Oil Trust 
of Russia, Ltd 
Undefined Oil T 
 
1911 The North 
Caucasian Oil 
Company 
Caucasus Oil T 
 
1911 Russian 
Ventures Ltd 
Siberia Mining T 
 
1911 Pioneer 
Company of 
Siberia 
Siberia, 
Amur 
Mining T 
 
1911 Maikop 
Victory Oil 
Company, Ltd 
Caucasus Oil T 
 
1912 The Russian 
General Oil 
Corporation 
Caucasus Oil T 
 
1912 Eggo 
  
23 12 1328 1913 
1912 Chengeleksk 
Possessory 
Company 
Kertch 
 
23 12 1325 1913 
1912 Chermoev 
Syndicate 
Caucasus 
 
23 12 1331 1913 
1912 Sakhalin Oil 
Fields Ltd 
Sakhalin Oil T 
 
1912 The Sissert 
Co. 
Siberia Mining T 
 
1912 The Russian 
Petroleum Co. 
Caucasus Oil T 
 
1912 The Tanalyk 
Corporation, 
Ltd 
Siberia Mining T 
 
1912 The Russian 
Eastern 
Agency Ltd 
Undefined Financing T 
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1912 Maikop-
Eastern Oil 
Company 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 1332 1912 
1912 United 
Siberian 
Exploration 
Co. 
Siberia Mining 23 12 1348 1913 
1912 Russian 
Anglo-
American 
Corporation 
  
23 12 1349 1914 
1912 Lewandowski 
Petroleum 
Company 
Caucasus 
 
23 12 1351 1916 
1912 Petersburg 
Company of 
Landed 
Property and 
Mortgages 
St 
Petersburg 
Banking/Real 
Estate 
23 12 1355 1913 
1912 Orenburg 
Gold Mines 
Siberia Mining 23 12 1346 1912 
1913 The West 
Caucasian 
Oilfields, Ltd 
Caucasus Oil T 
 
1913 Russian Gold 
Mines Ltd 
Siberia Mining 23 12 1810 1916 
1913 Gadhinsk-
Chelekensk 
Oil Company 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 1825 1916 
1913 International 
Russian Oil 
Industries 
Company, Ltd 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 1828 1914 
1913 Maikop New 
Production 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 1832 1915 
1913 New 
Caucasian 
Petroleum 
Company, Ltd 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 1847 1917 
1913 Maikop-
Ashheron 
Caucasus Oil 23 12 1853 1914 
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Petroleum 
Company, Ltd 
 
Table 3. Requests to the Foreign Office for Assistance in Customs Disputes, 1892-
1902. 
 
Year Requests Cases in which diplomatic 
action taken 
1892 3 0 
1892 3 1 
1893 9 1 
1894 5 0 
1895 5 0 
1896 6 0 
1897 3 1 
1898 3 1 
1899 6 4 
1900 6 2 
1901 1 0 
1902 0 0 
 
 
